Secondary school admissions by Coldron, J. H. et al.
Secondary school admissions
COLDRON, J. H., TANNER, E., FINCH, S., SHIPTON, L., WOLSTENHOLME, 
C., WILLIS, B., DEMACK, S. and STIELL, B.
Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at:
http://shura.shu.ac.uk/183/
This document is the author deposited version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.
Published version
COLDRON, J. H., TANNER, E., FINCH, S., SHIPTON, L., WOLSTENHOLME, C., 
WILLIS, B., DEMACK, S. and STIELL, B. (2008). Secondary school admissions. 
Project Report. London, Department for Children, Schools and Families.
Repository use policy
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the 
individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print 
one copy of any article(s) in SHURA to facilitate their private study or for non-
commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or 
use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain.
Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive
http://shura.shu.ac.uk 
Research Report DCSF-RR020
Secondary School
Admissions
John Coldron, Emily Tanner, Steven Finch, 
Lucy Shipton, Claire Wolstenholme, Ben Willis, 
Sean Demack and Bernadette Stiell
Sheffield Hallam University and National Centre for
Social Research
 
Secondary School Admissions
John Coldron, Emily Tanner, Steven Finch, Lucy Shipton,
Claire Wolstenholme,  Ben Willis,  Sean Demack  and Bernadette Stiell
Sheffield Hallam University and National Centre for Social Research
The views expressed in this report are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department
for Children, Schools and Families.
© Sheffield Hallam University 2008
ISBN 978 1 84775 097 6
Research Report No
DCSF-RR020
Project Team
Director: John Coldron (SHU CEIR)
Project Co-ordinators: John Coldron (SHU CEIR)
Steven Finch (NatCen)
Project managers: Lucy Shipton (SHU CEIR)
Bernadette Stiell (SHU CEIR)
Emily Tanner (NatCen)
Database designer and
consultant:
Dave Jefferies (SHU CEIR)
SHU CEIR Researchers: Claire Wolstenholme
Ben Willis
Sean Demack
Caroline Cripps
Natalie Entwistle
NatCen Researchers: Sarah Tipping
Rupert Sinclair
Project Administrator: Ian Chesters (SHU CEIR)
Centre for Education and Inclusion Research
Sheffield Hallam University
Unit 7 Science Park
Howard Street, Sheffield  S1 1WB
www.shu.ac.uk/ceir
The National Centre for Social Research
35 Northampton Square
London
EC1V 0AX
www.natcen.ac.uk
Acknowledgements
John Bigley Alan Winstanley and Richard Morse for advice throughout.
Anna Vignoles and Rebecca Allen for their data on segregation.
Anne West, Hazel Pennell for discussions on the work.
Thanks to extremely busy staff in Local Authorities and schools who still found
time to respond

CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.................................................................................... ..i-x
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1
1.1 Background....................................................................................................1
1.1.1 Key findings ....................................................................................................... 1
1.1.2 The aim of this study ......................................................................................... 1
1.1.3 The objectives of an admission system ........................................................... 2
1.1.4 Measures of effectiveness used in this study ................................................12
1.2 Design of the Project ....................................................................................15
1.2.1 Key points ........................................................................................................15
1.2.2 Objectives of the study....................................................................................15
1.2.3 Strand 1: Admission arrangements for entry in September 2006.................16
1.2.4 Strand 2: Parents’/Carers’ experiences of the application process for 2006
.........................................................................................................................17
1.2.5 Strand 3: Outcomes of the application process for entry in September 2006
.........................................................................................................................19
2 ADMISSIONS ARRANGEMENTS................................................................. 20
2.1.1 Key findings .....................................................................................................20
2.2 Introduction ..................................................................................................20
2.2.1 Secondary schools in England .......................................................................21
2.2.2 Responsibilities for admissions ......................................................................24
2.2.3 Regulation and co-ordination of admissions ..................................................25
2.2.4 The process and timing of admissions for entry to Year 7 in September
2006 .................................................................................................................28
2.2.5 Parents and carers and children in care ........................................................29
2.3 Description of types of local authority co-ordination arrangements and their
frequency.....................................................................................................30
2.3.1 Key findings .....................................................................................................30
2.3.2 Number of preferences required on the common application form:..............30
2.3.3 Equal preference/default ranking authorities and first preference first
authorities. .......................................................................................................31
2.4 Banding .......................................................................................................35
2.4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................35
2.4.2 Key findings .....................................................................................................36
2.4.3 Authority wide banding:...................................................................................36
2.4.4 Banding in Voluntary Aided and Foundation schools and Academies .........38
2.5 Selection......................................................................................................40
2.5.1 Key findings .....................................................................................................40
2.5.2 Authorities with schools that select by attainment .........................................41
2.5.3 Grammar schools ............................................................................................44
2.5.4 Partially selective schools ...............................................................................45
2.5.5 Selection by aptitude.......................................................................................48
2.6 Supplementary information...........................................................................53
2.6.1 Key findings .....................................................................................................53
2.6.2 Introduction ......................................................................................................54
2.6.3 Representativeness of the respondents.........................................................54
2.6.4 Categories of supplementary information ......................................................57
2.6.5 Examples of types of requests........................................................................59
2.7 Schools that are over or undersubscribed.....................................................61
2.7.1 Key findings .....................................................................................................61
2.7.2 Introduction ......................................................................................................61
2.7.3 Subscription status of schools ........................................................................62
2.7.4 Analysis of attributes of schools associated with subscription status...........63
2.8 Oversubscription criteria...............................................................................65
2.8.1 Key findings .....................................................................................................65
2.8.2 Introduction ......................................................................................................66
2.8.3 The nature of the data on oversubscription criteria .......................................67
2.8.4 Frequency and importance of each category of oversubscription criteria ....69
2.8.5 Levels of complexity........................................................................................82
3 PARENTS’ EXPERIENCES .......................................................................... 85
3.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................85
3.1.1 Background to admissions process and survey comparisons ......................85
3.1.2 Summary of research methods ......................................................................87
3.1.3 The format of regression tables......................................................................88
3.2 How parents find out about schools ..............................................................89
3.2.1 Key findings of section ....................................................................................89
3.2.2 Comparison with 2000 survey ........................................................................90
3.2.3 Use and usefulness of formal sources of information ...................................91
3.2.4 Use and usefulness of informal sources of information.................................99
3.2.5 School visits...................................................................................................100
3.2.6 Overall use of information .............................................................................105
3.2.7 Summary........................................................................................................106
3.3 The application process..............................................................................107
3.3.1 Background to the application process ........................................................107
3.3.2 Key findings of section ..................................................................................107
3.3.3 Comparison with 2000 ..................................................................................108
3.3.4 Mode of applying for schools ........................................................................110
3.3.5 Schools applied for........................................................................................112
3.3.6 Applying for schools outside the LA .............................................................114
3.3.7 Applying for faith schools ..............................................................................116
3.3.8 Schools with special application requirements ............................................116
3.3.9 Over-subscribed schools ..............................................................................122
3.3.10 Summary........................................................................................................127
3.4 Making choices ..........................................................................................128
3.4.1 Key findings of section ..................................................................................128
3.4.2 Comparison with 2000 ..................................................................................128
3.4.3 Reasons why parents wanted a place at their preferred school .................129
3.4.4 Reasons for not applying to the nearest maintained school .......................131
3.4.5 Favourite schools that parents chose not to apply to ..................................136
3.4.6 Ordering schools ...........................................................................................137
3.4.7 Involvement of family members and actions taken......................................140
3.4.8 Summary........................................................................................................143
3.5 Parental satisfaction with the application process and outcomes.................144
3.5.1 Key findings of section ..................................................................................144
3.5.2 Comparison with 2000 ..................................................................................145
3.5.3 Offers .............................................................................................................147
3.5.4 Appeals ..........................................................................................................150
3.5.5 Satisfaction with application procedures ......................................................153
3.5.6 Satisfaction with application outcomes ........................................................156
3.5.7 Travel arrangements .....................................................................................158
3.5.8 Summary........................................................................................................161
3.6 Chapter Summary ......................................................................................162
4 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ADMISSIONS SYSTEM IN 2006:
CURRENT OUTCOMES AND MEASURES OF THE SUCCESS OF
ADMISSION ARRANGEMENTS ................................................................. 164
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................164
4.2 Procedural efficiency, integrity and fairness ................................................164
4.2.1 Key findings ...................................................................................................164
4.2.2 The co-ordination and regulation of admissions..........................................165
4.2.3 Transparency, Information and the manageability of the process ..............166
4.3 Diversity.....................................................................................................167
4.3.1 Key findings ...................................................................................................167
4.3.2 Kinds of diversity ...........................................................................................168
4.3.3 Structural diversity.........................................................................................170
4.3.4 Educational diversity .....................................................................................171
4.3.5 Compositional diversity .................................................................................172
4.3.6 The inter-connection of dimensions of diversity...........................................177
4.3.7 Reputational Diversity ...................................................................................177
4.3.8 The number of schools from which parents can choose?...........................177
4.4 How satisfied are parents? .........................................................................178
4.4.1 Key findings ...................................................................................................178
4.4.2 Results of the appeals measure ...................................................................179
4.4.3 Results as to which of their expressed preferences applicants received ...182
4.4.4 Acceptability of the school offered................................................................184
4.4.5 Results on those who expressed no preference..........................................185
4.5 Efficiency of the procedures .......................................................................185
4.5.1 Key findings ...................................................................................................185
4.5.2 Co-ordination of the system..........................................................................185
4.6 How fair is the system? ..............................................................................186
4.6.1 Key findings ...................................................................................................186
4.6.2 Introduction ....................................................................................................186
4.6.3 Segregation by socio-economic class..........................................................187
4.7 Do the current admission arrangements contribute to better levels of
attainment? ................................................................................................188
4.7.1 Key findings ...................................................................................................188
4.7.2 How admissions might impact on attainment...............................................188
4.8 Summary ...................................................................................................190
5 DISCUSSION OF POLICY OPTIONS ......................................................... 192
5.1 Direct and indirect social selection..............................................................192
5.2 The effects of balancing intakes .................................................................193
5.3 Practical difficulties of balancing intakes .....................................................194
5.4 Fair Banding ..............................................................................................195
5.5 Geographical Priority Areas (Catchments) ..................................................196
5.6 Feeder primary schools ..............................................................................197
5.7 Random allocation .....................................................................................197
5.8 Closing schools..........................................................................................197
5.9 Effects of the wider policy context...............................................................198
5.10 Subsidised travel........................................................................................198
5.11 Selection by prior attainment or aptitude and indirect social selection..........199
5.12 Faith schools..............................................................................................199
5.13 Mixed methods under local control .............................................................200
5.14 Other considerations ..................................................................................200
6 REFERENCES ............................................................................................ 202
7 APPENDICES.............................................................................................. 209
7.1 Appendix A  Glossary.................................................................................209
7.2 Appendix B  Examples of oversubscription criteria ......................................213
7.2.1 Example One.................................................................................................213
7.2.2 Example Two.................................................................................................216
7.2.3 Example Three ..............................................................................................221
7.3 Appendix C  Missing value analysis for local authorities who did not return
first preference data ...................................................................................226
7.4 Apendix D  Criteria in the composite prospectus for Coopers' Company and
Coborn school relating to specialist criteria. ................................................227
iEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Key Findings
• Admissions in 2006 were better coordinated and more effectively regulated
than in 2000. However in some areas the co-ordination role of Local
Authorities ended with the offer of places in March. After this date each
admission authority within the area dealt with its own appeals and any other
matters and no one had responsibility for the management of admissions
and appeals across the whole area.
• Appeals heard increased up to a peak of 7% of all admissions in 2000/01
and then have steadily declined to 6.1% in 2005/061
• In the sample, parental satisfaction was broadly similar to that in 2000.
Overall about 85% of parents gained their first choice school. The figure for
London parents was 72%. Nationally 93% of parents gained either their first
or second preference. Once their children start at the school, the great
majority of parents are satisfied with the school with 95% of parents who
got their first choice being satisfied and 82% of parents whose child
attended a school that was not their first preference being satisfied.
• In the sample 81% of parents said they were satisfied with the choice of
schools in their locality. Satisfaction was lowest among parents living in
London even though they have more schools to choose from.
• 25% of parents did not apply to their nearest maintained school. The main
reasons cited were poor reputation, poor exam results and problems with
behaviour/discipline2.
• Socio-economic status is widely considered to be a factor in the fairness of
admissions. The sample was analysed to find any associations between the
outcomes of the admissions process and socio-economic status. No
association was found between the chances of gaining first choice of school
and the socio-economic status of parents. This suggests that either different
groups of parents seek different things from their secondary school or that
parents are responding realistically to their chances of gaining entry to
certain schools, or both. It does not mean that there are no educational
disadvantages systematically visited on some groups rather than others. It
indicates rather that the way that inequality of educational opportunity
continues to occur is not reducible to whether or not a parent gets their first
                                             
1 Figures from DCSF Statistical First Releases
2 This is different from the number of children who do not attend their nearest school which appears to be
higher. DCSF figures supplied to the authors suggest about 50% of pupils travel further than their nearest
school. Burgess et al also suggest a higher figure see Burgess S., McConnell, B., Propper, C. and Wilson, D.
(2007) The Impact of School Choice in England: Implications from the economic evidence. Policy Studies, Vol.
28, No 2
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choice of school. There were no significant associations found between
appealing and parents’ family characteristics.
• While less affluent and less educated parents accessed fewer sources of
information there was no evidence from the analysis of those gaining their
first choice of school or of those appealing that this disadvantaged them in
terms of their gaining their preferred outcome.
• It is a misconception to think that the unfairness of admissions consists in
some groups being denied access to ‘good’ schools. It does not take
adequate account of how intake contributes powerfully to the public
perception of schools as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. A more adequate account focuses
on how the admissions system contributes to segregated intakes and how
that segregation leads to unequal educational opportunity.
• Although admissions were better regulated in 2006 compared with 2000
some schools that were their own admission authorities, in particular
voluntary aided schools, were less compliant with the School Admissions
Code of Practice 2003 and were more likely to covertly select than
community schools.
• The most highly selective LAs (those that have the highest proportion of
places allocated to children who score highest on an 11+ test) had more
socially segregated schools, fewer parents gaining their first preference and
a greater number of appeals.
• Admissions policy should concentrate not only on compliance with the 2007
Schools Admissions Code which is likely to reduce the incidence of direct
covert selection by schools but priority should also be given to mitigating
the indirect causes of segregated intakes.
• The most effective approach is likely to be a statutory requirement to take
action combined with freedom at the local level to determine what methods
will work in particular contexts. Admission forums, local authorities and
admission authorities will need to take positive action where the outcome of
local arrangements is found to be intakes that are socially distinct to an
unacceptable degree.
• Policy options available for redressing indirect selection that leads to
socially segregated intakes include a body to set the admission criteria for
all the schools in an area, fair banding, subsidised travel for lower income
families, measures to ensure balanced intakes to grammar schools, random
allocation and removing the ability to select a proportion by aptitude.
Procedural fairness with regard to appeals would be enhanced if Local
Authority co-ordination was extended and if they fully managed appeals for
all admission authorities in their area.
It is some years since a comprehensive study of admission arrangements was
conducted and considerable changes to secondary school admissions have since
been introduced. It is therefore timely to map the admissions arrangements and to
evaluate outcomes enabling us to identify any trends since 2000 and to set a
baseline against which to chart any changes following the new arrangements.
In order adequately to describe how effective the admission arrangements were
we needed to be clear about the objectives of the admissions system. In general
school admissions policy aims to achieve a fair system, improved standards of
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education and a more cohesive society. A number of dimensions of social justice
are therefore implicated. That admissions should have regard to the need for the
fair distribution of educational opportunity, the need for distributive justice, is
widely acknowledged. This is however often cast as ensuring access to a scarce
resource of ‘good’ schools. This is a misconception of the problem since it does
not adequately take account of the role of intake in the way schools are
constructed as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ and a more adequate account is in terms of avoiding
segregated intakes. An effective system would also, as far as possible, enable
parents to educate their children according to their beliefs, fulfilling the need to
protect individual liberty, the dimension of justice of autonomy. Less often
recognised is the need to avoid another form of injustice, the concern for justice of
recognition, which arises from the harm inflicted by the denigration of schools,
children and communities that can accompany the process of admissions.
From these aims the following nine objectives and three valid measures of
effectiveness were identified and these provided the foci of the mapping and the
evaluation of the admission arrangements operating in England in 2006.
An effective admissions system would:
• Provide a means by which those who consider admissions arrangements to
be unfair can refer the matter to an independent adjudicator
• Provide an effective means for parents to appeal to an independent tribunal
if they are unsatisfied with the outcome
• Provide access to clear and understandable information and criteria that are
transparent, and seen to be objectively applied
• Ensure that all parents are treated equally and schools do not covertly
select students on the basis of social status or prior attainment
• Satisfy parents’ wishes as to how and where their children are to be
educated
• Not inhibit the quality of education overall and, if possible, contribute to
enhancing it
• Not allow the greater achievement of some children to be at the expense of
others
• Contribute to social cohesion
• Not contribute to the harm inflicted by denigration of children and
communities
The measures are:
• the proportion of parents gaining their first preference
• the level of appeals
• the level of segregation of intakes.
The study consisted of three strands.
Strand One aimed to provide a comprehensive description of the admission
arrangements for entry to maintained secondary schools in England in
September 2006.
Strand Two was a survey of parents’ and carers’ to gain a representative
view of the experience of those who sought a place for their children starting
in Year7 in September 2006.
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Strand Three gathered data about the outcomes of the admissions process in
terms of the number of parents who gained a place at their first preference
school, the level of appeals and the level of segregation.
Responsibility for setting admission arrangements rests with the Admission
authority for each school. Regulation of the practice of admission authorities is
important to reduce unfair practices. Admissions in 2006 were subject to the
School Admissions Code of Practice 2003. Three mutually reinforcing measures of
regulation were in place namely the requirement to consult, the requirement to
have regard to the published guidance, the opportunity to object to the Schools
Adjudicator.
Admission arrangements
Banding  Only a small minority of schools adopted fair banding (as defined in the
School Admissions Code of Practice 2003) but it is likely that it will become more
widespread in future. Three Local Authorities in London had authority wide fair
banding. Of these two had fewer appeals and all three had less segregated
intakes than other London authorities. These systems accommodated a number of
Voluntary Aided faith schools. In two of the LAs there were 5 VA schools that did
not opt in to the banding arrangements.
Selection by prior attainment (general ‘ability’)  Selection by prior attainment was
found to perform relatively badly in relation to the objectives of an effective
admissions system as defined above. There were selective schools in 43 Local
Authorities. Twenty of these authorities had 10% or more selective places. In the
14 most selective authorities (those with between 19% and 39% of selective
places) there were more appeals, fewer parents gained their first preference and
the intakes were more socially segregated compared to all other authorities. Other
studies suggest that there is little if any compensating gain in overall educational
standards.
Selection by aptitude  There has been a small increase in the proportion of
schools selecting 10% of their intake by aptitude from an estimated 1.3% in 2000
to 3% in 2001 to 4% in 2006. Because of the rise in the number of schools with a
specialism, this small proportionate increase means that more children in 2006
than in 2000 were subject to selection by aptitude. Voluntary-aided and
Foundation schools were much more likely to select in this way than Community or
Voluntary Controlled schools. There are significant differences between selection
by aptitude and selection by ‘ability’. Nevertheless there are strong arguments to
suggest that selection by aptitude is likely to be socially selective by default. A high
relative attainment in any of the subjects (even sport) will involve expense of
resources of time and money for travelling, equipment and training. More affluent
families have more of these resources as well as more social and cultural capital.
In addition, parents from higher socio-economic groups tend to be more active in
choosing a school and to be more willing for their children to travel away from their
nearest school (financial resources will play a part in this as well) and so they may
be more likely to apply for the aptitude places. These possibilities remain to be
proven but there would appear to be a potential for unfairness.
vSupplementary information  Supplementary information forms that ask for extra
information beyond that required to apply published criteria offer schools the
means for social selection. 29% of non-Community schools ask for additional
information of this kind with Voluntary Aided schools more likely to do so than any
other type of school. The 2007 School Admissions Code now prohibits the use of
supplementary forms which ask for any personal information that is not relevant to
applying acceptable oversubscription criteria.
Subscription status  In order to help parents gain a place at their most preferred
school the published information is supposed to allow a parent to see whether the
school is over or undersubscribed (the schools subscription status). For a very
large proportion (42%) of schools it was not possible to tell their subscription
status from the information given.
Over subscription criteria  When schools are oversubscribed the admission
authority, on the basis of criteria their admission authority has determined, decide
which applicants are most eligible and therefore have higher priority. Some
oversubscription criteria and the way they are implemented provide the means of
covert selection by schools on the basis of social characteristics or prior
attainment. Oversubscription criteria are often complex combinations of a limited
number of elements. We looked in detail at the most common criteria.
The School Admissions Code of Practice 2003 recommended that authorities give
top priority in their oversubscription criteria to children in public care. This is now
a statutory requirement from September 2007. We found that 67% of all schools
had this as a high priority (either first or second place) in their oversubscription
criteria but for nearly 24% it did not feature anywhere in their criteria. Voluntary
Aided and Foundation schools were least likely to have Child in Care as any kind
of priority with nearly a half of Voluntary Aided and just over a third of Foundation
schools not mentioning them at all. From the 2007/08 admissions round onwards,
admission authorities are now required by law to give highest priority in their
oversubscription criteria to children in care.
17% of all schools put Medical or Social Needs as their first priority. 53% of
schools included it somewhere in their oversubscription criteria. Community and
Voluntary Controlled schools and Academies were the most likely to have Medical
or Social Needs as a priority. Foundation schools were less likely to do so, but
Voluntary Aided schools were much less likely with only a quarter making this any
kind of priority.
Issues relating to other criteria were:
• Siblings and Catchment areas were significant criteria for all types of
schools.
• 61% of all schools’ used Proximity but it was often used as a tie break for
when other criteria fail to differentiate.
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• 32% of all schools used Feeder schools somewhere in their criteria. Only
6% have it as their first priority. Voluntary Aided schools used this more
often than any other type of school.
• 30% of all schools used First Preference. A minority of all types of schools
had this criterion. This is now unlawful.
• Only 15% of all schools have any Faith Related criteria but for these it is a
high priority. As would be expected, the great majority (nearly 90%) of
Voluntary Aided schools designated with a religious character used Faith
Related criteria. 60% of Voluntary Aided faith schools gave some priority to
Other Faiths. 16% gave some priority to children of No Faith.
• Only 9% of all schools had Parent Commitment as a priority but this
included nearly a third of all Voluntary Aided schools. The 2007 School
Admissions Code prohibits schools from taking account of parents’ personal
interests or other circumstances, except for faith schools who may enquire
about membership or relationship with a church or religious denomination.
While there is some overlap between this criterion and faith criteria the third
of VA schools appeared to go beyond the need to establish religious
commitment and all of the schools represented in this 9% would be likely
now to fall into the unlawful category.
• 4% of all schools had criteria that gave priority to children who were related
in some way to adults connected with the school (Associated Adults) such
as teachers or governors. This too is now unlawful.
Parents’ Experience
The survey presents a picture of parents’ experiences of secondary school
admissions that is broadly positive and comparable with the findings of the
previous study in 2000.
The broadly positive experiences of more than two-thirds of parents can easily be
summarised. These parents found that information about schools was accessible,
adequate and useful. They found the application process to be reasonably
straightforward and the choice of school quite easy to make, focusing as it did on
their local school. The outcome of the process was satisfactory as 84% of
respondents were offered a place for their child at the school they had put as their
first choice. There was a minority of respondents for whom the admissions
process resulted in substantial disappointment (14% did not get their first
preference school) and dissatisfaction (4% said that they were dissatisfied with the
school that their child attended). For these parents dissatisfaction was generally
focused on the outcome rather than the process.
While parents generally felt well informed about schools, there was evidence that
some parents had better access to knowledge than others. School prospectuses
and brochures were in plentiful supply but were used more by better educated
parents than less well educated parents. The internet was playing a growing role
and parents who had easy access to the internet appeared to have significantly
better access to information. However, the most highly valued information was
obtained informally, through school visits and talking to other parents and school
staff. These trends suggest that parents with poorer educational attainment, low
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internet access, poorer social networks and poorer information-gathering skills
could be disadvantaged in the admissions process. It is important to stress that
these findings only relate to access to the available information and we found no
evidence that less well-educated parents or parents from less affluent socio-
economic groups were disadvantaged in the applications because of their lower
use of information. However, these findings clearly have relevance for the Choice
Adviser initiative.
The survey identified some notable trends affecting a minority of parents. In areas
where places were limited, particularly in London, parents were invited to express
a larger number of preferences and did so, were more likely to apply to schools
outside their local authority and were less likely to get a school of their choice.
Special admissions arrangements, which will be more restricted under the new
admissions code, increased the complexity of the process and were associated
with increased special actions, such as coaching and extra tuition, by parents who
were keen to improve their child’s chances.
Proximity to schools was found to be central to the over-subscriptions criteria of
many admissions authorities and parents had a good understanding of how this
affected their chances of success. A fifth of parents had taken account of
catchment areas the last time they moved home and those who hadn’t done so
were more likely to take other special actions to further their application. This
established relationship between proximity and application success may be
weakened as the School Admissions Code 2007 is implemented, with positive or
negative consequences for some parents’ satisfaction with the system. In this
context, it is worth noting that parents’ satisfaction with their child’s travel
arrangements was greater when the child could walk or travel by school bus than
when they had to travel by car or public transport.
Outcomes and effectiveness
The system in 2006 was more efficiently managed and better co-ordinated than in
2000. The requirement to consult combined with the opportunity to object to the
Schools Adjudicator made compliance with the School Admission Code of Practice
2003 more likely. Community and Voluntary Controlled schools and Academies
were more likely than Foundation and Voluntary Aided schools to follow the
guidance and recommendations with Voluntary Aided schools the least likely to
have complied.
Procedural non-compliance on the part of schools and covert selection is only a
part of the reason for segregated intakes. It is a widespread assumption that
parents from lower socio economic groups are being denied access because they
are less able to understand the admissions process and therefore less able to
successfully negotiate it. We found no evidence to support this. While more
educated parents were likely to access more information very few parents felt they
were lacking basic information about secondary schools and there was no
evidence that parents who were less educated had any reduced chance of gaining
their first preference. Factors such as residential segregation, the likelihood of an
unsuccessful application, and the disincentive of financial and social costs are
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more likely to explain the social segregation of intakes than an inability to
understand or negotiate a complex system.
Diversity of provision is a current policy priority. The different rationales for
diversity need to be noted and the different kinds of diversity need to be
distinguished. One rationale is to provide the means to realise the right of parents
to educate their children according to their views and beliefs; a second arises as a
pre-requisite of an effective education market. Schools are diverse in many ways.
We identified four categories of diversity and considered the evidence in this and
other studies of their incidence and whether or not it was increasing or decreasing.
The four kinds of diversity are: Structural, Educational, Compositional and
Reputational. Each school presents a different mix of these. Structural diversity
has increased significantly. It is difficult to judge whether educational diversity has
increased or decreased but the evidence available suggests a decrease. In
relation to compositional diversity, while grammar and secondary modern schools
are at the extremes of segregation by attainment, all types of schools differed in
this way. Social segregation nationally has not significantly increased since the
introduction of more parental choice in 1988 but is higher in areas where: the
population is more dense, there is a greater number of schools nearby, there is
structural and religious diversity between schools, there are more schools that are
their own admission authority, the area is one of the 14 most selective. Other
studies provide evidence that, despite there being no overall increase, social
segregation is increasing in specific localities particularly in London and other
densely populated areas. There has been no increase in ethnic segregation
between schools other than that explained by the increase in the BME school
population. The minority population is not evenly spread across all LAs, but is
concentrated in a few areas. In these enclaves there are schools where the
students are almost exclusively White and others where they are almost
exclusively from minority communities. While it is important to have identified the
extent of diversity on each separate dimension, there are important inter-
connections between them. How schools differ in reputation is extremely salient to
parents’ expression of preferences but it is not amenable to measurement.
How satisfied are parents?
Appeals heard increased up to a peak in 2000/01 and then have steadily declined.
Appeal rates are higher in Local Authorities with higher proportions of children
whose first language is not English, outside London, with higher population
density, where intakes are more socially segregated and where there is a high
level of selection. There was no evidence that some groups of parents make more
appeals than other groups.
In 2006 about 85% of parents gained their first expressed preference. This figure
has remained fairly consistent since 2000. It is also a consistent finding that the
percentage is lower in London at around 70% where there are more and a greater
variety of schools within easier reach. First preference rates are higher in Local
Authorities with lower population density; fewer Voluntary Aided or Foundation
schools or Academies and less diversity of schools; higher proportions of pupils
with English as a first language; lower rates of cross border movement (imports
and exports); and that are less socially segregated.
ix
The admission system is now more uniform across Local Authorities and more co-
ordinated. The great majority of respondents (97%) received an offer for their child
on the due date and parents’ satisfaction with the process was generally high.
How fair is the system?
A powerful driver of the social segregation of schools is residential segregation in
combination with admission arrangements prioritising proximity. Added to this is
further social sorting as a result of schools’ specific criteria and procedures.
Voluntary Aided schools used aspects of, and particular arrangements of,
admission procedures and criteria that lend themselves to covert social selection,
more often than other schools. Other studies have shown that these schools have
more advantaged intakes than other types of school.
While the better regulation in 2006 compared to 2000 may have reduced covert
selection it did not eliminate it nor greatly mitigate residential selection. Admission
arrangements such as banding, which are not widely used currently, can mitigate
social segregation especially in densely populated areas. For example,
segregation was much less in the three banded authorities than in comparable
areas.
What are the effects on attainment?
There are three ways in which admissions might impact on attainment, positively
through increased competition between schools, negatively through some
children’s higher attainment being at the expense of others’ lower attainment as a
result of social segregation and neutrally through selection to schools on the basis
of attainment or aptitude. The evidence form other studies suggests that there is
little if any increase in overall attainment as a result of competition but that some
children are gaining at the expense of others. The evidence concerning selection
and overall attainment levels is complex but it is clear that it contributes
substantially to social segregation without any significant balancing educational
benefit.
xPolicy options
Because of the central role of segregation in falling short of a number of
objectives, it is useful to consider the pros and cons of policy options available to
better balance intakes. The theoretical benefits of balanced intakes are
considerable but the practical problems arising from the complexity of particular
contexts and the need to accommodate other policy priorities are great. A
requirement on admission authorities to move towards better balanced intakes
while leaving the detail to be worked out at local level would seem to be wise. This
is the approach embodied in the new Schools Admissions Code 2007. Policy
options include a body to set or apply the admission criteria for all schools in an
area, fair banding, subsidised travel for lower income families, measures to ensure
balanced intakes to grammar schools, random allocation and removing the ability
to select a proportion by aptitude.
A number of arrangements suggest themselves as a means of reducing social
segregation. Banding is a powerful means of balancing intakes both by attainment
and social characteristics. Catchments of geographical priority areas are also an
effective means but may be less manageable or sustainable. Feeder schools have
the advantages of predictability and sustained relationship between schools but
share similar problems to catchments. Random allocation can be an efficient and
effective means of allocating places especially in combination with other
oversubscription criteria.
A mixture of methods is indicated, with a requirement on admission authorities to
determine locally how best to better balance intakes. Schools have a strong
incentive to select on the basis of social characteristics. School reputations are
gained and lost in a complex and little understood process but their pupils'
performance in public examinations plays an important part in the way the school
is perceived by parents, local authorities and agencies such as Ofsted bolstered
by comparisons in performance tables of various kinds. It is also the case that
some children offer challenges that make the day to day work of teachers harder
and more stressful (Thrupp 1999). It is therefore in the school’s interests to attract
children who are, because of their social characteristics or prior attainment level,
more likely to perform well in these tests and are easier to teach. Reducing the
incentives for schools to select might be achieved by changing the way schools
are held accountable, making more explicit the inclusive mission of schools and
providing resources according to the social characteristics of the intake. Selection
by ability/attainment is currently also largely selection by social background. One
option would be to abolish selection by attainment. A less drastic alternative is to
take effective steps to ensure equal social representation amongst those who
qualify on the 11+ test.
Some of the educational and social cohesion benefits of eliminating segregation
between schools would be lost if social segregation was reintroduced within
school. Procedures such as streaming and setting pose this danger.
A fairer and more effective admissions system will not solve the problems of lack
of equal educational opportunity or social mobility but it can make a valuable
contribution in combination with other policies.
11 INTRODUCTION
This section sets the project in the context of the debate and practical concerns
about the administration of admissions. It gives an outline of the issues at the
heart of the debate, explains why there is a need for greater clarification of what
would be an effective admissions system and sets out the contribution this project
is intended to make. Having attempted to better conceptualise what effectiveness
might mean there is a discussion of how it might be measured.
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Key findings
• The time is right, following considerable changes, for a comprehensive
mapping of the operation of admissions to secondary school and setting a
benchmark against which to measure the effects of changes from
September 2007.
• The debate about admissions is about how best to achieve a fair system,
improved education and a more cohesive society.
• The more social segregation of school intakes the less fair or equitable the
system.
• Where there are unbalanced intakes one group is gaining at the expense of
another.
• The system should not contribute to the harm inflicted by denigration of
children and communities.
• In order to be able adequately to describe how different kinds of admission
arrangements are operating we need to clarify what the objectives of the
admissions system are.
• Nine objectives are identified.
• Three valid measures of effectiveness are identified: the proportion of
parents gaining their first preference, the level of appeals, the level of
segregation of intakes.
1.1.2 The aim of this study
Admissions to schools is central to the achievement of important policy objectives
of successive governments over the last thirty years and is often the subject of
heated debate, acting as an arena where political and moral outlooks compete. It
is therefore important that there is a solid basis of fact to enrich and ground this
debate and to inform policy.
A previous study (Flatley et al 2001) sought to provide a comprehensive report of
the admission arrangements in place in all local education authorities in England
and a nationally representative survey of parents concerning their experience of
choosing a secondary school. There has been considerable change in relation to
admissions in the six years since the fieldwork for that project was done. Changes
include a new School Admissions Code of Practice (2003) and School Admission
2Appeals Code of Practice (2003), an increase in the number of specialist schools,
the introduction of Academies, the consolidation of the work of admission forums
and an increased number of rulings by the schools adjudicator. To date there has
been no other such comprehensive study. West and Hind’s study in 2003 looked
at the arrangements existing in 2001 in all authorities but did not conduct a parent
survey. There have been interesting partial studies focused on London (Pennell,
West and Hind 2006) and others which looked at a sample of local authorities
across England (Gorard et al 2002). A report by Which (Which 2005) conducted a
survey of parents but did not look in detail at the admission arrangements in Local
Authorities.
In February 2007 the School Admissions Code came into force. This code has
much greater power than the previous 2003 School Admissions Code and
introduces a number of strong measures that admission authorities must, or
should, follow. It is likely to have a significant impact on practice resulting from
requirements on admission authorities concerning such details as over-
subscription criteria, the prohibition of giving higher priority to those who place a
school higher on their application form (usually referred to as first preference first)
and information. This report aims to give an updated and comprehensive map of
the details of admission arrangements as they exist prior to these changes, of
parents’ experiences of choosing a secondary school and of current overall
outcomes and effectiveness. This will make it possible in the future to identify how
and where any changes take place. In the next section we attempt to identify the
objectives against which we will measure the effectiveness of admissions and
consider what would count as valid measures
1.1.3 The objectives of an admission system
The debate concerning admissions
When Shirley Williams was Secretary of State for Education in 1976 she noted
that she was dealing with a small, although growing, number of appeals from
parents against the schools they had been allocated. Since the Education Reform
Act in 1988, successive governments have adopted parental choice and the
development of a ‘quasi-market’ in education (Le Grand 1991, 1993; Adnett and
Davies 2002) as a means for the general improvement and reform of schools. A
number of policies have been introduced to enable parents to choose and to
introduce real competition. These include making school funding more dependent
on pupil numbers and thus providing an incentive to attract pupils, standardised
tests to enable comparison of the educational performance of the children who
attend, regular independent and publicly available assessments of the quality of
schools by OFSTED, and a greater diversity of providers of schools. Parental
choice of school, together with information about school performance, was
intended to create pressure on schools to improve their standards, because of the
risk that parents would take their children elsewhere.
Some schools were highly sought after and others parents sought to avoid. A
report in 1996 (Audit Commission 1996) highlighted considerable difficulties in the
management of the process of choice with many parents feeling dissatisfied with
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increasingly difficult to co-ordinate the supply and allocation of school places
within their area in an efficient and effective way. The problems were felt most
acutely in the large urban areas and particularly London. Alongside these
developments there was a growing academic critique that the introduction of
parental choice and the quasi-market was disadvantaging certain social groups
(Gewirtz et al 1995; Lauder et al 1999), and that schools and parents were
adopting unfair practices (Woods et al 1998; West, A., Pennell, H. 1997; West, A.,
Pennell, H. & Noden, P. 1998). There have more recently been concerns
expressed about the ethnic segregation of schools and the potential threat to
social cohesion (Denham 2001; Cantle et al 2006).
The consequences of these polices are felt acutely by the various stakeholders.
The way admission to schools operates directly affects the interests of parents
who are looking for a suitable education for their children and previous qualitative
studies reveal that many feel extremely anxious about the process3. There are
implications too for local authorities because the criteria in place, the number of
admission authorities that exist, and the system of co-ordination adopted directly
affect the ability of officers to manage the admissions process to maximise the
satisfaction of parents. For admissions managers in deeply polarised areas it
presents extreme difficulties in achieving coherent regional schools provision.
Schools can also suffer. Some are inundated with applications while others cannot
fill the available places. For the schools which are unpopular their already difficult
job is made harder and schools which are heavily oversubscribed spend a great
deal of time and energy managing the process of admissions and appeals.
Politicians in large urban areas face seasonal complaints from constituents and
this reflects on central government which has a regulatory role and has pledged
itself to ensure a fair admissions system.
The debate about admissions, while often appearing to be about arcane
technicalities, does in fact go to the heart of current policies about how best to
achieve social justice, an improved education system and a cohesive society.
However, the interplay between detail and these underlying issues is often
complex and obscure. Positions taken in the debate that reflect profound
differences of political and moral outlook, are often implicit rather than explicit.
Effectiveness can only be gauged in relation to clear objectives. Only when we
have clarified what the objectives of a system are can we make use of evidence to
judge how far the system is achieving its aims (Tough and Brooks 2007). The
objectives of an effective admissions system have remained largely implicit and
there has not been enough analysis of what they might be. Our first task therefore
is to clarify what effectiveness might mean and in the process we will identify the
                                             
3 See Ball 2003; Coldron 1999; Lucey and Reay 2000, 2002, 2007
4main threads of the debate, give a rationale for the design of the study and provide
the basis for understanding the report of the empirical work.
First objectives
We may take four objectives as relatively uncontroversial. Firstly, that the
admissions system should not inhibit the quality of education overall and, if
possible, should contribute to enhancing it. The measure of this we take to be the
average standards of achievement in public examinations of all children. However,
an acceptable average could be achieved as a result of one group performing
extremely well while another group performs extremely poorly and this, perhaps
slightly more controversially, we take to be undesirable. We therefore need to
make a second condition, that admissions should not inhibit the achievement of
some children at the cost of the lower achievement of others. Thirdly, all parents
should be treated in the same way in relation to the process and procedures of
admissions. This means in practice that every parent should have the same
access to clear and understandable information and that the criteria for admission
are transparent, objectively applied and do not advantage some parents over
others. Fourthly, there should be an objective and effective means for parents to
appeal to an independent tribunal if they are unsatisfied with the outcome of the
process.
These objectives are fairly easy to identify. However much of the heat around
admissions comes from different takes on the more complex concerns for fairness
and social justice and the most effective way of achieving a healthy society. One
way of clarifying the different positions is to understand what kinds of unfairness
admissions might seek to avoid and what kinds they might enhance (Gewirtz 1998
and 2002). Three kinds of claims to justice can be distinguished as relevant to the
admissions debate; the claim that people should be able to determine their own
lives as far as possible – justice as autonomy; the claim that resources and goods
should be distributed fairly – distributive justice; the claim that people and groups
should be accorded respect whatever their identities – justice of and through
recognition. The first two have largely been the focus of debate but we argue that
the last is just as important but has received less attention. We attempt below to
make more explicit the nature of these social justice claims in relation to
admissions.
Admissions and Parents’ right to choose
It is important not to conflate arguments as to the right to choose with the
economic arguments for choice which will be considered in later sections. It is
generally regarded that it follows from the principle of autonomy that parents
should have the right to bring their children up according to their views and
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educated. Schools are only part of a child’s education, and some countries, such
as France, consider that the home is where this kind of autonomy should be
exercised and differences of religion and values inculcated. The school system is
to be kept secular and, from the point of view of contested values, uniform. The
English system has a different history and faith schools are embedded in the
system. This diversity of schools means parents can express religious values
through their choice of school. Independent of religion, it is arguable that, since a
significant part of the education of their children is delegated by parents to
schools, parents should be able to exercise some influence on the kind of
schooling their child receives. This is acknowledged in, for example, the
opportunity for parents to be consulted on the nature of sex education and the fact
that they are allowed to withdraw them from these lessons if they wish.
Other aspects of schooling might also be important in this regard for at least some
parents – for example being educated with the same sex or having a strong
uniform policy. Whatever parents say is an important value can be claimed as a
legitimate expression of their autonomy. The principle of autonomy therefore
seems to legitimate not only what everyone would agree were personal values to
be respected but also every degree of whim or prejudice. What then is the
responsibility of the admissions system in relation to the principle of autonomy?
The exercise of autonomy as a choice of school requires that there is a diversity
from which to choose. Where all the offerings are uniform there is no choice at all.
Not just any diversity will serve however. For example a parental preference for an
educational experience that would advantage their child over others would not be
just. Differences in religious affiliation, curriculum, social organisation, pedagogic
philosophy and moral climate would seem to fit the bill. The schools on offer would
need also to reflect an adequate range of the major value positions in the
community they served. It is considerations such as these that provide legitimacy
for the calls for state maintained Muslim schools. Measures of the effectiveness of
a policy that facilitates justice as autonomy would therefore be:
• how far does it provide diversity among schools
• how far do parents have a real rather than a theoretical possibility of choice
between what the parents believe to be a reasonable range of schools
• how far is there equality of opportunity for all parents to exercise such
choice5.
                                             
4 There are important and difficult issues about what this means for the autonomy of the children as persons
but, for the present purposes, we accept the general view. See Brighouse (2000) for an extended discussion.
5 The role of choice here is different from the role it plays in arguments that stress the benefits of competition
or the claim that choice within a market offers the optimum means of distributing social goods.
6This raises some familiar difficulties and dilemmas. Firstly there may be practical
difficulties in managing a large system to provide real choice to all. Brain and Klein
(1994) surveyed parents about their preferences in one English town and found
that nearly twice as many secondary schools would be needed to satisfy all the
preferences. Significantly, they concluded that greater diversity of provision would
generate more kinds of preference and the problem of matching would have been
worse. Further, real access may be radically restricted for those with financial
resources to spare and all but eliminated for the rest. It may require large amounts
of public resources expended on subsidising travel and maintaining surplus
spaces.
Another problem is that providing principled choice of this kind may in fact be used
by parents for social advantage. For example, where a particular faith school is a
good and therefore popular school, it is not inconceivable that families will become
religious in order to gain entry to the school and the social advantages that it
offers.
Distributive justice and admissions
The concern of distributive justice is the fair allocation of social goods or
resources. In a meritocratic, and therefore socially mobile, society our level of
education would be a major means by which we are allocated to our occupations
and consequently to different levels of prestige and financial reward. On this basis
education is a major resource that would in a just society be allocated fairly. This
does not imply equally. For, quite apart from the impossibility that every individual
can attain the highest competence in all fields, if educational attainment is to serve
as the criterion for allocation, it requires that outcomes differ. Some people need to
do better than others. When, inevitably, some people get greater social and
financial rewards than others we are persuaded to accept this inequality if we think
their rewards are the result of greater ability or hard work – the meritocratic
principle6.
If however some individuals or social groups are unfairly handicapped and others
unfairly advantaged in the competition for educational success then the fairness of
the system is brought into question. But, it appears that good education is not
currently equally accessible to all. It is likely that there will be many, probably
interrelated, factors contributing to this inequality but admissions to schools is
implicated. The problem of ‘selection by mortgage’ is a good illustration. It is well
established that the higher the socio-economic level of the intake of a school the
greater the likelihood that it will be perceived as ‘good’ and popular with parents.
                                             
6 While this meritocratic argument is widely accepted as common sense the difficulty of justifying it in a
rigorous philosophical argument has been a central theme in modern political theory.  See Kymlicka 2002 for
an introduction to these debates.
7Many areas, particularly metropolitan areas, are characterised by residential
segregation and accompanying geographical distribution of wealth and status
(Cheshire and Sheppard 2004;  Burgess et al 2004; Butler and Hamnett 2007). If
the admission arrangements, such as a proximity criterion or catchment, result in
most children going to their nearest school some areas will have ‘good’ and
popular schools while others will have ‘poor’ and unpopular schools and hence
‘selection by mortgage’.
Another aspect of potential unfairness would be if some parents more often gained
access to their preferred schools than those less skilled. The evidence from
studies in England (Gewirtz et al 1995; Flatley et al 2001; Ball 2003), Scotland
(Echols and Willms 1992), France (van Zanten 2003), New Zealand (Lauder et al
1999) and the USA (Holme 2002) is that already advantaged parents, through a
combination of selection by mortgage and successful management of the
admissions process, get their children into higher attaining schools than others. On
the whole these parents are more highly educated, on a relatively high income, are
in professional or service occupations and own their own homes (Flatley et al
2001). Gaining access to 'better' schools, it is argued, is a way in which the
already advantaged maintain and enhance their social and economic position. As
we will see we found no evidence in this study that this was the case.
These arguments characterise the problem of unfairness as a result of the
systematic denial of already disadvantaged groups to gain access to a scarce
resource i.e. ‘good’ schools. If we accept this argument it follows that the objective
of policy should be removing administrative or financial barriers to achieve more
equal access for the less advantaged. The scarce resource sought after is taken to
be the educational excellence of the school - in short, high quality teaching,
management and leadership. These things are, in principle, capable of being
made less scarce, and even plentiful, by improving the quality of teachers and
headteachers. School improvement is, on this argument, an important objective of
policy and if admissions can contribute, it should be an objective of admissions
too. It is argued by those who advocate the market (see Tooley in Education and
Skills Select Committee Report 2004b) that greater parental choice would both
improve schools for all by ensuring providers (schools) improved their offer in
competition with other schools and, through such devices as vouchers, enhance
access for groups of parents previously discriminated against. Any continuing
problems, they argue, would be because we have not gone far enough in allowing
the market to operate and that greater fairness will result from greater deregulation
so that successful schools can expand and unsuccessful schools close. But these
arguments are questionable.
One problem is that, consistent with allowing the customer to decide, they conflate
‘popular’ with ‘good’ and the criterion of what makes a good school is left vague
and undefined. This makes room for the assumption that parents are choosing on
the basis of educational excellence. But, if they do not, the argument that schools
will be improved by competition is weakened. The characterisation of the problem
as one of 'good' and 'bad' schools is misconceived. An alternative approach
emphasises the fact that schools are predominantly constructed as ‘good’ simply
by the fact of their intake (Holme 2002). Schools that already have a socially
advantaged intake appear to be educationally better (because of their better raw
8exam performance), are perceived by many parents to be safer places for their
children and to offer more suitable peers for their children. These schools are
therefore sought after, including by the already advantaged who have the
wherewithal to achieve entry and who deploy ‘status discourses’ (Holme 2002) to
justify dividing schools into desirable and undesirable. The resource that is scarce
here is not educational excellence, but a socially advantaged intake. Such
segregation is a characteristic that is, necessarily, incapable of being achieved by
all schools. As Burgess puts it (Burgess et al 2007),
If the main basis for choice between schools is the quality of teaching, the
competitive pressure created by choice should have a positive impact...But
if parents are choosing schools on the basis of peer groups for their
child...the scarce resource of ‘acceptable peer groups will be rationed in
some way, and the middle classes are likely to emerge winners. p140
Each of these constructions implies a different approach to the use of admissions
arrangements to achieve the desired end. Emphasising the enhancement of
parental choice as a means of improving access to the few good schools and of
providing competitive pressure for all schools to improve, would take as objectives
an increased diversity of providers, parents having and making use of a real
choice between schools that differ in educational quality, the elimination of socially
discriminating entry criteria, the elimination of financial barriers felt by some
parents and not by others (e.g. the cost of travel to a preferred school), and a
robust policy of school improvement through rigorous inspection and monitoring of
performance. More balanced intakes and improved schools for all may be
objectives of policies but they follow as a result of them in time. Alternatively,
emphasising the effects of intake implies the adoption of policies that seek to
achieve more socially balanced intakes prior to and as a necessary pre-condition
of the proper exercise of educational choice as opposed to social choice. This
argument leads to the advocacy of arrangements that reduce segregation, a local
responsibility to monitor the balance of local schools and to act on any highlighted
segregation.
While the starting points and the means are clearly quite opposed, the ultimate
objectives may not be incompatible. An advocate of a deregulated system would
likely be embarrassed by evidence of highly segregated schools in a fully
marketised system. Equally, it would be hard for someone who insisted on the
need for balanced intakes to justify a highly regulated system that rode roughshod
over parents’ principled wishes to have some say as to which school their child
attends. Given that a perfect market and perfect equality are ideals not achievable,
the relevant difference is not in the ultimate ends but the means with which each
would seek to achieve it. Achieving balanced intakes would require a very
considerable curtailment of parental choice, particularly the ability of the already
advantaged parents to segregate their children from the less advantaged. In
addition less segregated intakes might, for example, result in longer journeys for
young people and a disconnection of the school from its immediate neighbourhood
community. Similarly, even if the optimum benefits of a fully deregulated market
might seem seductive, there would be a period of radical adjustment where the
popular schools would expand and the unpopular schools would slowly wither until
they were closed and new providers introduced. The experience of the children
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importantly however this would not be a passing phase. The energy of the market
comes from the difference between good and bad schools. It depends on a
continual, not passing, characterisation of schools as better or worse, rightly
popular or rightly unpopular. The effect of this denigration is suffered by, and
damages, the children, families and staff of the schools at the bottom of the local
hierarchy created by the market (Reay and Lucey 2000). The important point is
that, even if different schools take their turn at being unpopular, there will always
be children and schools at the bottom of the hierarchy as the least well regarded
schools. The real damage caused to children and communities is inherently unjust
and too much of a price to pay for the potential benefits. The means each would
use to move towards their ultimate aims are difficult to justify, morally and
politically. The ends may not be seen to justify the means. These issues of the
way people are perceived take us to the final kind of social justice claim.
Justice as recognition: The problem of systematic denigration
The widespread perception that some parents are gaining at the expense of others
has ironically had the effect of casting the blame on already disadvantaged
parents. A deficit model of already disadvantaged parents from lower socio-
economic groups is embodied in the various types of parent choosers in the
school choice literature – skilled choosers’ are opposed to ‘disconnected choosers’
(Gewirtz et al 1995); 'alert' to 'inert' (Echols and Willms 1992). Seeking to explain
why already advantaged parents gain access to the ‘good’ schools attention is
drawn to the difference in the financial means, organisational skills, and
educational and social resources to understand or engage fully in the process
(Education and Skills Select Committee 2004a). Authors, trying to show how
blaming schools for poor performance is often misplaced, emphasise that it is not
the staff and teaching that is bad but the children who go there (Butler and
Hamnett 2007; Gibbons and Telhaj 2007). Either way disadvantaged parents and
children are constructed as the problem together with the scarcity of good schools.
This contributes to a pattern of denigration of already disadvantaged children,
families and communities.
Nancy Fraser (1996 and 1997) characterises justice as participatory parity, where
everyone can share in all aspects of the social. She includes material rewards but
also those that come from respect. Any arrangements that reduce the sharing of
rewards relative to others are unjust. Participatory parity is affected by a just
distribution of socio-economic resources (distributive justice) and by cultural and
symbolic recognition of different identities (justice as recognition). She
characterises injustice of recognition as cultural or symbolic and ‘rooted in patterns
of representation, interpretation and communication including:
...disrespect (being routinely maligned or disparaged in stereotypic public
cultural representations and/or in everyday life interactions). (Fraser, N.
1996 pp.70-71)
One of the most relevant characteristics for parents from more affluent socio-
economic groups when choosing a secondary school is the intake of the school
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(see Ball 2003 for an overview of the evidence). This is accompanied by ‘status
ideologies’ (Holme 2002; Oakes et al 1997) which Holme describes as,
seemingly commonsense beliefs held by dominant status groups to explain
why members of other groups seem to fail disproportionately in a society
where opportunity is theoretically open to anyone with the will and drive to
achieve.(Holme 2002  p 3)
The most often cited discrete criteria of academic performance, fear of bullying,
moral security and quality of discipline are for many parents proxies for intake and,
reflecting the residential segregation of towns and cities (Cheshire and Sheppard
2004), the populations of whole areas are considered unsuitable. As one parent
said of a school she said she would not even consider (Coldron 2005):
I think Milton High is fairly heavily populated by Haringey.
In some, mainly urban, contexts the instinct of the already advantaged parents to
separate themselves (Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) joins with the
opportunity for choice, diversity, local politics, residential segregation and
admission arrangements to polarise perception of schools (Gewirtz et al 1995;
Lauder et al 1999; Lucey and Reay 2002; Coldron et al 2001). This results in some
schools being oversubscribed and parents struggling for entry. In the process the
rejected schools, and by implication the children and their communities, are often
and consistently vilified. As one London LEA officer explained in 2000:
…we've got this incredible polarisation of parental perception of schools,
which just gets worse all the time...It's fuelled by the league tables...It's
fuelled by the controversy we had here last year where parents took their
children out of school and were refusing to go to the schools that did have
vacancies and were slagging them off in the most unpleasant way in the
press.
This demonisation becomes part of children’s experience (Reay and Lucey 2000
and 2002) and does harm to many children as they inevitably react to the sense of
inferiority and stigma of attending a school so badly perceived (Reay and Lucey
2002). Some schools too, in their need to improve their exam performance, are led
to denigrate children from certain communities and use their admissions policies to
change their intake. As one member of senior management in charge of school
admissions explained:
...We were trying to get rid of this group, because…30%, 35% of our intake
was from [the city] and we felt that was part of the problem, that bringing
sort of [city] pupils into a school like this, to some extent they drag it down to
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their tone...they tend to drag it down rather than us drag them up. The
parents want to send them to a nice school, but they don't want the school
rules to apply to their son or daughter. And we were committed with the
siblings [the sibling over-subscription criterion] to a vicious circle and quite
often...another terrible intake. A lot of working class families had large
families and you were committed to them sort of...And that's one of the
reasons why they decided to get rid of the sibling link two years ago.7
This wholesale vilification and denigration of less advantaged families and
communities is a means by which material advantage and power are maintained
and the imposition of symbolic and cultural inferiority, mal-recognition, made to
appear acceptable. Admission policies that aimed to reduce this kind of injustice
would seek to reduce the polarisation of perception of schools on the part of
parents and reduce the motivation of schools to exclude certain groups.
Admissions policies can contribute by ensuring that schools are not able to pick
and choose their intakes, and that information on school performance to help
parents make good choices fully recognises the value added by schools.
List of objectives against which the effectiveness of the system should be
measured
We can now draw up a list of objectives which will inform our description and
mapping of the system and against which we can seek to measure effectiveness.
An effective admissions system would:
• Provide a means by which those who consider admissions arrangements to
be unfair can refer the matter to an independent adjudicator
• Provide an effective means for parents to appeal to an independent tribunal
if they are unsatisfied with the outcome
• Provide access to clear and understandable information and criteria that are
transparent, and seen to be objectively applied
• Ensure that all parents are treated equally and schools do not covertly
select students on the basis of social status or prior attainment
• Satisfy parents' wishes as to how and where their children are to be
educated
• Not inhibit the quality of education overall and, if possible, contribute to
enhancing it
• Not allow the greater achievement of some children to be at the expense of
others
• Contribute to social cohesion
• Not contribute to the harm inflicted by denigration of children and
communities
                                             
7 Quote taken from Coldron and Williams (2001)
12
1.1.4 Measures of effectiveness used in this study
A good set of measures would gauge overall effectiveness against those
objectives and enable comparison between different sets of arrangements. We
take in this report three objective measures, the level of appeals, the proportions
of parents gaining which of their expressed preferences and the levels of
segregation. The advantages and limitations of these measures is discussed
below.
Appeals as a measure of effectiveness
We can reasonably assume that the greater the number of appeals the greater the
dissatisfaction of parents with the original allocation and vice versa. The number of
appeals works as an overall measure of parental satisfaction and therefore of
effectiveness. An effective policy would result in acceptable offers to all parents
using the initial procedures without recourse to the appeal process which is costly
in the time of many professionals from the local authority and schools. A system
that resulted in fewer appeals would therefore be more administratively and
financially efficient and effective as well as in terms of parental satisfaction. But it
is important to note that such an outcome is determined not just by the system in
the sense of ensuring adequate information, administration or regulation important
as these are. Parental perception, expectations and consequent behaviour are
what ultimately determines parental satisfaction and these are affected by the way
choice of school is framed by their perception of the local schools and through
public discussion and policy formation at both national and local levels.
However, the validity of appeals as a comparative measure between the
arrangements in different authorities works for some but not all Local Authorities.
The level of appeals for a Local Authority’s schools tells us only about the level of
satisfaction of the group of parents who made applications for those schools.
These are not necessarily the same set as those parents who are resident in the
area. Indeed, in one London area where the schools are sought after, and where
there are adjacent areas with less popular schools, up to half of applicants are
non-resident and half of the resident parents apply to schools outside the Local
Authority. In this case there can be no sound conclusions drawn from the level of
appeals about the level of satisfaction of those Local Authority residents with the
arrangements in their area or of any other identifiable cohort of parents, or of the
effectiveness or otherwise of the admission arrangements in that Local Authority.
However, where there is a low level of cross border traffic and the set of applicant
parents is largely the same as the set of resident parents, and the field within
which all parents are choosing is more or less the same for all parents, then the
level of appeals does offer a way of comparing the effectiveness of the
arrangements in that area.
Parents' expressed preferences as a measure of effectiveness
It is commonplace in debate about admissions to take the proportion of parents
allocated the school that was their top ranked expressed preference (first
preference) as a sign of the effectiveness of admissions. If a parent gets the
school they put down as their first preference then it is reasonable to assume they
will be satisfied. It is difficult to claim that choice exists if a significant proportion of
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parents do not get the school they put as their first preference. There are however
some difficulties that need to be considered.
Firstly the time for which the data is collected can affect the validity of the
measure. Some of our respondents pointed out that the data for March 1st (the
national offer day) do not reflect the proportion of parents who eventually get their
first preference following the whole admission process including appeals and
therefore may not properly reflect the real effectiveness of the system. This is true,
but while all authorities have data for March 1st many do not have secure data for
the end of the process. It is also the case that the March 1st figure better reflects
the way the initial allocation works and this is of more relevance for judging the
operation of such aspects as over subscription criteria. It remains true however
that in most cases there is an improvement in the percentage between March and
the beginning of the school year.
Secondly, two authorities with a high proportion of selective places were worried
that the figure for first preferences would not accurately reflect the level of
satisfaction delivered by the system because a proportion of parents put a
selective school down as first preference but, if their child doesn’t reach the right
level in the test they are not then eligible for the grammar school. They argued that
if, in what is misleadingly called an 'equal preference system' where the ranking of
schools is used only if the child is eligible for two or more schools, the child is then
offered a place at their highest preference comprehensive/secondary modern then
this represents their ‘first’ choice. We felt that, since the grammar school was their
first choice and the admission criteria had resulted in their not getting their first
preference it was more accurate to count them as having gained their second
choice.
Thirdly, although it does not invalidate the measure, it should be noted that a small
proportion of parents do not put down the school they most preferred as their first
choice on the Common Application Form. There may be a school within their field
of choice that is their favourite school but, because they make a strategic decision,
taking into account how likely they are to get in, they do not put it as their first or
any preference. Because of this possibility the parent survey in both the 2001 and
current study asked parents about this. In the 2001 study 8% of parents reported
that there were other state schools they would have preferred for their children
over the ones in which they had applied for a place, and there were regional
differences, with London parents least likely to get a place in their favourite school.
A more effective system would have a lower percentage of parents who reported
doing this. However the numbers are small and the reasons for not doing so can
be various.
Fourthly, some non-selective authorities that have an equal preference/default
ranking system returned our request for data on each of the preferences saying
that because it is 'equal preference' they do not distinguish which of the schools is
most or least preferred by the parent. This we believe is an incorrect interpretation
and if put into practice would badly misrepresent the wishes of most parents. It is
not reasonable to assume that if a parent is invited to make a list of preferences
each one of the schools on that list is equally acceptable and, that if they get one
of their expressed preferences, this should count as their choice having been
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satisfied. It is arguable that those who get one of their first two preferences should
be counted as gaining a preferred school but this becomes difficult to sustain for
lower ranked schools. But, the only sure way of knowing if parents are satisfied
with the school they have been offered, wherever they put it in their ranked
expressed preferences, is to ask them.
We therefore sought two measures. On March 1st, the proportion of first
preferences gained by applicants in each Local Authority which gives a strong
indication of the satisfaction level of the cohort of applicants to that authority but
where there are a great deal of cross border applications, as in London, it does not
allow us to compare the effectiveness of the admission arrangements of an area in
terms of the satisfaction of residents of an area. The aggregate figure for all Local
Authorities gives a reasonable approximation of the overall satisfaction level.
Secondly, the responses from a nationally representative sample of parents as to
how satisfied they were with the outcome and which of their preferences it was.
Segregation as a measure of effectiveness
We have seen that equity is one of the objectives of an admission system. No
parent or group of parents should more easily gain access to ‘good’ and popular
schools than any other parents. We have seen that there are problems in
achieving this kind of equity and that socially and financially advantaged parents
may well be gaining access more easily than others. Although the problem is
difficult to solve it is fairly easy to measure. If all social groups had the same
chances of getting into the ‘best’ and most popular schools the intakes of those
schools would reflect the proportions of social groups in the Local Authority area.
There would be no segregation. The more segregation of the intakes of popular
schools the less fair or equitable the system.
Measurement of segregated populations is fairly well established and, although
the technicalities with regard to the segregation of school intakes have been hotly
disputed, the results from different studies are consistent. We have in this study
taken Allen and Vignole’s (2006) method of using two measures. The first, D
(Difference), measures how many children in an area would need to move
between schools to achieve a fully balanced intake. This provides a single value
for each authority and allows us to explore associations between the degree of
segregation in an area and the different kinds of admission arrangements. A
difference measure cannot however capture whether the level of segregation in a
highly segregated area is due to there being a few schools with highly advantaged
intakes with the rest with more or less similar intakes (advantage skew) or, a few
schools with extremely disadvantaged intakes (disadvantage skew) or, a smooth
continuum from highly advantaged moving by even differences through to highly
disadvantaged. The second measure S (Skew) captures this aspect.
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1.2 Design of the Project
1.2.1 Key points
• The study consisted of three strands:
Strand One aimed to provide a comprehensive description of the
admission arrangements for entry to maintained secondary
schools in England in September 2006.
Strand Two aimed to gain a representative view of parents’ and carers’
experience of the admissions process for those who sought a
place for their children starting in Year7 in September 2006.
Strand Three sought to gather data about the outcomes of the admissions
process in terms of the number of parents who gained a
place at their first preference school, the level of appeals and
the level of segregation
• The main sources of information for Strand 1 was the composite
prospectuses published by Local Authorities for entry in September 2006
and a request for supplementary information forms from all Voluntary Aided
and Foundation schools
• Strand 2 was a survey of parents whose children had been admitted to year
7 of a maintained secondary school in September 2006
• The main source of information for Strand 3 was a request to Local
Authorities for 2006 admissions data
1.2.2 Objectives of the study
This study aims to make it possible in the future to identify how and where any
changes take place and to gauge relative effectiveness. We have identified
objectives against which we intend to measure the effectiveness of admissions
and have considered what would count as valid measures. Our specific objectives
are therefore as follows:
• map admissions arrangements (used to allocate places for year 7 pupils for
state secondary school in September 2006) across admissions authorities in
England
• examine the experiences, views and expectations of parents and carers who
applied for a place in a state secondary school for September 2006, including
those who researched schools and made applications online;
• collate information on the outcomes for all pupils of applications for Year 7 in
September 2006.
In the next sections we describe the methods pursued in each of these three
strands.
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1.2.3 Strand 1: Admission arrangements for entry in September 2006
Authorities and schools included
This study describes the admission arrangements for all mainstream maintained
secondary schools in English local authorities. There are 150 local authorities. The
City of London has no maintained secondary schools. The Scilly Isles has one
school catering for all phases of education and therefore has no transfer policy.
The total of eligible local authorities was therefore 148. The study does not look at
the admission arrangements for independent schools funded by fees. The focus is
on the arrangements for pupils transferring from the primary stage of schooling to
the secondary stage. It therefore includes admission arrangements for transfer at
age 11 from primary to secondary schools and those transferring at 13 or 14 from
middle schools to high schools. Arrangements for Academies and, where they
were included in the composite prospectus for an area, City Technology Colleges
are also described. It does not include Special schools, Pupil Referral Units, or
Middle schools deemed secondary.
Sources of information
In fulfilment of its responsibility to co-ordinate the admissions process the Local
Authority is required to publish the admission arrangements for all participating
schools in a composite prospectus for the agreed relevant area each year.  The
composite prospectus provides information for parents about the system for the
co-ordination of admissions between the different Admission Authorities of
maintained schools and Academies but not other independent schools. In addition
it includes, for each school, the criteria for admission, procedures for application,
and information about the relative popularity of the school in previous years. This
information is intended to give parents sufficient information to express an
informed set of preferences.
The composite prospectuses therefore set out the admission arrangements of
every maintained school in the country and this was our main source of
information. We requested the composite prospectus from all of the local
authorities in England publicised to parents whose children entered Y7 in
September 2006. This material had been finalised in April 2005, and issued to
parents in September 2005. They were at the time of collection for the project
technically obsolete but, for the majority of areas, still accessible. Of the 148
eligible authorities we were able to obtain the 2006 composite prospectus from
135 (91%). The 2006 prospectus was not available for 13 authorities (9%). For
these we used the 2007 prospectus having checked as far as possible that there
had been no significant changes in the arrangements between 06 and 07.
Supplementary information
It is not uncommon for schools where the governors and not the local authority are
responsible for admissions (Voluntary Aided, Foundation schools and Academies)
to require further information from parents on forms for which parents have to
apply directly to the school. These are an important part of the admissions process
for parents applying to these schools. We wrote to all of these schools requesting
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copies of their supplementary information forms or confirmation that they did not
ask for further information.
Contextual information
In addition to these data from schools and Local Authorities we collected the
following background information about each local authority:
• population density
• level of appeals in 2005 and 2006
• level of segregation between schools
• level of cross border traffic.
1.2.4 Strand 2: Parents’/Carers’ experiences of the application process for
2006
The strand used a telephone survey of parents or carers of children who started
secondary school in year 7 in 2006. The aim was to achieve complete interviews
with 2,000 parents, recruited through a representative sample of schools.
The sample of schools was drawn from Edubase, a database of information on all
maintained schools in England held on behalf of the DCSF. Prior to sample
selection, the sampling frame was ordered by region, LA selection type, the
proportion of Community schools in the LA (quartiles), LA, school-level urban/rural
indicator, school statutory lowest age and size based on number of children in the
school.
Schools were drawn with probability proportional to size, which meant that larger
schools had a higher chance of being selected than smaller schools. A ‘weighted’
sampling approach was used to draw the sample, whereby London schools and
schools in selective LAs with 19% and higher proportion of selective places were
given an increased chance of selection, enabling a large enough sample to be
drawn for analysis. Sampled schools were asked to provide contact details for all
parents of children in year 7.
A pilot was conducted in six schools to test the methods of contacting schools,
drawing samples, and interviewing parents.
The fieldwork for the main stage was carried out between 11th December 2006
and 30th March 2007. A total of 163 schools were contacted and 59 provided
useable contact details for parents (36%). Schools were contacted by a mixture of
postal and telephone methods and contact details were accepted in a variety of
formats by disk, email or paper. Reasons why schools did not co-operate included
the administrative burden, concerns about data protection, reluctance to
jeopardise the trust of parents in passing on their contact details, and pupil contact
details not being up-to-date or held in a format suitable for sharing.
A total of 2,950 parents were selected from the contact details provided by schools
(50 for each school). These were sent a letter to explain about the study and then
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contacted for telephone interview. Telephone interviews were achieved with 2,215
of these parents, a response rate of 75%.
A two stage weighting procedure was adopted. At the first stage, selection weights
were applied to correct for the selection probabilities of schools and parents. The
second stage used calibration weighting to match the weighted sample (after
selection weights had been applied) to the population of parents on a number of
key area and school-level variables, using a logistic regression model. The
following area characteristics were found to be associated with lower levels of
response: being in London or non-metropolitan areas outside London, having a
high proportion of community schools and being in a partially selective (rather than
a non-selective) area. The following school characteristics were found to be
associated with lower levels of response: having higher key stage 4 scores, being
a Voluntary Controlled school and having a selective admissions policy.
The final weighted sample had an effective sample size (that is, the estimated
sample size needed for an equal probability sample that would give the same
standard error) of 1,564. This amounts to 71% of the actual sample size; hence
the sample had an efficiency of 71%.
The topics included in the questionnaire included:
• the information parents/carers used to find out about secondary school and
how this affected their choice;
• the factors parents/carers took into account in choosing a school and how
this impacted on their satisfaction;
• the proportion of parents/carers that made on-line applications and their
experiences of this;
• parents’/carers’ experiences of the admissions application process and their
levels of satisfaction with the process and outcome;
• parents’/carers’ social characteristics.
Wherever possible, the same questions and structure as used in the previous
study (Flatley et al., 2001) were used as a starting point. The questionnaire
content was then reviewed in order to take into account changes to admission
procedures since 2001.
Analysis of the survey was carried out using the SPSS and Stata software
packages. Data from Strand 1 was incorporated into the survey dataset for use in
analysis.
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1.2.5 Strand 3: Outcomes of the application process for entry in September
2006
Number of first preferences gained
All parents are requested to express a minimum of three preferences for schools.
Some authorities ask for more than three preferences, for example for all London
authorities parents are asked to state six preferences. Even where there is what is
called an 'equal preference' system in operation if a child is eligible (i.e. fulfils the
criteria) for two or more schools the Local Authority takes the order of preference
into account and allocates the school ranked highest by the parent8. Therefore the
Local Authority has to have data on each parents’ order of preferences and which
one they gained.
We requested the following outcome data from all 148 LAs:
• the proportions of pupils offered a place on 1 March 2006 at their
first/second/third/fourth/fifth/sixth preference school.
• the percentage of parents with children about to enter secondary school in
September 2006 who declined to express any preference (either by not
returning the form or by returning it blank).
Overall 106 (72%) authorities provided data. There was a higher response of 87
out of the 116 (75%) authorities outside London. There was a lower response of
19 out of 32 (59%) from London authorities and within this from Inner London 5 out
of 13 (39%). Nevertheless there was representation from all regions of the country.
Level of appeals
We made use of the appeals figures published by DCSF for 2004/05 and for
2005/06 for all admission authorities in an area.
                                             
8 The 2003 Code recommends that parents ranking is the model adopted but it does allow coordinated
admissions systems to adopt alternative criteria.
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2 ADMISSIONS ARRANGEMENTS
2.1.1 Key findings
• The great majority (92%) of all secondary age children in England attend
state maintained schools;
• There are four types of maintained school - Community, Voluntary
Controlled, Voluntary Aided and Foundation. Academies and City
Technology Colleges are fully funded by central government but retain their
independent status.
• Nearly two thirds (62%) of state funded secondary schools are Community,
about one sixth (17%) Foundation and about one sixth (17%) Voluntary
Aided. The remaining 4% is made up of Voluntary Controlled schools,
Academies and City Technology Colleges;
• Responsibility for setting admission arrangements rests with the Admission
authority for each school;
• There are five types of admission authority - one for each of the  types of
school (Voluntary Controlled schools come under the same admission
authority as Community schools);
• The Local Authority has responsibility to co-ordinate the agreed admission
arrangements in their area;
• A pan London admissions scheme operates to co-ordinate admissions
across all London Boroughs and some adjacent Local Authorities;
• Admissions in 2006 were subject to the School Admissions Code of
Practice 2003. All admission authorities had to have regard to the guidance
published there;
• Three mutually reinforcing measures of regulation were in place namely the
requirement to consult, the requirement to have regard to the published
guidance, the opportunity to object to the Schools Adjudicator.
2.2 Introduction
This chapter presents the results of our mapping of the admission arrangements
for secondary schools in England. Arrangements can vary at three different levels,
the Local Authority, the admission authority and the School. For example, at the
Local Authority level, some coordination arrangements take no account of the
order of parents' preferences on the application form except when a child is
eligible for two or more places (equal preference/default ranking system) while
others take account from the beginning and give higher priority to parents who
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make a school their first or highest preference (a first preference first system) and
some are highly selective and some have no selection. Similar differences are to
be found between Admission Authorities in the same Local Authority, and at the
school level some will have selection by aptitude while others do not9. We
collected data about arrangements at each of these levels.
We also collected data about two kinds of outcomes from the admissions process.
The first was the proportions of parents gaining a place at one of the schools for
which they had expressed a preference and the ranking of that preference; for
example was it the first, or second, or third etc  of their expressed preferences.
The second kind of outcome data was the level of appeals. In addition we gained
data about characteristics of Local Authorities, Admission Authorities and
individual schools to enable us to test for any associations between these
contextual characteristics, their admission arrangements and their outcomes.
2.2.1 Secondary schools in England
Our focus was all state funded secondary schools in England. Ninety two per cent
of all secondary age children in England attend these schools (Coldron 2007). We
did not look at admissions for independent fee charging schools. There were a
total of 3122 state funded secondary schools in England listed in the 2006
composite prospectuses. Schools vary according to their governance and who
constitutes the admission authority (the body responsible for deciding the
arrangements for admitting pupils). There were five types of Admission authority
relevant to this study:
• the Local Authority (for Community and Voluntary Controlled schools )
• the governors of a Voluntary Aided school
• the governors of a Foundation school
• the governors of an Academy
• the governors of a City Technology College.
The differences between the types of school and their admission authorities is
important in understanding admission arrangements in England and our analysis.
Community schools: The Local Authority employs the school’s staff, owns the
school’s land and buildings and is the admission authority. In 2006 these were the
most numerous making up nearly two thirds (62%) of all maintained secondary
schools. However local contexts vary greatly and there are local authorities where
                                             
9 While the admission authority sets common admission arrangements for all of  its schools it is possible for
there to be variation in terms of some arrangements. For example, where there are a number of Community
schools in an area some may opt to select by aptitude while others do not.
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there are no Community schools (e.g. Brent) and others (e.g. Cornwall) where all
maintained secondaries are Community schools.
Voluntary Controlled: The Local Authority is the employer and the admission
authority. The school’s land and buildings (apart from the playing fields which are
normally vested in the Local Authority) will normally be owned by a charitable
foundation. These schools made up nearly 3% of all maintained secondaries. They
are most often schools with a religious affiliation. Because the Local Authority is
the admission authority these schools are, where appropriate, combined with the
community schools for the purposes of analysis in this report.
Voluntary Aided: The governing body is the employer and the admission authority.
The school’s land and buildings (apart from playing fields which are normally
vested in the Local Authority) will normally be owned by a charitable foundation.
These schools made up 17% of all maintained secondary schools. The great
majority 87.5%) were Christian of which 64% were Roman Catholic, 21% Church
of England and 2.5% Mixed Christian (e.g. part Roman Catholic and part Church
of England). 10% (fifty two) had no religious affiliation while the remaining 2.5%
were made up of nine Jewish schools, three Muslim and one Sikh.
Foundation: The governing body is the employer and the admission authority. The
school’s land and buildings are either owned by the governing body or by a
charitable foundation. These schools made up 17% of all maintained secondary
schools.
Academies: Academies are all ability schools established by sponsors from
business, faith or voluntary groups working in partnerships with central
Government and local education partners. Sponsors and the Department for
Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) provide the capital costs for the Academy.
Running costs are met in full by the DCSF. The school governors are the
admission authority but their funding agreements contain requirements aimed at
ensuring fair admissions. For example in 2006 they were required to comply with
the School Admissions Code of Practice 2003. There were fifty Academies in
September 2006. Some followed the criteria for the Community schools in their
area.
City Technology College: These schools are independent all- ability, non fee-
paying schools for pupils aged 11-18. The school governors are the admission
authority but their admissions are regulated by legislation aimed at ensuring a
balanced intake. There were15 such schools in England but most have converted
to Academies and there were only the four remaining found in the composite
prospectuses.
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Table 1
Type of school as a % of all maintained secondary schools in 
September 2006
62.2
17.0 16.8
2.9 1.6
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
Community Foundation Vol Aided Vol Controlled Academies
Table 2
Schools other than community schools
Foundation, 529, 50%
Vol Aided, Roman Catholic, 
335, 31%
Voluntary Aided, non-
religious, 52, 5%
Academies, RC, 4, 0%
Vol Aided, Sikh, 1, 0%
Academies, other, 23, 2%
Vol Aided, Jewish, 9, 1%
Vol Aided, Muslim 3, 0%
City Technology Colleges, 4, 
0%
Vol AIded, Cof E, 110, 10%
Vol Aided, Mixed Christian, 
13, 1%
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2.2.2 Responsibilities for admissions
The criteria for admission to a school are set by the admission authority for that
school. The Local Authority as admission authority has responsibility for admission
to its Community and Voluntary Controlled schools and in almost all cases this
means they set the criteria for more than one school. In only a very few cases this
responsibility is formally devolved to the governors of the Community schools. The
admission authorities for Voluntary Aided schools have formal responsibility for
setting the criteria for only one school. The great majority of these schools are
either Roman Catholic or Church of England and they often follow Diocesan
guidance and therefore the criteria are often the same for more than one school in
an area. The admission authorities for Foundation, Academies and CTCs set the
criteria for only their school.
The system for the co-ordination of admissions within an area is determined by the
Local Authority through local consultation within the local admission forum. If the
local stakeholders cannot reach agreement within the admission forum the
Secretary of State is empowered to impose a system in the best interests of
children and parents. Local Authorities are responsible for administering the
agreed co-ordinated admissions scheme within their area. This is a quite distinct
and separate role from their being the admission authority for their Community
schools. The Local Authority is required to co-ordinate admissions up to the
national offer day on March 1st each year. After this date administration passes
back to the separate admission authorities. Some Local Authorities are asked by
the schools in their area to continue their co-ordination role after March and until
all children have been placed.
The administration of admission appeals is the responsibility of the governors of
each Voluntary Aided school, Foundation school, Academy and CTC. For
Community schools it is the responsibility of the Local Authority. Appeals panels
must be independent of the admission authority and guidance on their conduct is
contained in the School Admission Appeals Code (2003) and overseen by the
Council of Tribunals10. Parents also have the right to refer their case to the Local
Ombudsman if they believe there has been some maladministration (Coldron et al
2002).
The arrangements for London admissions are slightly different. London is distinct
in many ways from other parts of the country in ways relevant to admissions. It has
a more dense and more ethnically diverse population, larger numbers of schools
within travel distance, public transport that makes travelling away from the locality
                                             
10 This is now called the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council since Oct 2007.
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easier, a great diversity of types of school on offer (including independent schools)
and areas with extremes of wealth adjacent to areas of extreme deprivation
(Pennell. West and Hind 2005). The contrasts between sectors of the population
leads to a hierarchy of schools because of the variation in the prior attainment of
intakes (DfESc, 2005, p. 9). It is true that a hierarchy exists in many other areas
(Coldron 2005) but it may be steeper in London. These characteristics are
accompanied by a notably higher rate of cross border traffic (where children gain a
place outside their area of residence) and a higher level of appeals11.
This makes for an extremely complex context and one that is more difficult for
parents to negotiate and for the co-ordinators of admissions to manage. The 2001
report (Flatley et al 2001) found evidence that London parents were the least likely
to be offered places at their highest preference12 school – 68% compared with
85% nationally, three times less likely to be offered a school place at the school
they most wanted than parents living elsewhere and notably more likely to opt
away from their nearest school.
The London Authorities agreed in 2003 to operate a Pan London Admissions
scheme by 2005 where all London boroughs, the City of London and some local
authorities with borders to London authorities co-operate on an agreed mode of
co-ordination of school admissions (Pennell, West and Hind 2005). For example
all authorities require the same number of preferences, six, on a Common
Application Form and an equal preference/default ranking system is used.
2.2.3 Regulation and co-ordination of admissions
Admissions to schools are subject to various Acts and accompanying regulations.
These are laid out in codes of practice on admissions and on appeals that the
Secretary of State for Education is required to produce. The first code was
published in April 1999 and the first cohort to which it fully applied was the intake
to Year 7 in September 2000. The requirements of the School Standards and
Framework Act (1998) and the guidance in this first code are summarised below:
• requirements for all admission authorities to consult each other on their
proposed admission arrangements and criteria, with the possibility for other
admission authorities (and in the case of existing partial selection
arrangements, parents) to complain to the Schools Adjudicator if they think
the arrangements are not in the interests of local children and parents;
• the outlawing of any new selection by ability, while allowing up to 10%
selection by aptitude to be introduced for certain subject specialisms;
                                             
11 DCSF website: Local Authority Cross Border Movement of Secondary School Pupils Resident in England,
January 2006 (Final) and Statistical First Release on Appeals in 2006.
12 In the report this was called their ‘favourite’ school.
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• requiring all admissions policies, in particular over-subscription criteria, and
all attainment and aptitude testing arrangements to be clear, fair, objective
and published;
• encouragement for admission authorities in an area to have standard
application forms and common timetables and to agree arrangements in
new admission forums;
• requiring Local Authorities to publish composite prospectuses with
summary admissions information for all schools in their area, including how
over-subscribed they have been in the past;
• ruling out admissions interviews, except for church schools who may use it
to assess religious commitment and boarding schools to check boarding
suitability;
• making appeal panels independent of the Local Authorities and governing
bodies who made the decisions appealed against, and smaller so as not to
intimidate parents.
The legislation and guidance were a response to a number of widely
acknowledged problems. Added to the growing concern about the fairness of the
system as discussed earlier there was also an element of chaos and unhelpful
variation in the system and in 2000 it was found (Flatley et al 2001) that Local
Authorities still differed markedly in the way that they managed the process. Some
Local Authorities co-ordinated the offer of places to all parents, while in others
parents were required to apply to individual schools and as many as they wished.
This resulted in some parents being offered multiple places while others had no
place offered at all. Only 60% of Local Authorities used a common application
deadline for the schools in their area and for letting parents know of the decision.
This presented difficulties for parents as to whether to confirm acceptance or wait
for to see if another school would offer them a place. There were different ways in
which Local Authorities asked parents to express a preference. The most
common, found in 75% of Local Authorities, asked parents to name a number of
schools as preferences in rank order (first preference, second preference, etc.).
The Local Authorities then attempted to allocate them a place at their first choice
school. But nearly 13% used a system whereby parents were notified of a place
allocated at a school and they were invited to confirm that particular school as their
expressed preference or to name one or more alternative preferred schools. In 5%
of Local Authorities parents were asked to express multiple preferences and each
preference was treated as if parents would be happy for their child to attend any of
the schools on the list. The Local Authority then allocated one of those preferred
schools in accordance with their admission criteria. Just under 10% of Local
Authorities used a single preference system where parents were invited, initially, to
express a preference for just one school and if this was unsuccessful they were
able to apply for an alternative school at further stages of the process.
In 2003 a revised code was introduced to be implemented no later than
September 2005, which set out the means to further rationalise the process across
all Local Authorities. While the 1999 Code recommended or encouraged
compliance the School Admissions Code of Practice 2003 laid out
recommendations and guidance to which all admission authorities and Local
Authorities had to have regard. Although compliance was not mandatory it was
expected that all stakeholders would do so. Objections to arrangements in an area
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would be judged in the light of the guidance provided in the code. It was therefore
a relatively strong measure and reinforced the regulation of the process.
In 2006 the relevant guidance and regulations in operation were still those in
operation in 2003. In summary they were:
• Parents submit one application for all maintained schools applied for to their
Local Authority.
• Most Local Authorities asked parents to apply for three schools which is the
minimum allowed by the regulations. The maximum number of schools
could vary.
• Parents are asked to list the schools in order of preference.
• The stakeholders in an area can decide how they deal with applications,
either by operating a ‘first preference first’ system or an equal
preference/default ranking system.
• Local Authorities are required to publish in one composite prospectus clear
and transparent information about schools in their locality including the
criteria for entry and the popularity of the schools (i.e., whether they are
over-subscribed).
• All Local Authorities are responsible for making a single offer of a place to
all parents on the same day in early March (ie 1 March or the next working
day).
• Parents are entitled to appeal to the admission authority that refused their
child a place at one of their preferred schools.
With regard to schools managing their intake the 2003 School Admissions Code of
Practice states that:
• priority should be given to school place applications from children in public
care13
• there should be no interviews14
• a protocol needs to be established between all the schools in each authority
to ensure that vulnerable children are admitted fairly and not only by
schools with already challenging intakes.
It also sets out guidance to ensure consultation and co-ordination between all
admission authorities in an area, explicitly introduces checks and balances to
manage potentially competing interests and introduces new responsibilities on
Local Authorities for the administrative co-ordination of the process.
                                             
13 DfES 2003b para 7.22
14 DfES 2003b para 3.16
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In effect, this meant that admissions to secondary school was (and continues to
be) regulated at the national and local level by three mutually reinforcing
measures. Firstly, the school admission authorities in an area were required to
consult with each other and to try to agree a co-ordinated admissions policy. This
ensured early publication of the intentions of the different admission authorities in
an area. Secondly, there was the requirement to have regard to the guidance in
the codes, one relating to admissions (the School Admissions Code of Practice
2003) and one relating to admission appeals (the Appeals Code of Practice 2003).
Thirdly, any maintained school’s admission arrangements are open to objection to
the Schools Adjudicator. The Adjudicator cannot act without an objection being
received, but the 2003 School Admissions Code of Practice explicitly encouraged
objections to be made:
School admission arrangements should work for the benefit of all parents
and children in an area. In striving to achieve admission arrangements that
serve the interest of all parents and children in local communities, LEAs are
recommended to refer objections to the Adjudicator on behalf of parents
where necessary. If admission arrangements include practices that are
stated in this Code to be bad practice, the LEA can be held to account by
the Local Government Ombudsman if it does not object to those
arrangements. (DfES 2003a para. 4.11)
The Office of the Schools Adjudicator (OSA) reported a significant increase in the
number of cases referred. From September 2005 to September 2006, 343
referrals were received compared to 270 referrals in 2003/2004 and 227 in
2004/2005. Of the cases received, 245 were objections to admission
arrangements. 127 of these were from Local Authorities, often acting on behalf of
admission forums showing, in the opinion of the OSA, that ‘many local authorities
and admission forums are reviewing the admission arrangements of all schools in
their areas and objecting to those arrangements that seem to them to offend
against the Code of Practice’ (Office of the Schools Adjudicator 2006).
In February 2007 a new code (School Admissions Code 2007) came into force
required to be first implemented for the cohort entering school in September 2008.
Bodies must now act in accordance with the new Code which has greatly
strengthened requirements making it clear where guidance must be followed. It
introduces radical changes and it will be of interest in the future to see what effect
it has together with the new Admission Appeals Code which comes into force on
17th January 2008.
2.2.4 The process and timing of admissions for entry to Year 7 in
September 2006
Following consultation between local admission authorities the co-ordinated
admissions scheme for each area was agreed by April 2005. At the beginning of
the school year 05/06 the composite prospectus was sent out by each local
authority to all parents and carers of children resident in their area about to
transfer to secondary school and to non-residents parents who applied to schools
in the local authority. Parents/carers had about six week to visit schools and
gather information and advice and come to a decision about their preferences.
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They were then invited to return a minimum of three preferences on a Common
Application Form by a given date in late October.
By an agreed date in mid-November, the home Local Authority sent all admission
authorities/ Local Authorities details of applicants for their schools. In an area that
operated equal preference/default ranking the home Local Authority did not reveal
the order of preference. In an area that operated ‘first preference first’ they did.
The school admission authorities then applied their admission criteria, including
any selection tests, and sent their own Local Authority a list indicating the order of
eligibility for entry of all children for whom application to the school had been
made. When all admission authorities had sent these ranked lists to the Local
Authority in whose area they were located, each Local Authority should have had
a list for each of its maintained schools (and any Academies). The Local Authority
compared the lists from all schools in its area. When a child qualified for a place at
more than one school, the Local Authority allocated a place at the school indicated
by the terms of its co-ordinated scheme (usually if a child had been offered two
schools the Local Authority allocated them to the one the parent ranked higher15).
Thus both the first preference first system and the equal preference/default
ranking take account of parents' ranking of schools. If any child looked like
remaining unplaced, the home Local Authority considered how to place them in
schools within its area. By mid-February each Local Authority then sent the
schools which it maintains (and any Academies) the final lists of pupils to be
allocated places, and on 1 March – the ’national offer day’ for secondary schools -
it wrote to every resident parent who filled in its secondary application form, to tell
them of their allocated school place.
2.2.5 Parents and carers and children in care
Children have a range of carers. We have used the single term parent throughout
to denote all carers who have the legal rights of a parent over a child. Children in
public care are a vulnerable group in need of special attention and regulations
(restated in the School Admissions Code of Practice 2003 and the School
Admissions Code 2007) make a special case for the prioritisation of children in
care in schools' oversubscription criteria. Who then is legally responsible for
looked after children and who actually makes the decision concerning choice of
secondary school for them? Local authorities are legally responsible for looked
after children and are therefore 'corporate parents' with parental responsibility.
                                             
15 The 2003 Code states in section C9 that the LEA may choose to use some other criterion than parental ranking. We did
not ask what criteria LAs used but we believe that most authorities use the recommended model i.e. Ranking. It is also still
possible for more than one offer to be made because two Local Authorities may decide to offer a place: See section C6: ...If
on exchanging information it transpires that both the home and another Local Authority intend to make an offer, either both can do so,
leaving the parent to choose between them, or one Local Authority can hold back its offer in favour of the other. However, this second
alternative should only be chosen if the two Local Authorities have made an agreement to that effect and explained it to parents in their
composite prospectuses.
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Within the local authority the actual responsibility lies with social workers in the
Local Authority's children's services.
The answer to the second question is more complicated. The social worker will
apply for children in their care to go to particular schools. If the child is in long-term
foster care the foster carers view would have weight in this decision also,
particularly around the practicalities of getting the child to and from a school. At
secondary school age, the child's view would also be taken into account- for
example, if the child wanted to stay in a school they already attended, the
feasibility of this would be explored. Children in care have regular reviews and the
review (chaired by a reviewing officer, and involving immediate carers, other
involved professionals, the child and possibly his/her natural parents) may decide
on a school to apply to if it best meets the child's needs. The natural parents also
have a say as they still have shared parental responsibility with the local authority
for their child while he/she is in care. If for example, they wanted their child to
attend a Catholic school this would be respected. Finally, all children in care have
a PEP (personal education plan) which operates like an Individual Education Plan
and it may be that, in reviewing this, recommendations would be made about the
best school for the child to go to on transition from primary to secondary,
especially if there are special educational needs.
2.3 Description of types of local authority co-ordination arrangements and
their frequency
2.3.1 Key findings
• 64% of Local Authorities invited parents to express the minimum number of
3 preferences
• 27% invited six preferences
• 101 authorities use an equal preference/default ranking system and 47 use
first preference first
2.3.2 Number of preferences required on the common application form:
In 2003 the regulations required that the coordinated admission system in any
local authority invite parents to express no fewer than three preferences on a
common application form. Most LAs (95, 64%) invited just 3 preferences, some
invited 4 or 5 preferences (12, 8%) whilst a notable number invited 6 or 7
preferences (41, 28%).
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Number of preferences parents allowed to express
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All London LAs (13 inner and 19 outer) invited 6 preferences as part of the pan-
London scheme. Outside London, 16 metropolitan LAs invited more than three
preferences compared with 5 non-metropolitan LAs. There are likely to be more
preferences invited in areas of dense population and where there is a greater
number of admission authorities. Over half of the Local Authorities using the equal
preference/default ranking system invited more than 3 preferences compared with
less than a tenth of LAs using the ‘first preference first’ system. The fourteen most
selective areas (19% and above of selective places) were also more likely to invite
more than three preferences - over half of these selective LAs compared with one
third of other LAs.
In terms of appeals, the number of preferences invited correlates positively with
the proportion of appeals lodged and heard (rho for both about 0.40). Local
authorities inviting more than 3 preferences are more likely to have a relatively
even mix of all types of school or to have a predominance of Voluntary Aided or
Foundation schools. A higher number of preferences is associated with higher
levels of segregation (specifically in terms of greater concentrations of advantage).
2.3.3 Equal preference/default ranking authorities and first preference first
authorities.
An equal preference or default ranking authority wide system exists where the co-
ordinated scheme for schools in an area is based on an agreement that all
preferences should initially be considered equally against admissions and
oversubscription criteria. The rank order is used later if a child is eligible for a
place at more than one school. In this case the school ranked highest by the
parent is offered. A first preference first authority wide system is where all or most
schools in the area have an oversubscription criterion that gives priority to
applications that put the school as a first preference. For oversubscribed schools
this means that applications which put the school as second or third preference
are not likely to get a place and that parents' have a much lower chance of getting
their second and third preference schools.
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There has been some controversy over the fairness of these two systems (Coldron
2005) and the Schools Adjudicator has been asked to make determinations in a
number of cases e.g. Calderdale and Kent (Annual Report of the Office of Schools
Adjudicator 2006). The 2003 School Admissions Code of Practice recommends
the equal preference/default ranking system and, while allowing ‘first preference
first’, presents what it sees as the problems and the benefits.
Compared to [the equal preference system], this variant is likely to result in
a higher number of parents getting children into their first preference
schools. But those parents who do not (because those schools are over-
subscribed with first preferences and others fit the over-subscription criteria
better) will be less likely to get an offer from their second or third preference
schools (because they may already have been provisionally filled with
higher preferences) and so have to consider taking a place at a less
acceptable school. This variant may therefore lead to less parental
satisfaction overall, where there is significant variability in schools’
popularity and/or quality. Because – compared to [the equal preference
system], – it gives more weight to preference order and less to over-
subscription criteria, it is also less likely to be agreed by admission
authorities who would wish to apply criteria such as partial selection by
ability or aptitude or religious or denominational commitment equally to all
applicants – it would mean, for example, that a Catholic school giving
priority to Catholic pupils would have to put a first preference non-Catholic
applicant ahead of a second preference Catholic applicant. Also, [the first
preference first system] could lead to less parental satisfaction where
parents cannot be sure at the time of expressing preferences whether their
children will meet the admissions criteria for schools they might wish to put
as first preference. An example would be a selective area, where parents do
not know whether their own children will pass the 11-plus. (section C8)
The debate is essentially about fair admissions and the tension between
facilitating parental choice and reducing the evident problems where intakes are
segregated both socially and by attainment. In areas like Kent or Calderdale where
wholly selective grammars attract a majority of the highest attaining children, non-
selective schools may wish to use the first preference first criterion so that parents
who are not sure whether their children will gain a place at their preferred grammar
school will be encouraged to put their preferred comprehensive as their first
expressed preference. In this way the non-selective schools hope to gain a better
balanced intake which evidence shows (PISA OECD 2001; OECD/Unesco 2003;
Thrupp 1999; Lupton 2003 and 2004) would benefit all of the children in their
school. Similar issues arise in non-selective areas where there are very popular
and very unpopular comprehensive schools. However, for parents who prefer the
more popular schools it reduces the value of expressing second and subsequent
preferences. First preference first systems are likely to show a higher proportion of
parents gaining their first expressed preference than are equal preference/default
ranking authorities. This cannot be taken necessarily to mean that they are
delivering greater overall satisfaction because it is also likely that fewer parents
gain their second or third preferences.
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Particular problems arise where parents do not get to know the results of the 11+
tests before they expressed their preferences. The 2007 School Admissions Code
has now outlawed any first preference first criterion (section 2.13) and strongly
encourages testing before preference (section 2.92).
It is of interest therefore on a number of counts how many authorities and schools
use these criteria. Here we report on Local Authority use in 2006 and the use by
schools is reported in the section on oversubscription criteria. In 2006 101 (68%)
of Local Authorities used an equal preference/default ranking system whilst 47
(32%) used a first preference first system.
All inner and outer London Local Authorities had an authority wide equal
preference/default ranking system.  Forty two per cent (31) of metropolitan Local
Authorities had an authority wide first preference first system compared with 38%
(16) of non-metropolitan Local Authorities. Geographically, there were 3
government regions where a majority of Local Authorities had the first preference
first system: the North East (12, 75%); South West (9, 60%) and the North West
(9, 55%).
Table 4
This geographical pattern is reflected in two other measures: average population
density (higher for equal preference/default ranking LAs) and the average number
of admissions dealt with (also higher for ‘equal preference/default ranking LAs).
Analysis of attributes associated with these modes of co-ordination revealed that:
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• On average lower proportions of first preferences are seen amongst equal
preference/default ranking LAs (mean=84%, median=88%) compared with
first preference first LAs (mean=93%, median=94%).
• In terms of appeals, on average LAs using the equal preference/default
ranking system had a greater proportion of appeals lodged (mean=11%,
median=9%; compared with mean=9%, median=8%) and heard (mean=8%,
median=7%; compared with mean & median=6).
• The proportion of appeals heard that were successful was greater amongst
the first preference first LAs (mean=45%, median=46%) compared with
equal preference/default ranking LAs (mean & median=32%).
• A higher proportion of LAs using equal preference/default ranking are
among the fourteen most selective (11, 11%) compared with first
preference first LAs (2, 4%).
• In terms of diversity, a greater proportion of LAs classed as predominantly
non-autonomous (19, 34%) or diverse (26, 33%) have an authority wide first
preference first system compared with LAs classed as predominantly
autonomous (2, 17%)16.
• On average, LAs using the equal preference/default ranking system had a
greater proportion of autonomous schools (mean=39%, median=35%)
compared with LAs using the first preference first system (mean=30%,
median=30%).We can conclude that first preference first is associated with
lower relative autonomy of schools at the LA level.
• In terms of social segregation, on average, the 2004 dissimilarity index was
slightly larger for equal preference/default ranking LAs (mean=0.29,
median=0.28) compared with first preference first LAs (mean=0.27,
median=0.27). For both, the average skew was towards concentrations of
advantage – slightly sharper for equal preference/default ranking LAs
(mean=0.08, median=0.06) compared with first preference first LAs
(mean=0.06, median=0.03).
It is important to put these associations into context and to be cautious about
drawing conclusions. Most importantly we should not assume that either of the
systems causes the attributes with which they are associated. For example, we
know that selective areas are associated with higher appeals and greater
segregation and that the most selective areas are more likely to have equal
preference systems. So it may be that being selective explains both the greater
number of appeals and the greater segregation found in authority wide equal
                                             
16 A Predominately autonomous LA is defined as one where :25% or less of the LA's schools are
community/VC.
A Predominately non-autonomous LA is defined as one where 25% or less of an LA's schools are VA/F/AC.
A Diverse LA is defined as one where the number of autonomous schools were in the range of 26% to 75%
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preference systems and not that they adopt equal preference. Further, the
difference between the two systems in the numbers of parents gaining their
first preferences should not be interpreted as necessarily meaning that equal
preference systems lead to less parental satisfaction overall. In a first
preference first area, if the schools a parent puts as first, second or third are
oversubscribed they risk not getting in to their first preference school and are
also likely not to get their second or third choice because they do not fit the first
preference over-subscription criterion of those schools. This means that the
first preference system to some extent restricts parents' room for manoeuvre,
reduces their options and constrains them to put preferences for schools that
are not their real preferred choice.
2.4 Banding
2.4.1 Introduction
Banding is where a school uses test results of attainment to allocate children to a
range of attainment bands so as to determine a particular range of attainment of
the intake. Where the intention is to ensure that the range of pupils admitted
contains a greater proportion of higher attaining children this is selective banding.
In contrast 'fair banding' is defined in the School Admissions Code of Practice
2003 (Section 3.26) where it is used to try to ensure that the intake includes a
proportionate spread of children of all abilities. The 1998 Standards and
Framework Act allowed new fair banding arrangements to be introduced but
prohibited the introduction of new selective banding. It did however allow the
continuation of selective banding where it had been in place prior to September
1997 (DCSF 2007). Because schools must accept applicants if there are places
available, as in the case of an undersubscribed school, banding only operates
when the number of applications exceeds the number of places.
The banding procedure for new banding arrangements as described in the School
Admissions Code of Practice 2003 is required to apply to the applicants to a single
school. This is a significant feature. Applicants are the reference group for
allocation to bands:
For any banding arrangements introduced since the start of the 1997/98
school year to be lawful, they must ensure that the intake represents the
range of applicants’ abilities, not, for example, a national or LEA average.
(Section 3.27)
It is therefore possible that the average attainment of the applicants to a particular
school might be higher or lower than the average of all children in a Local
Authority. In this case it is still possible for intakes to be more or less advantaged
relative to other schools in the area. This is in contrast to arrangements where the
reference group is not applicants but a national or Local Authority average. In this
case some bands may not be filled by applicants who have put the school as first
choice and, consequently, those who have put the school as a lower preference
could be allocated a place. The Education and Inspections Act 2006 allows a
wider range of reference groups.
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Banding is permitted by Section 101 of the School Standards and
Framework Act 1998 (‘1998 Act’) as amended by Section 54 of the
Education and Inspections Act 2006 (‘2006 Act’).  Admission authorities
may now adopt admission arrangements that band applicants to produce an
intake that is representative of any one of:
the full range of ability of applicants for the school (or group of schools
banding jointly);
the range of ability of children in the local area; or
the national ability range.
(Section 4 Information Note on Banding 2007 DfES website)
2.4.2 Key findings
• Only three Local Authorities had authority wide banding, all in London
• Two had fewer appeals and all three had less segregated intakes than the
average for other London authorities
• 35 autonomous schools outside these authorities also banded their intake.
The great majority were in London
• The numbers are small, but of these, twice as many Voluntary Aided
schools (18) banded their intake compared to Academies (9) and
Foundation schools (8).
• The great majority had 'fair banding'
• One school used 'selective banding'.
2.4.3 Authority wide banding:
Authority wide banding aims to achieve in every school an intake representative of
the whole attainment range in that authority. Prior to the application process,
children are sorted according to attainment into as many bands as the authority
decides on the basis of an LA wide measure. Each school in the authority is
allowed only to take from its applicants a proportionate group of people depending
on the size of the band. For example, for those with five equal sized bands this
would be an equal proportion of children (20%) in each band. Others may have
three bands of 25%, 50% and 25%. It is sometimes called 'fair banding' with
reference to the problems associated with intakes segregated by attainment or
social background (Levacic 2007). Over-subscription criteria are applied to each
band should there be more applicants for that band than there are places. The 'fair
banding' label distinguishes it from other banding arrangements where unequal
proportions are taken from each band, a system operating only at the level of 2
schools in non-banded authorities and which will be discussed below.
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There were only three banded local authorities in 2006. The 2007 School
Admissions Code endorses banding as good practice (Chapter 2 section 2.79).
This, together with the requirement on Local Authorities to become proactive with
regard to segregation of intakes (Chapter 4 section 4.6) makes it likely that more
authorities will look at the possibility of using banding in their areas. The three LAs
using authority wide 'fair' banding in 2006 were Lewisham and Tower Hamlets in
Inner London and Greenwich in Outer London. The details of their arrangements
are given in the table below.
Table 5:  Details of arrangements in the three banded authorities
Method of measuring
attainment
Number
of bands
Proportions in
each band
Reference
Group
Greenwich Optional reading and
maths SATs in Y5
5 20% LA
Lewisham Optional reading and
maths SATs in Y5
5 20% LA
Tower Hamlets Optional reading
SATs in Y5
4 25% LA
All three used the optional SATs in Y5. All three local authorities had a variety of
types of school and a significant proportion of specialist schools. Three of
Lewisham's eight specialist schools selected a proportion of their intake by
aptitude.
Only in Greenwich were all the area's schools banded. In the other two there were
non-community schools that were not part of the 'LEA wide' scheme.
Table 6:  Lewisham schools banded and not banded
Community VA (RC) VA (CofE) VA (not
rel)
Academy
(RC)
Academy
(not rel)
Total
Banded 6 0 0 1 1 2 10
NotBanded 0 1 1 1 0 0 3
Totals 6 1 1 2 1 2 13
Table 7:  Greenwich schools banded and not banded
Community VA (RC) VA (CofE) VC Academy
(RC)
Total
Banded 8 2 1 1 1 13
Not Banded 0 0 0 0 0 0
Totals 8 2 1 1 1 13
Table 8:  Tower Hamlet schools banded and not banded
Community VA (RC) VA (CofE) VA (not rel) VC Total
Banded 9 0 2 1 1 13
Not Banded 0 2 0 0 0 2
Totals 9 2 2 1 1 15
Appeals heard in Greenwich and Tower Hamlets were fewer than average for their
region and for London as a whole, while Lewisham was above average on this
measure. But, as outlined in section 1.1.4, the limitations of appeals as a
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comparative measure in London should be remembered. All three had less
segregated intakes than the average for London (Allen and Vignoles 2006).
Table 9:  Levels of appeals and segregation in the three banded authorities
Appeals Heard as a % of all
submissions
Segregation (lower = less
segregated)
Greenwich 7.4 0.20
Lewisham 13.4 0.22
Tower Hamlets 7.2 0.27
Inner London 10.7 not available
Outer London 8.6 not available
London 9.3 0.29
2.4.4 Banding in Voluntary Aided and Foundation schools and Academies
Banding is also found in schools that are their own admission authorities that are
not in banded LAs. In 2006 there were 35 such admission authorities. The great
majority of these were in London. The table below excludes those schools in
banded Local Authorities.
Table 10
Number of banded AAs not in banded LAs by region
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Twice as many Voluntary Aided schools (18 or 3.4% of all VA schools) banded
their intake compared to Academies (9 or 21% of all Academies) and Foundation
schools (8 or 1.5% of all Foundation schools).
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Table 11
Banded AAs not in Banded LAs by 
type of school
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Table 12
Banded AAs not in banded LAs as a 
proportion of type of school
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Most of these schools used banding to get a balanced intake by attainment (fair
banding) but two schools in Lambeth (one Voluntary Aided and one Foundation17)
used it to select an intake of higher attainment e.g. by having three bands and
                                             
17 The Foundation school moved to a 25%, 50%, 25% policy in 2007.
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taking 40% from the highest attaining group, 40% from the middle attaining group
and 20% from the lowest attaining group. As with the banded Local Authorities,
various standardised tests were used including those developed by NFER (2007)
and the optional SATs results.
The reference group used to construct the parameters of the bands is important.
The 2003 School Admissions Code of Practice required this to be the applicants to
the school. This meant that if the average attainment of the group of applicants
was different to that across the Local Authority the intake of the banded school
might still be skewed by attainment compared to other schools in the area. The
2006 Education and Inspections Act now allows the reference group to be:
a) applicants for the school(s) or a group of schools; or
b) children in the local area; or
c) the national ability range18.
Thirty one out of thirty five of the schools had applicants as their reference group,
three of the remaining four used an authority wide measure and the reference
group for one was unknown.
2.5 Selection
2.5.1 Key findings
• 10 out of the 14 most selective authorities required parents to opt in for the
tests, in 3 they had to opt out and one was variable
• In the 14 most selective authorities there were, on average, more appeals,
fewer parents gained their first preference and the intakes were more
socially segregated than in the other authorities
• There are more grammar schools that are Foundation schools than any
other type
• Selection and social segregation appear to go hand in hand.
• There has been a small increase in the proportion of schools selecting by
aptitude from an estimated 1.3% in 2000, 3% in 2001 to 4% in 2006
• Voluntary-aided and Foundation schools were much more likely to select
pupils by aptitude than Community/Voluntary Controlled schools19.
• By far the most common form of test for aptitude was a live trial or audition
                                             
18 See 2007 School Admissions Code (para. 2.80)
19 This may partly be explained by the smaller proportion of Voluntary Controlled and Community schools with
specialist status.
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• For a large proportion of schools for whom we do not know the method of
selection it means that their admission arrangements are not transparent
and this is worrying because of the potential for covert selection.
2.5.2 Authorities with schools that select by attainment
Some schools select all (grammar schools) or part (partially selective schools) of
their intake by attainment as measured in a test. There are 43 local authorities with
schools that use such selection by prior attainment as part of their admissions
criteria. In areas where a substantial proportion of the total places are allocated to
those who score highest and where all children take the 11+ test than all places
are effectively selective in both grammar and secondary modern schools. However
in some areas that have substantial proportions of ‘grammar’ places not all
children take the test and the non-grammar schools in the area may be called
comprehensive or all-ability schools and aspire to a non-selective intake. This
despite the fact that their intakes will be affected by the selective process of the
explicitly selective schools.  Then there are the areas where there is a only a small
proportion of the places allocated on the basis of prior attainment and here the
non-selective schools may truthfully claim to have an all-ability intake although
with fewer higher performing children. For the sake of simplicity, in the table below
and subsequent discussion we have labelled places allocated to the highest
scoring children ‘selective places’ and all others as ‘non-selective places’ but the
complexity outlined above needs to be borne in mind. The table shows all places
allocated to children achieving the highest scores in an 11+ test in local authorities
as a percentage of all the secondary places available in that area.
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Table 13
Total
Places
Selective
Places Non-SelectivePlaces
%Selective
Places
%Non-Selective
Places
1 Trafford 3066 1200 1866 39.14 60.86
2 Southend-on-Sea 2178 750 1428 34.44 65.56
3 Buckinghamshire 5794 1980 3814 34.17 65.83
4 Slough 1557 530 1027 34.04 65.96
5 Kent 16781 4830 11951 28.78 71.22
6 Bexley 3451 991 2460 28.72 71.28
7 Sutton 2641 737 1904 27.91 72.09
8 Medway 3714 954 2760 25.69 74.31
9 Lincolnshire 8665 2065 6600 23.83 76.17
10 Poole 1705 360 1345 21.11 78.89
11 Wirral 4472 938 3534 20.97 79.03
12 Reading 1127 234 893 20.76 79.24
13 Kingston upon
Thames 1441 284 1157 19.71 80.29
14 Torbay 1275 240 1035 18.82 81.18
15 Bournemouth 1888 312 1576 16.53 83.47
16 Barnet 3513 569 2944 16.20 83.80
17 Plymouth 3217 414 2803 12.87 87.13
18 Calderdale 2763 310 2453 11.22 88.78
19 Gloucestershire 7251 810 6441 11.17 88.83
20 Wandsworth 1926 194 1732 10.07 89.93
21 Brent 2872 240 2632 8.36 91.64
22 Birmingham 13033 999 12034 7.67 92.33
23 Warwickshire 6495 428 6067 6.59 93.41
24 Telford and
Wrekin 2230 146 2084 6.55 93.45
25 Bromley 3919 242 3677 6.18 93.82
26 Enfield 3473 180 3293 5.18 94.82
27 Walsall 3864 192 3672 4.97 95.03
28 North Yorkshire 8123 340 7783 4.19 95.81
29 Stoke-on-Trent 2891 120 2771 4.15 95.85
30 Croydon 3776 138 3638 3.65 96.35
31 Wolverhampton 3008 108 2900 3.59 96.41
32 Lancashire 14667 524 14143 3.57 96.43
33 Hertfordshire 13802 434 13368 3.14 96.86
34 Kirklees 5158 150 5008 2.91 97.09
35 Essex 17212 484 16728 2.81 97.19
36 Liverpool 6063 161 5902 2.66 97.34
37 Cumbria 6726 120 6606 1.78 98.22
38 Devon 8209 120 8089 1.46 98.54
39 Redbridge 3246 27 3219 0.83 99.17
40 Surrey 10891 85 10806 0.78 99.22
41 Southwark 2416 18 2398 0.75 99.25
42 Peterborough 2412 12 2400 0.50 99.50
43 Dudley 4135 16 4119 0.39 99.61
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Over half of the local authorities have fewer than 10% selective places. In some
cases these may be the result of single grammar schools in an area with
predominantly all ability schools. However in other cases the selective places may
be concentrated in towns which in effect create a small highly selective subset of
schools. In urban areas where there is little cross border traffic and the admissions
context is relatively self contained the existence of even a small percentage of
selective places can have an effect on the intakes of other schools. There are
fourteen authorities with percentages between nearly 19% and 39% with an
average of 27%. For the purposes of analysis we have used these fourteen most
selective authorities (shaded in the table above) to test for associations.
A significant aspect of the process of admission to selective schools is how
children get to take the 11+test. In 2000 Flatley et al (2001) found three methods
in highly selective areas. One was the universal opt out system where children
were automatically tested in their primary schools or elsewhere. It provides
universal access and raises no obvious equity issues beyond those generally
associated with selective systems. A second method was where parents were
invited to opt in to the test. In this case they had to apply to the school for their
child to be entered for the test which may have been held in a place other than the
primary school and at a given time which was often a weekend. Finally, some
areas entered children on the primary school’s recommendation (with parents able
to include them by request). As can be seen from the table below, in 2006 in the
fourteen most selective areas we found the first two systems in operation but none
based entry to the test solely on the primary schools' recommendation.
Table 14
Local Authority Entry system
Bexley Opt in
Buckinghamshire Universal opt out
Kent Universal opt out
Kingston upon Thames Opt in
Lincolnshire Variable
Medway Opt in
Poole Opt in
Reading Opt in
Slough Opt in
Southend-on-Sea Opt in
Sutton Opt in
Torbay Opt in
Trafford Universal opt out
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Wirral Opt in
The fourteen most selective areas were more likely to have a higher proportion of
non-Community schools than the remaining 134 areas and selection is clearly
associated with relatively higher levels of school autonomy at the Local Authority
level20. On average, appeals were more common in these most selective Local
Authorities with around 13% of admissions resulting in an appeal being lodged
(compared with less than 10% in all other LAs). The percentage of first
preferences was, on average, lower (mean=78%, median=79%) compared with
the other Local Authorities (mean=88%, median=92%).
Other studies have found that grammar schools have a significantly more
advantaged intake than other schools in their area (Levacic and Marsh 2007). We
also found that selection and social segregation appear to go hand in hand. On
average the 2004 dissimilarity index was substantially larger for the fourteen most
selective Local Authorities (mean=0.36, median=0.37) compared with the other
LAs (mean & median=0.27). For both, the average skew was towards
concentrations of advantage – this was sharper to a striking degree for the
fourteen most selective LAs (mean=0.23, median=0.19) compared with other LAs
(mean=0.06, median=0.04).
2.5.3 Grammar schools
In this section we look at the characteristics of the grammar schools themselves.
There are 164 grammar schools in total. The majority (108) are in the fourteen
most selective areas with 56 in the other areas. Inevitably, when grammar schools
and all ability schools co-exist in the same area and serve the same population,
the effect on the intake of the all ability schools will be to depress the average
attainment level of their intakes.
There are more grammar schools that are Foundation schools than any other type.
Sixteen percent of Foundation schools, 7% of Voluntary Aided schools, and 2.3%
of Community/Voluntary Controlled schools are grammars.
                                             
20 The reasons for this association are complex and may be linked to historical issues such as grant
maintained status. We cannot infer causes from statistical associations.
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Table 15
All grammar schools by type of school
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2.5.4 Partially selective schools
Selective arrangements that had been in place prior to 1997 are allowed to
continue but any new selective arrangements other than for fair banding or to
select up to a total of 10% for aptitude are prohibited. This meant that a number of
schools in 2006 were allowed to continue selecting all or part of their intake by
general ability (i.e. attainment in an 11+ test) and some were allowed to continue
to select more than a total of 10% by aptitude. In this section we report only on
those that select part of their intake by general ability through an 11+ test. Those
schools that selected more than 10% by aptitude are considered in the next
section.
In 2006 we found only 37 schools that select part of their intake by general ability
making only 1% of all secondary schools and they are spread between 20 different
local authorities (see table below). 19 are Foundation schools, 14 Voluntary Aided
and 4 are Community schools. They are found in different types of local authority
with 3 in Outer London, 2 in Inner London, 8 in other Metropolitan areas, and 7 in
non-metropolitan areas. The percentage of the intake selected by attainment
ranges from 9% to 43%.
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Table 16 Schools that select part of their intake on general ability/attainment
Local
Authority
Type of
school
Name of school % Selected
by
attainment
% Selected
by aptitude
Bexley C Erith School 20 0
Croydon F The Archbishop Lanfranc School 15 0
Croydon F Shirley High School 15 0
Croydon F Edenham High School 15 0
Croydon VA Riddlesdown High School 15 0
Dorset F Budmouth Technology College 30 0
Dudley VA Old Swinford Hospital 27 0
Essex F The King John School 15 0
Hertfordshire F Queens' School 35 10
Hertfordshire F Rickmansworth School 35 10
Hertfordshire VA Dame Alice Owen's School 33 10
Hertfordshire VA Parmiter's School 35 10
Hertfordshire VA St Clement Danes School 10 10
Hertfordshire VA Watford Grammar School for Boys 35 10
Hertfordshire VA Watford Grammar School for Girls 35 10
Kent F The Archbishop's School 15 0
Kent F Homewood School 20 1
Kingston VA The Holy Cross School 13 0
Lincolnshire C King Edward VI Spilsby 25 0
Liverpool VA St Margaret's CofE High School 15 0
Liverpool VA St Hilda's CofE High School 15 0
Peterborough VA The King's School 10 0
Poole F Poole High School 10 0
Reading F Reading Girls' School 24 0
Redbridge F The Chadwell Heath F School 15 0
Southend F Cecil Jones College 10 0
Southend VA St Bernard's High School 43 0
Southend VA St Thomas More High School for Boys 21 0
Southwark VA St Saviour's & St Olave's CofE School 15 0
Surrey F Glyn Technology School 15 0
Surrey F Rosebery School 10 10
Surrey F The Winston Churchill School 9 15
Torbay F Westlands School 25 0
Wandsworth C Ernest Bevin 33 0
Wandsworth F Burntwood School 25 0
Wandsworth F Graveney School 25 0
Warwickshire C Ashlawn School 12 0
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Two further schools in Lambeth, Archbishop Tenison and London Nautical21,
continued to use a 40%, 40%, 20% split between bands to select a higher
attaining intake and these should also be considered partially selective schools.
The actual impact of partial selection will depend on the specific context and the
detailed knowledge required for this is beyond the scope of the present study.
However, bringing together data at the area level with the findings about each of
these partially selective schools offers some interesting findings. In 16 of the 20
areas partially selective schools make up a small proportion of all schools but in
Croydon, Southend, Hertfordshire and Wandsworth they appear to have a more
significant presence. We look at each of these areas in more detail.
In 2006 Croydon had four partially selective schools out of twenty one. Three were
Foundation schools and one a Voluntary Aided. Each selected 15% by attainment.
None of these four selected by aptitude but four other schools in the area did so.
Being outer London there is a high level of cross border traffic with about 18%
imported i.e. children from other authorities attending Croydon secondary schools
and about 23% exported i.e. Croydon resident pupils attending secondary schools
in other authorities22..
Southend-on-Sea had three partially selective schools out of twelve. The three
include both of the two Voluntary Aided schools in the Borough and one
Foundation. The Foundation school selected 10%, and the two Voluntary Aided
schools 21% and 43%. The latter school described itself as bi-lateral with separate
selective and non-selective streams. None of the three schools selected by
aptitude but two other schools in the area did. There was a wholly selective
system in operation with four grammar schools in addition to the three partially
selective schools. This is a highly selective context with more than a third (34%) of
all secondary school places being on the basis of attainment tests. Southend had
a much higher level of imports (17.5%) and exports (11.5%) of pupils than the
average for the East of England (4.7% and 4.2% respectively), and was
comparable with London levels. The great majority of imports are from Essex.
Hertfordshire had seven partially selective schools out of seventy six. Five were
Voluntary Aided and two were Foundation schools. What is distinctive about these
schools is that all but one, which selects 10%, select around a third of their intake
(33 to 35%). In addition all seven select a further 10% by aptitude along with
seven other schools in the local authority. Hertfordshire imports a slightly higher
                                             
21 London Nautical moved in 2007 to a 25%, 50%, 25% split between bands but continued to select on
nautical ability.
22 DfES Local Authority Cross Border Movement of Secondary1 2 School Pupils Resident in England, January 2006 (Final).
Statistical First Release
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proportion of pupils (7.7%) than the regional average (4.7%) and exports slightly
fewer (3.1%) than the regional average (4.2%). The imports come largely from the
adjacent London boroughs and counties of Essex, Bedfordshire and
Buckinghamshire. The area has no wholly selective schools but the selective
intake of the seven partially selective schools equate to about two fully selective
grammar schools.
In 2006 Wandsworth had three partially selective schools out of ten. Two out of the
five Foundation schools selected 25% and one of the two Community schools
selected 33% of their intake. This amounted to 10% of the total number of pupils
admitted to Wandsworth secondary schools. None of these three selected by
aptitude but three other schools did. Two of the remaining three Foundation
schools used fair banding to gain a balanced intake. There is a great deal of cross
border traffic. Wandsworth exports a slightly smaller percentage of pupils (28%)
than the average for Inner London (29%) and imports substantially more (37%)
than the area average (25%). Many of the imported pupils come from the London
Boroughs of Lambeth, Merton and Hammersmith and Fulham. There are no wholly
selective schools in Wandsworth but, as for all London schools, the level of
competition is high.
We may conclude that while partial selection is found in a small minority of schools
there are a number of schools in some areas that select a substantial proportion of
their intake and this is likely to have a significant impact on the balance of intakes
within their local context. However, more detailed knowledge of the specific cases
would be needed to draw further conclusions.
2.5.5 Selection by aptitude
Schools are allowed to select up to 10% of their intake on the basis of aptitude for
certain subjects. This does not apply only to schools in the Specialist Schools
Programme; any admission authority may decide to give priority in this way. In
2000 (Flatley et al 2001) it was found that 43 schools, that is 1.4% of all secondary
schools, selected by aptitude. West and Hind (2003) calculated that, in 2001, 90,
or 3% of all secondary schools did so. Since then the number of schools on the
specialist school programme has increased greatly and in 2006 there were 2076
designated schools. In 2006 we found 129 schools selected by aptitude making an
increased proportion of 4.13% of all schools and 6.2% of specialist schools.
West and Hind (2003 p10) also found that in 2001 Voluntary-aided and Foundation
schools were much more likely to be partially selecting pupils by
attainment/aptitude than community/voluntary controlled schools. Our study found
this same tendency in 2006. Analysed by type of school, there were far more (one
in two) Foundation schools that selected by aptitude. Voluntary Aided schools
were also more likely to select in this way (just over one in four) whereas
Community, Voluntary Controlled schools (one in eight) and Academies (one in
twelve) were much less likely to do so. This may partly be explained by the smaller
proportion of Voluntary Controlled and Community schools with specialist status.
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Table 17:  Proportions of each type of school selecting by aptitude
School Type NumSchools
% of all Schools of
the type that select
by aptitude
Foundation 68 53
Voluntary aided 35 27
Community 15 12
Academies 11 9
The 1998 Standards and Framework Act allowed schools to continue with
selection arrangements if they were in place in 1997 prior to the Act.  This included
selection by aptitude for more than the 10% maximum allowed for any new
arrangements. We found 10 schools (8% of all schools that select by aptitude) that
selected more than 10% of their intake. Five of these selected between 15% and
17% of their intake, three between 20% and 27%, one 40%%, and one did not
specify.
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Table 18  Schools with pre-existing partial selection over a total of 10%
LA School % Selected
by aptitude
Specialisms Type of
school
Barnet M i l l  H i l l
School
25% Technology,
Music  and
Dance
Foundation
Birmingham Ninestiles
School
27% Tech,
Maths/Comp
and Science
Foundation
Buckinghamshire Waddesdon
C o f  E
School
15% Music Voluntary
Aided
Havering23 Coopers’
Company &
Coborn
Not specified Sport, Music,
Drama and
others
Voluntary
Aided
Kent Chaucer 15% Technology Foundation
Lancashire Rip ley  St
Thomas CE
High
15% Modern
Foreign
Languages
Voluntary
Aided
Liverpool Archbishop
Blanch CE
High School
(Girls)
15% Arts,
Maths/Comp,
Music,
Science,
Sport, Tech.
Voluntary
Aided
Liverpool King David
High School
17% Music Voluntary
Aided
Liverpool St Edward’s
College
20% Music Voluntary
Aided
Wandsworth Chestnut
Grove
40% Art, Modern
Foreign
Languages
Foundation
For the great majority of schools (86%) that select by aptitude this remains the
only formal means of selection. However 18 schools combined selection by
aptitude with selection of part or the whole of their intake by attainment.
The schools that selected by aptitude were not evenly spread geographically. A
quarter were in London, spread equally between Inner and Outer London.
                                             
23 See Appendix D
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Table 19:  Spread of schools that select by aptitude
Area NumSchools
% of all Schools that
select by aptitude
London 33 26
London - Inner 16 12
London - Outer 17 13
Elsewhere 96 74
In response to concerns about the difficulty of separating selection by aptitude
from selection by general ability, the specialisms for which schools could introduce
new arrangements to select by aptitude were restricted to the following:
• physical education or sport or one or more sports
• the performing arts or one or more of those arts
• the visual arts or one or more of those arts
• modern foreign languages or any such language
• design and technology and information technology.
Schools that were already selecting for other subjects prior to this regulation were
allowed to continue.
In response to the Education Select Committee (2004a), the Government has from
2008 withdrawn the option for schools to introduce selection by aptitude in design
and technology and/or information technology (School Admissions Code 2007)
whilst allowing schools already using such criteria to continue to do so.
The frequency of specialisms selected for in 2006 are given in the following chart.
Table 20
Frequency of specialism selected for
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There has also been scepticism expressed about how schools can fairly establish
aptitude without at the same time selecting by attainment (Education and Skills
Select Committee 2004a; West and Hind 2003). In addition, some forms of test of
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aptitude such as live auditions, are subject to the same criticism as interviews in
that they provide the means for selection on social grounds. While the 2003
School Admissions Code of Practice stated that there should be no interviews
(DfES 2003b para 3.16) and interviewing is now outlawed (see section 1.46
School Admissions Code 2007) the use of interviews or live auditions is allowed:
solely for the purpose of assessing a child’s suitability for a boarding place,
or to auditions, or other oral or practical tests in order to ascertain a child’s
aptitude in a particular subject at schools with a permitted form of selection
by aptitude. (section 1.46 and 1.47)
Given this debate it is of interest what methods the schools in 2006 used. We
found the following categories in the composite prospectuses and give their
frequencies in the chart below24. The most common category was a live test or
audition and this included auditions for music and drama, and sports trials.
Table 21
Method of selecting by aptitude
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The variety and frequency of kinds of test for each specialism are given in Table
22.
                                             
24 The category ''Test' included tests for specific modern languages as well as unspecified test for Technology.
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Table 22:  Frequency of methods of assessing aptitude
For the large proportion of schools for whom we do not know the method of
selection it means that their admission arrangements are not transparent and this
is worrying because of the potential for covert selection.
There are significant differences between selection by aptitude and selection by
‘ability’. Nevertheless there are strong arguments to suggest that selection by
aptitude is likely to be socially selective by default. A high relative attainment in
any of the subjects (even sport) will involve expense of resources of time and
money for travelling, equipment and training. More affluent families have more of
these resources as well as more social and cultural capital. In addition, parents
from higher socio-economic groups tend to be more active in choosing a school
and to be more willing for their children to travel away from their nearest school
(financial resources will play a part in this as well) and so they may be more likely
to apply for the aptitude places. These possibilities remain to be proven but there
would appear to be potential for unfairness.
2.6 Supplementary information
2.6.1 Key findings
• 50% of Voluntary Aided and Foundation schools and Academies did not
ask for any supplementary information. 21% asked only for evidence to
apply published criteria including confirmation of faith, or proof of residence
or related to a confirmation of aptitude and 29% asked for additional
information beyond this purpose.
• Voluntary Aided schools were more likely than any other type of school to
request supplementary information other than to apply published criteria
• The most frequent categories of information requested beyond evidence to
apply published criteria were Personal information about the child, Reasons
for application,  Background details of family or child and Commitment to
school
Live
trial/
Audition Ref Certificate Test
Gen
Ability
Test Unknown Total
Music 19 0 8 0 0 15 42
Technology 0 0 1 18 1 13 33
Arts 13 3 3 0 0 8 27
Sports 8 2 3 0 0 13 26
Languages 9 0 1 2 0 3 15
Maths&Comp 6 0 0 0 0 4 10
Science 1 0 0 0 0 2 3
Bus&Ent 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Total 73 5 16 3 1 59 157
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2.6.2 Introduction
Some Voluntary Aided and Foundation school admission authorities require
parents to submit information in addition to that required on the common
application form. The frequency and nature of the supplementary information
requested by schools is pertinent to the fairness of admissions because such
information can reveal the social or academic background of a child or because
judgements about such information are subjective. Pennell, West and Hind (2005)
in their survey of London secondary schools concluded that ‘the supplementary
forms used by some schools provide opportunities to select more ‘desirable’
pupils’. Admissions officers that they interviewed also reported concerns about the
use of these forms for that reason. Pennell et al’s concerns were that in some
cases parents were asked to provide information that did not seem to be related to
the school’s admissions criteria (e.g., whether parents were living in bed and
breakfast accommodation or parents’ occupations). This provided opportunities for
discriminating between applicants on social grounds. They were also concerned
that the length of some forms and the requirement, in some cases, that parents
and children write extensively about their reasons for wanting a place at the
school, could systematically deter some parents/carers (e.g. those with few or no
educational qualifications) from applying and such information could only be
judged subjectively. It is important to keep in mind that a request for this kind of
information only offers the opportunity for discrimination by intention or by default.
Evidence that such information is actually implicated in causing differences in the
social background of the intakes would by its nature be difficult to gain. But it is the
case that these schools have higher than average attainment and are more
socially advantaged.
The current study offered the opportunity to map the incidences of such requests
across all schools and enabled us to see how far the findings from London were
replicated across the country. We wrote to all Voluntary Aided and Foundation
schools and Academies and City Technology Colleges for copies of their
supplementary information forms, or confirmation that they did not ask for further
information, and analysed the kind of information required from parents25.
2.6.3 Representativeness of the respondents
Given the sensitivities around the issue and the possibility that schools would fear
attracting criticism, we were concerned that some might not wish to provide us
with the forms. In the event 722 (67%) schools responded and they were closely
                                             
25We did not ask the 90 Voluntary Controlled schools since they have the same arrangements and criteria as
Community schools.
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representative of all Voluntary Aided, Foundation schools and Academies by
region, type of school and denomination26.
They were also representative by region. Table 23 compares the proportion of
respondents in our sample (black bars) from each type of school with the actual
proportion of those schools regionally (white bars). It shows that the proportions
differ by no more than one percentage point, except for the North West and Inner
London which are slightly under-represented.
Table 23
Proportions of VA and Foundation schools that responded to survey by region
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26 Some caution needs to be expressed however in that it is possible that they are representative in terms of
the characteristics stated without being quite so representative in terms of admission arrangements due to
some schools with some relevant common characteristics being reluctant to respond.
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Proportions of types of schools that responded to survey
48.8% 49.4%48.3%
46.1%
2.5% 3.7%
0.4% 0.6%
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
All Schools (1084) Responded to Survey (722)
Types of Schools
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Foundation
Voluntary Aided
Academies
City Technology Colleges
Table 25
Proportions of Voluntary Aided schools that responded to survey- By 
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50% of the responding schools did not ask for any supplementary information.
21% asked only for evidence to apply published criteria including confirmation of
faith, or proof of residence or related to a confirmation of aptitude. 29% asked for
additional information beyond this purpose.
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2.6.4 Categories of supplementary information
The additional information beyond evidence to apply published criteria fell into the
following categories:
Personal information about the child  Includes photograph, ethnicity, information
about extra-curricular interests or child's reasons for wanting to attend the school.
Reasons for application  Including reasons for wanting to attend a Catholic school
if non-Catholic.
Background details of family or child  Often requested separately. Includes
parents' occupation/s or request for signatures of both parents.
Commitment to school  Mostly commitment to school ethos, often religious ethos,
but also includes commitment to fundraising or PTA participation.
Registration fee  Request for cash, including cost of administration and postage.
Child's linguistic or cultural learning  Includes child's first language and aptitude for
schools with specialism in foreign languages or international schools.
Family attended/s school  Beyond the often published criterion of sibling in school,
a request for information about previous family members attending the school.
Previous school  Requested as further information. Includes signature of primary
school head.
Reasons for leaving previous school
Reference from primary headteacher  Includes asking if primary head may be
contacted about application.
Academic record  Information about SATs results or any other academic tests or
records.
Other  Includes cross border information and marketing devices such as how they
heard of school and Views of the school after visit.
Altogether 146 (43.8%) of the 333 Voluntary Aided schools that responded
requested information in at least one of these categories and of all types of non-
Community school, they are the most likely to request this kind of supplementary
information27.
                                             
27 Discounting the Roman Catholic Academies because of their very small number.
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Table 26
Number of each type of school that requested supplementary information 
other than to apply published criteria (number of respondents in brackets)
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Table 27
Percentage of each type of school that requested supplementary 
information other than to apply published criteria (number of respondents 
in brackets)
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A greater proportion (27%) of London non-community schools requested
supplementary information than the proportion (18%) for other areas of the
country.
While examples of each one of the categories of additional information has been
found in some school’s admission arrangements it is useful to establish their scale
of use. The frequency of each category of request is given in the table below.
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Frequency of categories of information other than to apply published 
criteria requested by schools
61% of schools asked for only one category of information other than that to apply
admissions criteria. The remaining 39% asking for two or more categories.
Table 29 Number of questions in each supplementary information form
Number of questions requesting
supplementary information
1 2 3 4
Number of schools that asked only
this many questions
128 61 17 5
2.6.5 Examples of types of requests
In this section we give examples of the range and tone of the requests discussed
above. The first exemplifies the many requests that simply asked for information to
apply published criteria. The other two are examples of information asked beyond
this purpose, many of which are now unlawful. Indeed the 2007 School
Admissions Code precisely and explicitly identifies as unlawful a number of
potential means of discrimination through the use of supplementary information
(DCSF 2007 1.7.1 to 1.7.3).
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Example B: A supplementary information form from an
oversubscribed, Voluntary Aided, single sex, Roman Catholic
School, located in a wholly selective area in the south of England.
The form contains a combination of categories. Some are used to
apply published criteria such as details of siblings currently
attending the school, proof of residence and confirmation of faith.
However, the form also requests additional details.
These include the parents' church or parish where they were
married along with a copy of the marriage certificate. The form
also requires details of the child's and the family's involvement
with the parish, or the life of the church, as well as an explanation
as to why the child's parents are unmarried (if applicable) or why
the marriage was civil rather than a Roman Catholic Church
ceremony. Signatures are also required from both of the child's
parents.
Example A: A supplementary information form from a Foundation
School located in the Midlands.
The supplementary information form used by this school simply
requests information to apply published criteria. Details requested
include information of any siblings currently attending the school
and the name of the present school which the child currently
attends.
Example C: A supplementary information form from a Voluntary
Aided Church of England School in the south of England.
As well as requesting information to apply published criteria, such
as whether the child is in the care of the Local Authority and
sibling information, the form from this school also requests further
details from applicants.
Additional requests include a promise from parents that the child
will commit to the rules and ethos of the school. It is also
requested that parents include additional information about the
child such as their interests in the school, their favourite subject,
their hobbies and the child's character. Signatures are required
from both parents.
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2.7 Schools that are over or undersubscribed
2.7.1 Key findings
• For a large proportion (42%) of schools it was not possible to tell their
subscription status from the information given in the composite prospectus
• Given these difficulties we estimate that about 33% of schools are
undersubscribed, 25% oversubscribed and 1% evens and about 42%
unknown.
• Using these estimated figures, rates of oversubscribed schools are higher
in Local Authorities that are located outside London, use the equal
preference/default ranking system, are among the 14 most selective
authorities and have a majority of autonomous schools.
2.7.2 Introduction
The policy of parental choice of schools encourages parents to discriminate
between better and worse schools. Whether or not the policy has created or
facilitated it, in most areas parents perceive a hierarchy of schools. Some schools
are more popular than others. Schools cannot easily expand and contract to take
all who apply from year to year and it is expensive to allow schools to operate with
too much spare capacity as a contingency. As a result admission authorities draw
up criteria to allow them to choose between which applicants should have priority
for admission. These are the oversubscription criteria and we examine the kinds
and frequencies in the next section.
The concern has been widely expressed that popular schools are choosing the
children and not the parents choosing the school. Schools have a strong incentive
to select on the basis of social characteristics and attainment. School reputations
are gained and lost in a complex and little understood process but their pupils'
performance in public examinations plays an important part in the way the school
is perceived by parents, local authorities and agencies such as Ofsted bolstered
by comparisons in performance tables of various kinds. It is also the case that
some children offer challenges that make the day to day work of teachers harder
and more stressful (Thrupp 1999). It is therefore in the school’s interests to attract
children who are, because of their social characteristics or prior attainment level,
more likely to perform well in these tests and who are easier to teach. Further, it is
feared that some parents can better manage the admissions system to their
advantage and will therefore stand a better chance of getting in to the
oversubscribed schools.
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Whether a school is oversubscribed and what criteria they have to meet to get a
place is very significant information for parents to enable them to make realistic
choices. The 2003 School Admissions Code of Practice states28 that information to
parents must include "numbers of places and applications for those places in the
previous year." This is intended to ensure that parents are given an indication of
the likelihood of their children being able to gain a place at any particular school.
This is meant to be achieved by publication of the criteria for admission together
with information as to the relative popularity of each school. If a school is heavily
over-subscribed then some parents who do not meet the oversubscription criteria
may be wasting one of their options if they express a preference for it. In this
section we look at the subscription status of secondary schools for admissions in
2006.
2.7.3 Subscription status of schools
We categorised schools as Undersubscribed, Oversubscribed, Evens29 and
Unknown. For the purposes of this study a school is defined as Oversubscribed if
more parents put it as their first preference than there were places in the school in
terms of their published admission number for that school year and
undersubscribed if the converse. This is an apt definition given that first preference
ranking of the school by parents is used to allocate places at two stages, first by
the school if it has first preference as an over subscription criterion and secondly
by the LA if the child is eligible for more than one school irrespective of whether
there is a first preference first system or an equal preference/default ranking
system. These are the definitions that are relevant to parents.
                                             
28 "The information which must be published is: the name and address of the school and contact details; the
school’s classification; a summary of the admissions policy (it is not sufficient to refer parents to the school for
details of its admissions policy); a statement of any religious affiliation; and (for secondary schools) numbers
of places and applications for those places in the previous year." Section A22 Annex A: School Admissions:
The Law:
29 The number of schools will be extremely small where there is an exact fit of applicants with the number of
places available. We needed an Evens category that captured schools that were neither heavily over nor
heavily under subscribed. A school was defined as in the Evens category if the number of applicants who put
it as their first preference differed by 5% from the places available i.e. a school with 100 places that got
between 105 and 95 first preference applications was categorised as evens.
63
Table 30
Subscription status of all secondary schools 
33%
25%1%
42%
Undersubscribed
Oversubscribed
Evens
Unknown
Note: Because of rounding figures sum to more than 100
There is a surprisingly large proportion (42%) in the unknown category. For these
we found that it was not possible unequivocally to tell whether or not a school was
oversubscribed. Local authority composite prospectuses reported subscription
status in different ways. Sometimes where the subscription status was knowable
the prospectus clearly stated for each school the number of first preference
applicants in the previous year and the published admissions number (PAN) for
Sept 2006 in table form in the appendix.  These local authority prospectuses also
stated under which oversubscription criteria places were offered. In another set of
examples, again where the subscription status of each school was knowable, the
prospectus states the subscription status in writing for each school: e.g.: 'As the
school was undersubscribed last year, we offered places to all children who
applied from any area'. Where the subscription status was not knowable the
prospectus might state the available places (PAN) and the total number of
applicants received for each school, but does not differentiate between first and
other preferences.
This large number of unknowns is a significant finding. If we, as seasoned readers
of composite prospectuses, could not find adequate evidence even to estimate a
school's subscription status then parents are unlikely to be able to gain that
information from the prospectus either. Of course, parents have other sources of
information. 41% of respondents to the parent survey (reported in detail in section
3.3.9 of the next chapter) cited the prospectus but also five other sources (Ball and
Vincent 1998) but it appears that while the letter of the law may be being observed
the spirit may not be. It may be that Local Authorities were loath to emphasise
undersubscription for fear of increasing the unpopularity of some schools. It is
possible therefore that parents are told when a school is oversubscribed but the
information is fudged when a school is undersubscribed.
2.7.4 Analysis of attributes of schools associated with subscription status.
The 59% of schools whose subscription status is known came from only 55 (37%)
out of the 148 LAs and therefore some degree of caution is needed when
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considering the statistical findings below. The full analysis is given in the
Appendices together with a missing value analysis.
Only a limited number of associations were found between the percentage of
oversubscribed schools in a Local Authority and other variables. Rates of
oversubscribed schools are higher in Local Authorities that
• are located outside London: metropolitan Local Authorities have the highest
rates of oversubscribed schools (mean=35%, median=41%) then non-
metropolitan LAs (mean & median =26%), then inner London (mean=27%,
median=12%) and finally outer London (mean=22%, median=14%);
• use the equal preference/default ranking system of coordination: on
average, higher proportions of over subscribed schools are seen amongst
equal preference/default ranking Local Authorities (mean=31%,
median=20%) compared with first preference first Local Authorities
(mean=26%, median=21%).
• are among the 14 most selective: on average, the percentage of
oversubscribed schools is strikingly higher in the 14 most selective LAs
(mean & median=47%) compared with other LAs (mean=28%,
median=20%).
• are predominantly autonomous: LAs with predominantly autonomous
schools have higher rates of oversubscribed schools (mean=47%,
median=42%) than those LAs with predominantly non-autonomous
(mean=30%, median=21%). Diverse LAs (mean=26%, median=19%) i.e.
with roughly equal proportions of the different types of school, have the
fewest oversubscribed schools.
The association with segregation was somewhat equivocal but there was evidence
that there were lower proportions of oversubscribed schools in areas with schools
with 'low skew and low segregation' (mean=22%, median=13%) and higher
proportions in areas with 'low skew, high segregation' (mean=34%, median=37%).
Given the large number of areas that did not give enough information to establish
subscription status a missing values analysis is of interest. On average, the 93
LAs without detail on oversubscription were more likely to
• have lower population density
• be outside London
• not to be one of the 14 most selective
• have lower numbers of admission authorities.
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2.8 Oversubscription criteria
2.8.1 Key findings
• Some oversubscription criteria are a potential source of unfairness because
when schools are oversubscribed the admission authority, on the basis of
criteria their admission authority has determined, decide which applicants
are most eligible and therefore have higher priority. Some oversubscription
criteria and the way they are implemented provide the means of covert
selection by schools on the basis of social characteristics or prior
attainment.
• Oversubscription criteria are often complex combinations of a limited
number of elements.
• 67% of all schools put Child in Care as a high priority (either first or second
place) in their oversubscription criteria
• 77% of all schools had Child in Care somewhere in their oversubscription
criteria
• Voluntary Aided and Foundation schools were least likely to have Child in
Care as any kind of priority with nearly a half of Voluntary Aided and just
over a third of Foundation not mentioning them at all.
• Community/Voluntary Controlled schools and Academies were the most
likely to have Child in Care as a criterion with 86% and 79% respectively.
• While considerably fewer Voluntary Aided schools made any mention those
that did were more likely to put Child in Care as the first priority (60%).
• 17% of all schools put Medical or Social Needs as their first priority. 53% of
schools included it somewhere in their oversubscription criteria.
• Community (62%) and Voluntary Controlled (61%) schools and Academies
(58%) were the most likely to have Medical or Social Needs as a priority.
Foundation schools (47%) were less likely to do so, but Voluntary Aided
schools (22%) were much less likely with not quite a quarter prioritising
these children.
• Siblings was a significant criterion for all types of schools and the most
frequently used overall appearing in 91% of all schools.
• 65% of all schools used catchment. The great majority of Community and
Voluntary Controlled schools used Catchment, a half of the Foundation and
Voluntary Aided schools and a third of Academies.
• Catchment areas do not necessarily overlap with proximity to a school, but
may do
• 61% of all schools’ use proximity but often it has a low priority. It is often
used as a tie break for when other criteria fail to differentiate.
• 32% of all schools used Feeder schools somewhere in their criteria. Only
6% have it as their first priority. Voluntary Aided schools used this more
often than any other type of school.
• 30% of all schools used First Preference. A minority of all types of schools
had this criterion.
• Only 15% of all schools have any faith related criterion but for these it is a
high priority
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• 60% of Voluntary Aided faith schools gave some priority to other faiths.
16% gave some priority to children of no-faith (i.e. who had no religious
affiliation).
• 5 (0.9%) of Voluntary Aided faith schools did not have any faith criteria in
their published arrangements. They were all Church of England schools.
• Only 9% of all schools used Parent Commitment but this includes nearly a
third of all Voluntary Aided schools.
• 4% had criteria that gave priority to children who were related in some way
to adults connected with the school such as teachers or governors.
• On each of three measures Voluntary Aided Schools have markedly more
complex over subscription criteria than any other type of school.  They have
more oversubscription criteria, twice as many items per oversubscription
criteria and twice as many items in total.
2.8.2 Introduction
As we noted in the previous section, where more parents have expressed a
preference for a particular school in a particular year than it has places in that
year, there need to be criteria for deciding which applicants will be offered a place.
The 2003 School Admissions Code of Practice stated:
A.51 The admission authority has a fairly wide discretion in deciding what
these oversubscription criteria should be, provided that:
• the criteria are not unlawful;
• the admission authority has properly considered the factors which it
believes to be most important in ensuring that children receive an
efficient and suitable education, and has had regard to the guidance in
this Code;
• the criteria are clear, fair and objective and are published.
The ability to set such criteria is particularly important for Faith schools who wish
to maintain a distinct religious community. There have been concerns expressed
about the nature of some of the oversubscription criteria that some popular schools
apply. For example West and Hind (2003) found that in 2001 some grammar schools
added a further element of selectivity through the use of their oversubscription criteria and
in further work on London admissions Pennell, West and Hind (2005) found that:
A minority of schools,...mainly those that were their own admission
authority, reported criteria that appear to be designed to select certain
groups of pupils but exclude others....They were also less inclusive in that
they did not prioritise to the same extent as community/voluntary controlled
schools, vulnerable children. p22
The Schools Adjudicator has also upheld objections against schools on the basis
that their criteria were unfair, or not compliant with the 2003 School Admissions
Code of Practice in operation at the time. For example the issue of children in
public care was one for which objections were made in 2005/06 (Office of the
Schools Adjudicator 2006). They are a group of children who are very vulnerable
but who often present significant challenges for schools. The 2003 School
Admissions Code of Practice recommended that all admission authorities give
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these children top priority in their oversubscription criteria but West and Hind
(2003) found that in 2001 this was a criterion for only two per cent of schools. As
we report this has since risen and is likely to do so again following the
requirements summarised in the 2007 School Admissions Code.
2.8.3 The nature of the data on oversubscription criteria
In order for parents to make the best of the process they need to know and be able to
understand the oversubscription criteria for the schools they prefer. The 2003 School
Admissions Code of Practice requires that:
the oversubscription criteria must be set out clearly and unambiguously,
making clear not only what the criteria are but also the way in which they will
be applied, including the order in which they will be applied. (section A50)
For this study we logged the criteria for every secondary school in England. Each
admission authority in drawing up its oversubscription criteria was having to
respond to a variety of imperatives. Firstly they had to comply with the law on
discrimination; secondly they had to have due regard to the School Admissions
Code of Practice 2003 (although as we have seen this allows for wide discretion);
thirdly they had to consult and respond to other schools in their area – for Faith
schools this could include sister Roman Catholic or Church of England
Secondaries through the Diocese; fourthly they had to consult, and if necessary
negotiate with, the wider family of schools in their area through the admission
forum; and finally, they tried to be true to the ethos of the school and to serve its
best interests. There is evidence (Gewirtz et al 1995; Woods et al 1998; Lauder et
al 1999) that schools also feel the need to brand themselves to gain a strong
position in the local ‘school market’. In some cases the criteria were extremely
complex. That complexity may pose more problems in negotiating the process for
some parents than others and act as a social filter although we later express
caution about accepting this commonplace assumption. We therefore analyse the
complexity later in this section.
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Although there were many possible combinations there were in fact a limited
number of categories of criteria that were frequently used as elements to build the
compounds. We found the following categories of elements in use in 2006:
• Children in public care
• Medical or Social needs
• Special educational needs
• First preference
• Sibling
• Catchment areas
• Feeder schools
• Proximity to school
• Faith related
• Parental commitment
• Associated adult (ie parents/grandparent attended school or child of a
teacher/governor etc)
The last two listed, Parental Commitment and Associated Adult are now unlawful
but were not so in 2006. Instances of each of these categories was found either on
its own or in some combination. The actual oversubscription criteria were in a
priority order showing which category of children would be admitted before others
and each ranked oversubscription criterion was often a combination of instances
of the categories above. Sometimes, and this was particularly the case for
Voluntary Aided faith schools, the school identified categories of places e.g.
religious places and non-religious places and then applied slightly different criteria
within each category. Faced with this complexity, creating a record of a limited
number of explicit criteria for each of the 3122 schools that captured the significant
features in rank order was a difficult task. We logged 1084 different combinations
or compounds. The following instances of actual criteria give a feel for the
complexity and extended examples are given in the Appendix. Each example is of
an individual criterion listed by a school:
Example 1 Child who is baptised and attends (name of Church), and not living
in the catchment area but attending a primary school in the
catchment area, and with a sibling attending the secondary school
Example 2 Child who is baptised and is in public care and/or has special
medical/social needs, and lives in the catchment area
Example 3 Child in public care, and who is baptised, and lives in the catchment
area and attends a feeder primary school, or a Roman Catholic
primary school and  who lives within 2 miles of the schools
measured in a straight line
Example 4 Child who has a brother or sister attending the school, and is
baptised, and whose parents actively want a faith school, and who
lives within the catchment area.
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2.8.4 Frequency and importance of each category of oversubscription
criteria
To consider variations in the use and importance of the above elements, four
perspectives are taken:
1. Presence of oversubscription criterion: if an oversubscription criterion is
present on the list (%)
2. Presence of oversubscription criterion in position 1: Given that the
oversubscription criterion is present, the proportion of times that it is located
in the first position (%).
3. Number of appearances: Given that the oversubscription criterion is
present, the number of times it appears on the list.
4. Average highest position of oversubscription criterion: Given that the
oversubscription criterion is present, the mean highest position it takes on
the list.
The significance of each separate oversubscription criterion is then considered
separately. In the following tables the numbers have been rounded to whole
values and so what is given as 0% on the bar graph may in some cases still
represent a very small number of schools but only ever less than 0.5% of that type
of school.
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Table 31
Oversubscription criterion – presence & position across all schools
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Table 32
Presence of oversubscription criterion on the list (%) across types of AA
For the initial, all schools figure, n=3,122.  The subsample sizes of the other 5
figures reflects the total number of schools that come under each AA type.
Community Schools (n = 1,936); Academies (n = 43); Foundation Schools (n =
529); Voluntary Aided (n=524); Voluntary Controlled (n = 90).
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Table 33
Given that the oversubscription criterion is present, the proportion of times
it is placed in position 1 (%)
For the initial, all schools figure, as the subsample sizes for each item are
determined by whether they are actually present (as described under Table 33) i.e.
the subsamples are:  Siblings (n= 2,836); Care (n = 2,378); Catchment (n = 2,
020); Proximity (n = 1,915); Med-Social (n = 1,643); SEN (n = 1,611); Feeder
(n = 993); FP first (n = 923); Faith (n = 440); Parental Commitment (n = 283);
Associated Adult (n = 128).
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Table 34
Given that the oversubscription criterion is present, the mean number of times
that it appears
For ‘all schools’, subsample sizes:  Siblings (n= 2,836); Care (n = 2,378);
Catchment (n = 2, 020); Proximity (n = 1,915); Med-Social(n = 1,643); SEN (n =
1,611); Feeder (n = 993); FP first (n = 923); Faith (n = 440); Parental Commitment
(n = 283); Associated Adult (n = 128).
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Children in Care
In 2000 one admission officer reported:
When an LEA is only the admission authority for [a minority] of secondary
schools… fulfilling our statutory responsibilities in finding school places for
looked-after children and various other difficult to place children…including
excluded pupils is very challenging. section 9.4 p 64
Evidence has increased that this admission officer’s experience was by no means
unique. Some schools in a variety of ways seek to admit children who are easier to
educate and reduce the number of those who are harder (West and Hind 2003).
Looked after children often present schools with greater educational and pastoral
challenges than other children and therefore schools may be reluctant to admit
them. West and Hind (2003) found that in 2001 only 2% of schools put this as their
top priority. Since then awareness has grown of the needs of children in public
care. As part of meeting these needs the School Admission Code of Practice 2003
stated that:
Children in public care are a disadvantaged group who have very low
average levels of attainment, often related to frequent changes of school
because their care placements change. It is recommended that all
admission authorities give these children top priority in their
oversubscription criteria. section 3.14
It is therefore notable that in 2006, despite this recommendation, only 76% of all
schools had Child in Care somewhere in their oversubscription criteria and only
67% of all schools put Child in Care as a high priority (either first or second place)
in their oversubscription criteria in such a way as to ensure the child would be
admitted. A striking 24%, nearly a quarter of all schools, made no mention at all of
children in care in their criteria. Voluntary Aided and Foundation schools were
least likely to have it as any kind of priority with a half of Voluntary Aided and a
third of Foundation not mentioning them at all. Community/Voluntary Controlled
schools and Academies were the most likely to have it as a criterion with 86% and
80% respectively. However, while considerably fewer Voluntary Aided schools
made any mention, those that did were more likely to put it as the first priority
(61%). In 2005/06 24% of the 245 objections concerning admission arrangements
made to the Schools Adjudicator concerned the lack of adequate criteria giving
priority to children in public care.
75
Table 35:  Proportions of each type of school where Child in Care is present
School Type
Child In
Care All Schools
% Child In
Care
Voluntary controlled 81 90 90%
Community 1667 1936 86%
Academies 34 43 79%
Foundation 335 529 63%
Voluntary aided 272 524 52%
These figures replicate the findings of Pennell et al (2005) in their study of London
schools. It is important to remember that while this criterion is a very high priority
for many schools, and is crucial for the well being of this very vulnerable group of
children, it affects only a tiny proportion of the intake.
Medical/social needs and special educational needs
There are two other categories of children that many schools have traditionally
prioritised because of their unusual needs - those with special medical or social
circumstances, and those with special educational needs. Schools that accord
these children and families high priority are sending an important message about
inclusivity; that, despite potential greater difficulties for the school, it is their role to
prioritise the most vulnerable. Schools that do not so prioritise, either by putting it
as a low priority or not including it as a category at all, are sending another
message.
Seventeen percent of all schools put Medical or Social Needs as their first priority.
Fifty three percent (1642) of schools included it somewhere in their
oversubscription criteria. Just under a half of all schools did not list it as a priority.
Community and Voluntary Controlled schools and Academies were the most likely
to have this as a priority. Foundation schools were less likely to do so, but
Voluntary Aided schools were much less likely with, just under a quarter prioritising
these children.
Table 36:  Proportions of each type of school where the criterion of Medical or
Social (MedSoc) needs is present
School Type MedSoc All Schools % MedSoc
Community 1200 1936 62%
Voluntary controlled 55 90 61%
Academies 25 43 58%
Foundation 246 529 47%
Voluntary aided 116 524 22%
The category of Special Educational Needs is more difficult to interpret. When
found in the composite prospectus this referred to two categories of children. The
first was any child who had named the school on their statement of special
education needs. In this case the school is bound to take that child following
consultation. The second was children with unusual educational needs but who
had not reached the statementing stage. The former does not operate as an
ordinary oversubscription criterion because it is not discretionary on the part of the
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school and, whether or not it appears in their published criteria, they would be
required to admit the child following consultation. The latter however is optional
and again sends a strong signal of inclusivity and educational mission.
Fifty two percent (1611) of schools included it somewhere in their oversubscription
criteria. Just under a half of all schools did not list it as a priority. Community and
Voluntary Controlled schools and Academies were much the most likely to have
this as a priority. Foundation schools were less likely to do so, but Voluntary Aided
schools were much less likely with, just over a fifth prioritising these children.
Table 37:  Proportions of each type of school where SEN is present
School Type SEN All Schools % SEN
Academies 30 43 70%
Community 1247 1936 64%
Voluntary controlled 55 90 61%
Foundation 168 529 32%
Voluntary aided 111 524 21%
Again it is important to note that, like Child in Care, these criteria affect only a tiny
proportion of the intake of children to secondary schools each year. The next three
to be looked at, Siblings, Catchment and Proximity affect the great majority.
Siblings attending the school
This was the most frequently used criterion. It is important, for a variety of practical
and emotional reasons, for parents to be able to gain a place at the same school
as their other children should they so wish. Almost all Community, Voluntary
Controlled and Foundation schools used this criterion, and the great majority of
Academies and Voluntary Aided schools did so too. It was rarely the first priority
with only 5% of all schools placing it as number one but its mean highest position
(3.3.) showed it to be a significant criterion for schools.
Table 38:  Proportions of each type of school where Sibling is present
School Type Siblings All Schools % Siblings
Voluntary controlled 90 90 100%
Community 1895 1936 98%
Foundation 482 529 91%
Academies 32 43 74%
Voluntary aided 346 524 66%
Catchment
A catchment criterion prioritises applications from children who are resident in a
clearly defined geographical area. It need not be related to proximity although
distance to the schools is a major consideration in the drawing of the boundaries
of a catchment area. They are affected by geographical, demographic and
historical factors and these can sometimes create anomalies and difficulties in
managing admissions as things change over time. The drawing up of catchments
can offer a means of affecting the intake of schools and for that reason can often
be extremely contentious. The parent survey found that 22% of parents had taken
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catchment areas into account when they last moved house. Faith schools and
grammar schools, if they have this criterion, will of necessity draw from a larger
catchment area than non-religious or all ability schools.
In 2006 65% of all schools used this criterion. There were differences between
types of school. The great majority of Community and Voluntary Controlled
schools used Catchment, nearly a half of the Foundation and Voluntary Aided
schools and only a third of Academies. It was a significant criterion with a mean
highest position of 2.8. This criterion can reinforce the problems of residential
segregation and selection by mortgage but can also be used as a device for
affecting intakes through the choice of residential areas to include or exclude as
part of the catchment. Given the importance of location in determining the intake of
a school (Gordon and Monastiriotis 2007) it would have been interesting to look at
the different locations caught by different types of schools catchments. We could
not do this for the present project but it would be an interesting topic for further
research. Interestingly, use of this criterion varies with population density. Schools
in less dense areas use it more often than schools in more densely populated
areas.
Table 39:  Proportions of each type of school where Catchment is present
School Type Catchment All Schools
%
Catchment
Voluntary controlled 77 90 86%
Community 1394 1936 72%
Foundation 280 529 53%
Voluntary aided 255 524 49%
Academies 14 43 33%
Only 14% of all schools put this as their first priority. There were differences in the
proportions of each type of school so doing, with Voluntary Aided schools most
likely (29%) and Community (10%) and Voluntary Controlled schools (6%) least
likely.
Table 40:  Proportions of each type of school with Catchment as first priority
School Type Catchment All Schools
%
Catchment
Voluntary aided 152 524 29%
Foundation 116 529 22%
Academies 6 43 14%
Community 194 1936 10%
Voluntary controlled 5 90 5%
Proximity
This criterion appears in 61% of all schools’ criteria. However it is often used as a
tie break when other criteria fail to differentiate. It is one of the least likely to be
placed as the first priority with only 1% of schools doing so. Its mean highest
position of 5.1 is only just above parent commitment at 6.8. Almost the same
proportion of Community, Voluntary Controlled, Foundation schools and
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Academies use this criterion. The exception is some Voluntary Aided schools
which, of necessity, draw from a wider geographical area. This criterion can
reinforce the problems of residential segregation and selection by mortgage but
beyond this does not lend itself as a short term device for affecting intakes30
although it may be an important factor in maintaining social segregation.
Table 41:  Proportions of each type of school where Proximity is present
School Type Proximity AllSchools %Proximity
Academies 30 43 70%
Community 1348 1936 70%
Voluntary controlled 61 90 68%
Foundation 358 529 68%
Voluntary aided 121 524 23%
Feeder
A feeder school criterion identifies a number of primary schools the children of
which the secondary school will prioritise for entry. This provides some welcome
predictability for parents, children and the secondary schools. It can also be a
convenient means of administering admissions. It offers a means of affecting
intakes through the choice of feeder primary schools. Only 6% place it as their first
priority and 32% of all schools used this criterion somewhere in their list. Voluntary
Aided schools used this more often than any other type.
Table 42:  Proportions of each type of school where Feeder is present
School Type Feeder All Schools % Feeder
Voluntary aided 231 524 44%
Community 620 1936 32%
Voluntary controlled 25 90 28%
Foundation 125 529 24%
Academies 5 43 12%
First preference first
This criterion states that those parents who have put the school down as their first
expressed preference will have priority over parents who have put it as any other
preference. The issues arising from the first preference first system as an area
wide criterion have been discussed in section 2.2.3. Where the area wide system
operates, all the schools in that area have First Preference First entered in our
database as their first oversubscription criterion.
                                             
30 Although some recent studies have suggested that simply having a proximity criterion for all schools would
produce still segregated but more balanced intakes than the current system.
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Where the area wide system is equal preference/default ranking there may still be
some individual schools within the area who adopt First Preference First. This has
been the subject of objections to the adjudicator because it has the effect of
constraining parental choice in areas where there are very popular oversubscribed
schools. If a parent wishes to try for one of these schools but their second and
third preference schools have a First Preference First criterion, parents are faced
with the possibility that they would not get into any of their chosen schools. This is
particularly acute in areas where there are grammar schools (Coldron 2005)
because of the unpredictability of the 11+ test. In these areas the non-selective
schools have used the First Preference First criterion as a partial defence against
the grammar schools taking all of the high attaining children. It is also valued by
schools as a means of attracting only those parents who really want their children
to come to the school and are committed to what it offers.
In 2005/06 the Office of the Schools Adjudicator (Annual Report 2005/06) dealt
with 73 objections concerning first preference. Adjudicators upheld 68 of these
objections on the grounds that the use of such criteria is normally confusing to
parents in areas where equal preference/default ranking systems are used for
most schools and it can sometimes appear to act more in the interests of the
school than the parents.
It was because of the difficulties faced by parents that the School Admissions
Code 2007 now outlaws First Preference First as a criterion. In 2006 it was still
legitimate and 30% of all schools used it. A minority of all types of schools had this
criterion and the proportion of each type of school was roughly the same except
for Academies which were the least likely to use First Preference First. By its
nature this criterion when used is most often put as the first priority.
Table 43:  Proportions of each type of school where First Preference First is
present
School Type
1st
Pref
All
Schools % 1st Pref
Voluntary aided 162 524 31%
Community 593 1936 31%
Foundation 144 529 27%
Voluntary
controlled 19 90 21%
Academies 5 43 12%
Faith related criteria
This criterion applies exclusively to faith schools. They wish to provide a religious
education for the community of their faith. The great majority of faith schools are
Voluntary Aided while others became Voluntary Controlled. Some Foundation
schools and a significant proportion of Academies are designated as having a
religious character although some academies with a religious character do not
have faith based 0ver-subscription criteria. Faith related criteria do not of
themselves affect the social characteristics of the intake beyond the practice of a
particular faith. However, in so far as there are correlations between membership
of religious communities and socio-economic status then this criterion could affect
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the social characteristics of the intake. For example, if it were the case that
families who were part of the Anglican community also tended to be more affluent
and more educationally qualified, then a Church of England school with an over
subscription criterion to be active in the faith would be likely to have a more
advantaged intake.
Faith schools often wish to give priority to families and children who are most
devout and this leads to sometimes extremely complex combinations of criteria
and evidence which attempt to provide a means of differentiating the more
religiously committed from the less.
Only 15% of all schools have any faith related criterion. By ‘faith related criterion’
we mean criteria to do with the core faith, or other faiths, or no-faith.
Table 44:  Proportions of each type of school where Faith Related is present
School Type
Faith
Related All Schools
% Faith
Related
Voluntary aided 460 524 88%
Academies 4 43 9%
Voluntary controlled 2 90 2%
Foundation 2 529 0.4%
Community 6 1936 0.3%
Where it is used, only 54% of schools put it as their first priority but its mean
highest position is 1.7 showing that it has generally high rank. One worry about
this criterion has been its potential contribution to the segregation of faith
communities and the possible exacerbation of religious and social tensions
between different Christian faiths and, with the possibility of more Muslim and Sikh
schools and schools for adherents of other world religions, between ethnic
communities. In view of these concerns about social cohesion, there have been
calls for faith schools to admit a proportion of children from different faiths and of
no-faith. 60% of Voluntary Aided schools gave some priority to other faiths. A
smaller proportion (16%) gave some priority to children of no-faith.
Parent commitment
Parental commitment is important to schools in at least two ways. Firstly, schools
would like to maximise parents’ willingness to support the school’s policies on
such things as uniform, homework and discipline, and to inculcate a generally
positive attitude towards learning. Secondly, they would like to prioritise those who
positively want their school and what it offers. This oversubscription criterion is not
now lawful and is proscribed in the School Admissions Code 2007.
We have included in this category oversubscription criteria such as the following:
• Parent actively wanting a faith school
• Parent actively wanting single sex education
• Parent who shows commitment to the ethos of the school
• Parent who shows commitment to the expectations of the school
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By far the most frequently found of these was the first, parents actively seeking a
religious school. It is arguable that this criterion should have been included with
Faith Related and specifically with Non-Faith. Indeed the Non-Faith criterion was
often combined with a need to demonstrate that they actively wanted a religious
school. Nevertheless, it is not about membership or relationship with a church or
religious denomination and there is value in looking at it separately because the
criterion has the potential for social discrimination and unfairness. Most often the
evidence required was a supporting letter from the parents explaining their
reasons for applying and, through what they write, demonstrating commitment.
This would be a subjective judgement on the part of the admission authority
members. In addition it is a complex writing task and is likely to be done better by
more educated parents and would provide ample clues as to the social class of the
applicants.
Its mean highest position of 6.8 shows it to be a low priority and only 9% of all
schools used this criterion but, there are striking differences in the proportion of
each type of school doing so. Nearly a third of all Voluntary Aided schools did so
while the proportions for all other types of schools was in single figures. This
difference follows from the fact that actively wanting a religious school was
included but it remains a significant means of social discrimination not used by
other schools.
Table 45:  Proportions of each type of school where Parent Commitment is
present
School Type
Parent
Commitment All Schools
% Parent
Commitment
Voluntary aided 167 524 32%
Voluntary controlled 7 90 8%
Community 94 1936 5%
Foundation 13 529 2%
Academies 1 43 2%
Associated adults
A very small proportion of schools (4%) had criteria that gave priority to children
who were related in some way to adults who had been or (more commonly) were
still connected with the school such as teachers or governors. In 2005/06 the
Office of the Schools Adjudicator (Annual Report 2005/06) received 28 objections
to priority being given to children of staff and siblings of former pupils. 18 of these
were upheld on the grounds that they were unfair to other children who would be
displaced as a result. The other 10 were not upheld. This oversubscription criteria
is no longer lawful.
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Table 46:  Proportions of each type of school with where Associated Adults is
present
School Type
Assoc
Adults All Schools
% Assoc
Adults
Foundation 40 529 8%
Voluntary aided 27 524 5%
Community 59 1936 3%
Voluntary controlled 2 90 2%
Academies 0 43 0%
2.8.5 Levels of complexity
Over subscription criteria are ordered lists that are used by AAs to determine the
allocation of places in a popular secondary school. Each ordered item in the
oversubscription list is made up of single or multiple parts. Parents need to know
and understand the oversubscription criteria of popular schools in order to be able
to negotiate the admissions process and make realistic decisions. Some parents
may find complexity a barrier to accessing their preferred schools. We analysed
the complexity of oversubscription criteria. One definition of something being
complex is that it consists of many different and connected parts. We first
examined the number of oversubscription criteria used and second, the number of
items (or elements) that appear within each of the oversubscription criteria. These
two variables were then used to create a third (the average number of items per
oversubscription criteria). To give an illustration. The following set of ranked
oversubscription criteria has 5 OSCs, a mean of 1 item per oversubscription
criterion, and a total of 5 items or elements.
1. Looked After Children
2. Special Educational Needs(SEN)
3. Catchment Area
4. Brothers and Sisters (Sibling)
5. Attendance at a designated Feeder School
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OSC Criteria
Number of 
OSCs
Number of 
Items in 
OSCs
Number of 
Items per 
OSC
 
Mean 6 9 1.3
s.d 2.3 6.5 0.49
Lower Quartile 5 5 1.0
Median 6 6 1.2
Upper Quartile 7 10 1.6
Min 1 0 0.0
Max 22 59 4.5
Table 47:  Number of OSCs, individual items in OSCs & number of items per OSC
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Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med
 
Academy 4.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 1.1 1.0
Community 5.9 6.0 7.5 6.0 1.2 1.0
Foundation 4.8 5.0 5.6 5.0 1.1 1.0
VA 7.6 7.0 16.2 14.0 2.0 2.0
VC 6.0 6.0 8.0 7.0 1.3 1.1
No of OSCs No of items Items per OSC
Table 47 cont.
Table 47 shows that the average number of separate categories in the published
criteria for a school is 6, that each of these six categories are on average made up
of between one or two different elements or items and that the average total of
different items used is 9. The second figure shows that on each measure
Voluntary Aided schools are more complex than other types of schools. They have
more OSCs, twice as many items per OSC and twice as many items in total.
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3 PARENTS’ EXPERIENCES
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Background to admissions process and survey comparisons
When the parents in the 2006 survey applied for secondary schools on behalf of
their child, they were doing so under the 2003 School Admissions Code of
Practice31 and legislation32 which required Local Authorities to coordinate the
admissions process for their areas. The key features for parents of this admissions
framework can be summarised as follows:
• Local authorities must publish information about the admissions criteria of
schools in their locality including data on volume of applications for the
available places in previous years (i.e. showing whether they are over-
subscribed).
• Parents submit all their applications for maintained schools on a single form
returned via their home local authority.
• They must be invited to express a minimum of three preferences
• In almost all local authorities, parents are invited to apply for between three
and six schools.
• Parents are asked to list the schools in order of preference.
• Local authorities vary in how they deal with applications, some operating a ‘first
preference first’ system and others using an ‘equal preference’ system.
• Local Authorities send parents a single offer of a school place on the same day
at the beginning of March
• Parents are entitled to appeal to the relevant admission authority against their
refusal to offer a place.
The experiences of parents in the 2006 survey and those in the 2000 survey
differed in part because of the different admissions systems in operation. In 2000
parents had to apply separately to different local authorities and/or admission
authorities whereas now they apply for all maintained schools, even those in other
Local Authorities, on a common application form. They would therefore in 2000
have more than one ranked lists of preferences whereas in 2006 there can only be
one. It was also the case that, in 2000, parents could be offered more than one
                                             
31 Department for Education and Skills (2003) School Admissions Code of Practice London, DfES.
http://www.dfes.gov.uk/sacode
32 Section 89B of the School Standards & Framework Act 1998 as inserted by s48 of the Education Act 2002
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place for their child whereas now the Local Authority has a duty to offer only one
place. Where these differences affect the comparisons that can be made between
the 2000 and 2006 findings, they are highlighted in the chapter.
Since the 2006 parents applied for secondary schools a new School Admissions
Code (2007)33 has been introduced that will affect the 2008 intake. The emphasis
of the new Code is on improving fair and equal access to schools for pupils from
different backgrounds. Admission authorities are required “to act in accordance
with” the new code rather than “have regard to its guidance” as was the case
previously. The code prohibits covert selection practices that may operate through
oversubscription criteria, supplementary information, interviewing children and
parents and the type of school uniform required. These changes will affect
subsequent cohorts of parents applying for secondary schools.
                                             
33 Department for Education and Skills (2007). School Admissions Code. London, DfES.
http://www.dfes.gov.uk/sacode
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3.1.2 Summary of research methods
The research methods used in this parent survey were presented in outline in the
earlier section describing the design of the whole project and are described in
detail in the technical report. They are summarised briefly here.
A random stratified sample of 163 schools was selected from all maintained
schools in England (including the new Academies and CTCs). Schools were
contacted in writing and requested to provide the names and contact details of
pupils in the lowest year group in the school (usually Year 7). 59 of the schools
provided complete and accurate contact details, a response rate of 36%34.
50 parents were randomly selected from the lists provided by each school and
were invited by letter to take part in a 25 minute telephone interview. Of the 2,950
parents in the issued sample,  2,215 (75%) took part in the telephone survey.
Questions covered a range of topics including the following: different types of
information used to find out about schools, the process of applying for schools
including special admission arrangements, factors taken into account when
choosing schools, applications to over-subscribed schools, offers and appeals,
travel arrangements to the current school and background information about the
family. The schools applied for (as well as nearby schools and favoured schools
not applied for) were coded during the interview using a programme that matched
school names to the list of schools provided by the Department. This enabled
additional information about schools to be included in the analysis.
The analysis in this chapter is divided into the following sections:
• How parents find out about schools
• The application process
• Making choices
• Parents’ satisfaction with the application process and outcomes.
At the start of each section, the key findings are highlighted and comparisons
drawn between the 2000 and 2006 surveys.
                                             
34 These 59 schools covered 48 Local Authorities. The stratified random sample of 163 schools was 5.2% of
all secondary schools. The achieved parent sample drew from each of these 59 Local Authorities.
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3.1.3 The format of regression tables
Included in this chapter are several tables presenting the results of logistic
regression analyses that showed the associations between parents’ experiences
of applying to secondary schools and background characteristics of family, area
and schools.
The independent variables used in these regression analyses were identified
through preliminary tests of association. Variables that were significantly
associated with the statistic of interest were then entered into forward step-wise
logistic regression analyses, removing duplicate measures of the same item. To
maximise the possibility of drawing comparisons with the 2000 data, similar
variables were chosen where possible. The final regressions were run in Stata,
using weighted data. The tables present only those variables found to be
significant in the final regression and show the following data:
• The level of significance of each independent variable: p<0.05, P<0.01 or
P<0.001.
• The unweighted number of cases in each category.
• The odds ratio compared with the reference category value of 1.0. Odds ratios
greater than one indicate higher odds of the outcome variable occurring and
odds ratios less than one indicate lower odds.
• The 95% confidence interval for the odds ratio. These may be used to judge
the significance. If the interval does not include one it is significant (for example
1.5-3.1) and if the interval does include one it is not significant (for example
0.4-2.7).
The following groups of independent variables were considered for inclusion in the
regression models:
Family characteristics: Household income, Standard Occupational Classification
(SOC)35 of main earner in household, Whether at least one parent in household in
employment, Marital and employment status combined, Highest qualification level
of mother, Highest qualification level of parents, Age mother left education,
Housing tenure, Respondent ethnicity, Maternal ethnicity, Actively practising
religion, Parent religion, Took any special actions to get child into school, Current
school was first preference, Had previous experience of applying to secondary
school, Age of mother, Number of schools applied for, Whether took into account
catchment areas when last moving house, Child has special needs.
                                             
35 The 2000 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) is a classification of occupations that was developed
for use in national statistics. Parents were classified into SOC groups based on the occupation of the main
income earner in their household.
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Area characteristics (based on parent's LA): Type of local authority (London,
metropolitan, non-metropolitan), Population density, Index of multiple deprivation
quintiles, Diversity of admissions, Preference system (equal, first), Rate of appeals
as proportion of admissions in 2004-5.
Characteristics of current school attended: Admission policy, Type
(community, Foundation etc), Faith based, Urban/rural, Selective (wholly, partially,
not), Gender, Area (Inner London, outer London, rest of England – met, rest of
England – non-met), Specialist status.
3.2 How parents36 find out about schools
This section investigates the types of information that were used by parents to
help them find out about secondary schools, reporting where parents accessed
different types of information and how useful they were in helping parents choose
which schools to apply to.
Access to and use of information is a key aspect of choice and this section
explores whether any family and area characteristics are associated with use of
information in a way that suggests some parents are more limited in their access
to information than others.
3.2.1 Key findings of section
• 82% of parents used formal written sources of information to help them find out
about schools and 87% of parents used informal sources of information.
• The main changes to the use of formal sources of information since 2000 were
associated with growing usage of the internet. A quarter of parents reported
finding out about schools through their websites.
• Each of the information sources was considered to be very or fairly useful by
over 80% of the parents who used them, but informal sources were more likely
to be considered very useful than formal sources.
• The most useful sources of information were school visits and talking to others.
• Multivariate analysis showed that four factors were independently associated
with use of formal sources of information. These were mothers having degree
level qualifications, parents being in employment, parents having no previous
experience of secondary admissions and the local authority mainly using the
equal preference/default ranking system for admissions.
                                             
36 In this chapter, the term ‘parent’ is used synonymously with ‘respondent’ as 99% of respondents were
parents, foster parents, adoptive parents or step-parents. In most cases (85%) the respondent was the
mother.
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• Parents accessed formal written sources of information from a variety of
sources of which schools (primary and secondary) and the local authority were
the most important. The OfSTED website was used for accessing school
achievement and attainment data37 and OfSTED inspection reports.
• Multivariate analysis showed that four factors were independently associated
with use of school achievement or attainment data. These were mothers
having qualifications, especially if these were at degree level, parents being
owner occupiers, parents being non-white, and the local authority being
London or metropolitan.
• The most widely cited source of information was school visits, most of which
were for a school open day or parents evening.
• The most influential aspects of schools during visits were pupil appearance and
behaviour, school facilities and the teaching staff.
• 93% used at least one source of information mentioned in the survey and of
those who used no information, the majority knew about schools already, for
example, because an older sibling attended secondary school. It appears,
therefore, that very few parents were lacking basic information about
secondary schools.
3.2.2 Comparison with 2000 survey
The main changes to the use of formal sources of information since 2000 were
associated with growing usage of the internet. Thus, 25% of parents in 2006
reported finding out about schools through their websites whereas this information
category was not listed in the 2000 survey. Aside from this change, the proportion
of parents using each of the formal sources of information was broadly similar to
2000. Although a smaller proportion of parents used school prospectuses in 2006
than 2000 (59%, 69%), this would appear to be partially explained by use of the
internet as there were 6% of parents in 2006 who did not mention this source but
did mention using school websites.
A similar proportion of parents used achievement and attainment data in 2006 and
200038, but there were differences in where parents accessed these data. In 2006,
only 32%39 of parents saw the data in newspapers compared to 56% in 2000.
Instead, parents in 2006 were quite likely to access the data from the OfSTED
website (19%), the DfES website (6%) or another Internet source (4%) whereas
fewer than 4% of parents in 2000 had used the Internet for this purpose. The
proportions of parents accessing the data from schools and the local authority
were similar, although, in 2006, parents were more likely to access the information
from school websites and less likely to use school prospectuses than in 2000.
                                             
37 Previously known as ‘league tables’.
38 The 2000 report referred to these as ‘performance tables’.
39 32% of parents who used the data accessed them from either a national or local newspaper.
91
In 2006 as in 2000, the most widely used form of information was school visits
(71%, 78%). A slightly smaller proportion of parents talked to other parents in 2006
compared to 2000 (57%, 70%). Although a three-point scale was used to measure
the usefulness of information in 2006 and 2000, the coding of the answers was
slightly different. In 2000, the categories were ‘most useful’, ‘of some use’ and ‘of
little or no use’ whereas in 2006 they were ‘very useful’, ‘fairly useful’ and ‘of little
or no use’. Even so, in both years, school visits were considered the most useful
type of information by parents.
As in 2000, over 90% used at least one of the information sources asked about in
the survey.
3.2.3  Use and usefulness of formal sources of information
The different types of information about schools used by parents are discussed
under the headings of formal and informal since it is possible that some parents
may be more inclined to draw on written printed material and others on word of
mouth. This section investigates the use of formal sources which are defined as
official printed documents including those published on the internet.
Table 3.1:  Proportion of respondents using different types of formal sources of
information to help them find out about schools
2000 2006
Information source Column % Column %
School prospectuses or brochures 69 59
Local authority booklets 45 44
School achievement and attainment data 39 44
Ofsted inspection reports 25 29
School websites 0 25
None of the above na 18
Unweighted N 2170 2215
Base: All respondents
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
na = this figure from 2000 is not available
The most widely used type of formal information was that published by secondary
schools themselves either in the form of printed school prospectuses or
information on school websites. In total, 65% of parents used one or other of these
types of information with most using printed material in preference to internet
downloads. Smaller proportions looked to other sources of information about
schools. Local authority booklets (formally known as composite prospectuses) are
published by every local authority and should be available to all parents. They
contain key information about schools such as whether they are over-subscribed.
There was only partial overlap between the use of local authority booklets,
achievement and attainment data and Ofsted reports. Approximately half of the
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parents who used the latter two sources of information did not use local authority
booklets.
Logistic regression analysis was undertaken to identify what characteristics were
independently associated with the use of formal sources of information. Four
variables were found to be significant:
• The level of educational qualifications of the mother: mothers who had
education qualifications were more likely to use formal sources. Mothers
who had qualifications at level 4 or higher (degree level) were three times
as likely to use formal sources as those who had no qualifications.
• Having previous experience of applying for secondary schools: parents who
had no previous experience of applying for a place were more likely to use
formal sources.
• Marital and employment status: families with parents who were in
employment were more likely to use formal sources than either lone parent
families or two-parent families where one or both parents did not work.
• Predominant preference system in the local authority: parents in authorities
that mainly used an equal preference/default ranking system were more
likely to use formal information.
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Table 3.2:  Logistic regression: factors associated with the use of at least one
formal source of information (family and area characteristics, previous experience
of choosing secondary school)
Used formal information N Odds ratio 95%
confidence
interval
Highest qualification of mother (p<0.001)
No qualifications 385 1.0
NVQ level 1 or 2 or equivalent 864 2.1* 1.5 -3.1
NVQ level 3 or equivalent 349 2.6* 1.7 -4
NVQ level 4 or equivalent 398 3.0* 1.8 -4.8
Previous experience of applying to
secondary school (p<0.01)
No previous experience 931 1.0
Had previous experience 1065 0.7* 0.5 -0.8
Marital and employment status (p<0.01)
Couple, both employed 1037 1.0
Couple, both non-employed 78 0.5* 0.3 -0.9
Couple, one employed 426 0.6* 0.4 -1
Lone parent, employed 267 0.7 0.5 -1
Lone parent, non-employed 188 0.6* 0.4 -0.8
Predominant preference system in local
authority (p<0.01)
Equal preference/default ranking 1550 1.0
First preference first 446 0.7* 0.5 -0.9
Unweighted N 1996
Base includes only those cases that have values for all variables in the model.
*these odds ratios denote the individual categories that were significantly associated with the
outcome variable at the 95% confidence level. If an odds ratio is significant, a value greater than
one indicates higher likelihood of the outcome variable occurring for that category compared to the
reference category, and odds lower than one indicate lower likelihood.
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Parents accessed local authority booklets from a variety of sources but the most
common were the child’s primary school and directly from the local authority.
Table 3.3:  Where parents accessed local authority booklet
Column %
Where parents accessed LA booklet
A copy was circulated by the primary school 46
A copy was sent by the local authority/from the
local authority (or authorities)
36
A secondary school 11
The local authority website 4
The local library 3
A friend, relative or neighbour *
Don’t know 1
Other specific answer 1
Vague or irrelevant answer *
Unweighted N 1041
Base: Respondents who used LA booklets to help them find out about schools.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
74% of parents who used school prospectuses got them from secondary schools,
including from their websites. Overall, 94% of parents who used school
prospectuses got them from either a secondary school or their child’s primary
school.
Table 3.4:  Where parents accessed school prospectus(es)
Column %
Where parents accessed school prospectus
Secondary schools 72
Child’s primary school 21
The local authority 5
Downloaded from the school’s website 2
Friend, neighbour, relative 1
Don’t know 1
Other specific answer 1
Vague or irrelevant answer *
Unweighted N 1294
Base: Respondents who used school prospectuses or booklets to help them find out about schools.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
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More parents accessed achievement and attainment data from newspapers (32%)
than any other single source. 29% of parents accessed the information either from
a school brochure or the school website. 19% of parents accessed the data
directly from the OfSTED website.
Table 3.5:  Where parents accessed school achievement and attainment data
Column
%
Where parents accessed school achievement and
attainment data
Local newspaper 26
Brochure published by the secondary school 21
Ofsted website 19
From secondary school website 9
From local authority website (or printed materials) 8
National newspaper 7
From child’s primary school 7
From the DfES website 6
Other source on the internet (e.g., BBC) 4
Can’t remember where seen 4
Friends, neighbours, relatives 2
Other 2
Vague or irrelevant 1
Unweighted N 972
Base: Respondents who used school achievement and attainment data to help them find out about
schools.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
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The majority of parents who used achievement and attainment data, did so to find
out about academic results. A substantial proportion were interested in the value
added score. This is a measure that takes into account prior attainment of pupils
on entry into the school as well as a range of other contextual factors such as
income deprivation and first language. Value added information has been used in
achievement and attainment data since 2002 and is considered by many to be a
better indicator of school effectiveness and pupil progress.
Table 3.6:  What parents looked for in school achievement and attainment data
What parents looked for in achievement and attainment data
Column %
GCSE results/A-level results/SATS results 80
Value added score 36
Attendance 2
Size of school (number of pupils) 2
Change over time/trends 1
Proportion with special needs 1
Other 3
Vague or irrelevant 1
Unweighted N 972
Base: Respondents who used school achievement and attainment data to help them find out about
schools.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
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Logistic regression analysis was undertaken to identify what characteristics were
independently associated with the use of school achievement or attainment data.
Four variables were found to be significant:
• The level of educational qualifications of the mother: mothers who had
education qualifications were more likely to use such data. Mothers who
had qualifications at level 4 or higher (degree level) were nearly three times
as likely to use these data as those who had no qualifications.
• Housing tenure: parents who were owner occupiers were nearly twice as
likely to use such data as parents who rented their property from the
council.
• Ethnicity: non-white mothers were more likely to use the data.
• Type of local authority: parents in London and metropolitan areas were
more likely to use such data than those in non-metropolitan areas.
Table 3.7:  Logistic regression – factors associated with the use of school
achievement or attainment data
Used achievement and attainment data N Odds ratio 95%
confidence
interval
Highest qualification of mother (p<0.001)
No qualifications 332 1.0
NVQ level 1 or 2 or equivalent 750 1.9* 1.3 -2.8
NVQ level 3 or equivalent 315 2.0* 1.4 -3
NVQ level 4 or equivalent 344 2.8* 2 -4
Housing tenure (p<0.01)
Owner occupier 1240 1.00
Rented from council/housing association 361 0.6* 0.4 -0.8
Rented from private landlord/other 140 0.7* 0.4 -1.1
Maternal ethnicity (p<0.05)
White 1525 1.0
Non-white 216 1.6* 1.1 -2.3
Type of LA (p<0.05)
London 286 1.0
Metropolitan 590 1.0 0.8 -1.2
Non-metropolitan 865 0.7* 0.5 -0.9
Unweighted N 1741
Base includes only those cases that have values for all variables in the model.
*these odds ratios denote the individual categories that were significantly associated with the
outcome variable at the 95% confidence level. If an odds ratio is significant, a value greater than
one indicates higher likelihood of the outcome variable occurring for that category compared to the
reference category, and odds lower than one indicate lower likelihood.
These findings were consistent with those for the 2000 survey when parents who
had higher qualifications, were owner occupiers or lived in London were found to
have made greater use of performance data.
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The OfSTED website was the principal place where parents accessed OfSTED
inspection reports for schools. Most of the parents who looked at the reports on
the OfSTED website also referred to secondary school websites for this
information. However, there was little overlap between those who used the internet
to find OfSTED reports and those who accessed printed copies from schools,
demonstrating that it is important to retain both internet and printed sources of
information.
Table 3.8:  Where parents accessed Ofsted report(s)
Column %
Where parents accessed Ofsted
inspection reports
OfSTED website 44
Hard copy from secondary school 25
Summary on secondary school website 9
Hard copy from child’s primary school 9
Elsewhere on internet 6
Other parent, friend or neighbour 4
Local authority (including website) 2
Local library 1
Other specific answer 3
Vague or irrelevant 2
Unweighted N 647
Base: Respondents who used Ofsted inspection reports to help them find out about schools.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
Over 80% of parents who used each type of formal information reported that it was
very or fairly useful in helping them choose which schools to apply for. School
prospectuses were considered to be the most useful information by parents.
School websites fared the worst which may be because the development of school
websites varies greatly.
Table 3.9:  Perceived usefulness of formal sources of information in helping
parents choose which schools to apply for
Row %
Information source Very useful Fairly
useful
Little or no
use
Unwt N
School prospectuses or brochures 43 46 11 1294
Local authority booklets 37 49 14 1041
School achievement and attainment data 35 51 14 972
Ofsted inspection reports 41 46 13 647
School websites 35 47 18 581
Base: Parents who used at least one formal source of information to help them find out about
schools. (include missing data in base)
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3.2.4 Use and usefulness of informal sources of information
Whereas formal sources of information are based on written material, informal
information was defined as based on talking to others and shared opinions.
Overall, a slightly higher proportion of the sample took advantage of informal than
formal information (87%, 82%).
Table 3.10:  Proportion of respondents using different types of informal sources of
information to help them find out about schools
Column %
Information source
Visited schools 71
Talked to other parents, friends, neighbours 57
Talked to primary school staff 41
Newspaper articles 17
Talked to other professionals 9
Other specific answer 2
Vague or irrelevant answer *
None of the above 13
Unweighted N 2215
Base: All respondents.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
Visiting schools was the most widely used type of informal information and will be
explored in greater detail below. Over half the sample talked to other parents,
friends and neighbours to find out about schools and a little under half talked to
primary school teachers. Among the other professionals that parents talked to
were health and social care professionals, faith representatives, local authority
employees and school governors.
Table 3.11:  Perceived usefulness of informal sources of information in helping
parents choose which schools to apply for
Row %
Information source Very
useful
Fairly
useful
Little or
no use
Unwt N
Visited schools 77 19 4 1589
Talked to other parents, friends, neighbours 51 39 8 1273
Talked to primary school staff 57 33 10 944
Newspaper articles 33 54 14 366
Talked to other professionals 76 20 5 251
Base: Parents who used at least one informal source of information to help them find out about
schools. (include missing data in base)
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90% or more of parents who visited schools and talked to others found these
sources of information useful in helping them choose which schools to apply for.
Visiting schools and talking to other professionals were considered the most useful
sources of information. Overall, informal information was considered by parents to
be more useful than formal information.
3.2.5 School visits
Since visiting schools was both the mostly widely used source of information used
by parents as well as considered to be the most useful, it is explored in further
detail in this section.
About seven-in-ten parents (71%) visited a secondary school to help them find out
about it while three-in-ten (29%) did not. Approximately a third of the sample
visited one secondary school, one-in-five visited two schools and one-in-ten visited
three schools. Nearly all of the parents who did not visit a school for this purpose
said that this was because they already knew about the schools that their child
might go to.
Table 3.12:  Number of schools visited by parents
Column %
Number of schools visited
None 29
1 31
2 20
3 11
4 5
5 or more 3
Unweighted N 2215
Base: All respondents.
The main occasion or reason for visiting secondary schools was to attend a school
open day or parents evening – an event specifically designed for prospective
parents. A quarter of parents who visited secondary schools did so to observe the
school during a normal school day.
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Table 3.13:  Events or occasions for school visits
Column %
Events or occasions for school visits
School open day or parents evening 96
To see the school during a normal school day 24
Meeting with member of staff 15
Other school event 9
Other *
Unweighted N 1589
Base: Respondents who visited schools.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
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The main source of information about visiting secondary schools was the child’s
primary school. A third of parents found out about opportunities to visit schools
directly from the secondary school and a smaller proportion relied on information
accessed through the local authority.
Table 3.14:  Where parents found out about opportunities to visit schools
Column %
Where parents found out about opportunities to visit schools
Child’s primary school 50
Secondary schools (including prospectus, website, letter, by phone) 34
Local authority (including booklets, flyers) 15
Local newspaper 8
Talking to other parents, friends or neighbours 4
Talking to someone else 1
Respondent had direct contact with school (e.g., through job) *
Other 1
Unweighted N 1589
Base: Respondents who visited schools.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
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There were many different aspects of schools that parents considered influential
when visiting schools including those that were observed, those talked about by
teachers and written policies and records. In the table below, they were grouped
into three categories of teaching and learning, school characteristics and child
characteristics. The aspect considered influential by most parents was pupil
behaviour and appearance including school records on bullying and attendance.
Similar proportions of parents were influenced by the school’s facilities (44%) and
by the head teacher or other school staff (45% mentioned either of these).
Interestingly, academic achievement (‘pupil achievement, results or league tables’)
was not the most influential factor and was mentioned by about a third of parents
who visited schools.
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Table 3.15:  Aspects of schools considered influential by parents when visiting
schools
Column %
Aspects of schools considered influential
Teaching and learning
Other school staff (including friendliness, approachable,
interaction with pupils)
38
Pupil achievement/results/league tables 32
The headteacher 22
Availability of extra-curricular activities/after-school provision 14
Curriculum/subjects offered/ timetable/trips 4
Teaching style, class sizes 2
School specialism in particular subject 1
Presentation during open day 1
School characteristics
Facilities 44
School ethos/religion 31
The appearance of the school buildings 23
Classroom environment/work displays 23
Distance from home/travel/convenience 6
General atmosphere/impressions 4
Special needs provision (including languages, food) 4
Policy on discipline/bullying 3
Size of school 1
Reputation/opinions of friends/neighbours 1
School administration *
Other aspect of the area (e.g., crime) *
Mixed/single sex *
Child characteristics
Pupil behaviour/appearance (including records on
bullying/attendance)
46
Child’s impression 3
Other pupil characteristics (e.g., ethnicity, class, diversity) *
Other specific answer 5
Vague or irrelevant answer 3
Unweighted N 1589
Base: Respondents who visited schools.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
29% of parents responding to the survey did not visit any secondary schools and
of these, 89% said they knew about schools for a different reason. Therefore, only
3% of the total sample chose not to visit any secondary schools and did not have
an independent source of information about schools.
Of the parents who did not visit schools because they knew about schools for a
different reason, just over half cited the fact that the child’s sibling attended the
school. A further 24% said they had a family member, friend or neighbour who had
attended the school and 18% knew the area and local schools by reputation.
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Table 3.16:  Reasons why parents already knew about schools
Column %
Reasons why parents already knew about schools
Sibling(s) attended the school 53
Parent, family member or friend/neighbour attended the school 24
Knew the area/local schools/reputation 18
Feeder/link school/faith based school 5
Found out about school through talking to others 5
Has direct contact with school (e.g., through job/school activities) 4
Knew about school for other specific reason 3
Found out about school during application for sibling 1
Other specific answer 1
Vague or irrelevant 3
Unweighted N 547
Base: Respondents who did not visit schools and said they knew about schools for a different
reason.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
3.2.6 Overall use of information
Only 7% of the sample did not use any sources of information to help them find out
about secondary schools. Of these parents, most either had a child at secondary
school already or said that they knew about the schools already. The number of
parents who did not have access to information about secondary schools therefore
appears to be minimal.
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3.2.7 Summary
The findings in this section suggest that most parents had access to useful
information about the schools available to them. Only 7% of parents had not
obtained any information and most of them professed to already know what they
needed to know.
The internet was now used much more than at the time of the last survey in 2000.
A quarter of parents looked at school websites and Ofsted reports and
achievement and attainment data were often inspected online. However, school
prospectuses remained the most common information source and local authority
booklets were also commonly referred to, so the internet had not yet revolutionised
provision of school information. School prospectuses were typically obtained direct
from the school or from a primary school. Local authority booklets tended to be
circulated through primary schools or directly to parents. Attainment data were
most commonly accessed through newspapers.
Use of formal information about schools was associated with parental
characteristics and information need. Parents with lower education qualifications
were less likely to use formal information sources and attainment data, suggesting
that there may be an unmet need among some of the parents who will be targeted
by the Choice Adviser initiative. Other parents made less use of information
because they had less need of it, for example those who already had children in a
secondary school and those who lived in areas where most schools were non-
autonomous and so admissions arrangements were more straightforward.
While formal information sources were generally felt by parents to be useful,
informal sources such as school visits (including open days) and talking to other
parents, primary school staff and other professionals were valued most of all.
Parents reported that their visits to schools had been influential in forming positive
views about the behaviour and appearance of pupils, the quality of the school’s
facilities and the teaching staff.
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3.3 The application process
3.3.1 Background to the application process
This section investigates parents’ experiences of the application process, starting
with the mode of applying to schools and the number of schools applied for. Each
of the schools applied for was coded using computer assisted coding during
interview which enabled additional information about the schools to be linked to
the survey data from a national database of secondary schools40. The analysis
explores the characteristics of schools applied for including type and special
admission arrangements.
This section also explores parental experience of applying to schools that were
over-subscribed, meaning that more parents listed the school as a first preference
than there were places available. Parents were asked whether they considered
and applied for over-subscribed schools, where they accessed information about
oversubscription criteria, and the usefulness of such information. This section also
reports on the criteria that parents expected schools to take into account and
whether their child met the criteria.
Accessing places in over-subscribed schools is a key indicator of fair admissions
policy and has been subject to considerable scrutiny over recent months with the
publication of the 2007 School Admissions Code and the decision by some local
authorities to use a lottery system to distribute sought after places. The analysis
will contribute to this debate by examining whether family and area characteristics
are associated with applications to over-subscribed schools.
3.3.2 Key findings of section
• 99% of parents in the sample completed an application form for starting
secondary school in 2006.
• Only 2% of parents completed an application via the internet although this
option was available in about a third of the local authorities covered by the
research (it has subsequently been introduced in all other authorities).
However this is significantly lower than the national average in the subsequent
application year (2006/07) which was 18.2%.  Frequently cited reasons for not
using the internet included not having access to a computer, lack of confidence
and being given a paper copy.
                                             
40 A version of Edubase accessed in September 2006 was used as the basis for coding schools. Since this
database did not contain unique identifiers for the new Academy schools and City Technology Colleges, these
were coded after interviews were complete.
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• One third of parents applied for three schools. Of those who applied for fewer
than three schools (63%), the main reason was believing that the child would
be successful at the listed school(s), for example because an older sibling
already attended the school.
• Parents living in London were significantly more likely than parents living
elsewhere to apply for schools outside their local authority (27% in London
compared with 6% elsewhere).
• Controlling for other factors, parents who chose to apply for schools outside
their local authority were more likely to have a first preference school that they
believed to be over-subscribed, to be applying for a larger number of schools
and to live in London.
• Voluntary aided schools were more likely to request supplementary information
than schools of other types. The most frequently requested type of
supplementary information requested was to verify published oversubscription
criteria relating to religious affiliation.
• 38% of parents who completed an application form applied for at least one
school that they reported to be over-subscribed. Schools listed as first
preference were more likely to be over-subscribed than other school
preferences.
• The most frequently cited oversubscription criteria that parents expected
schools to take into account were catchment area and sibling attendance at the
school.
• Multivariate analysis showed that five factors were independently associated
with parents listing as first preference a school that they believed to be over-
subscribed. These were parents having higher incomes, mothers having
qualifications, especially if these were at degree level, parents practising
religion, the child not having special needs and the parents taking special
actions to maximise the child’s chances of gaining a place41.
3.3.3 Comparison with 2000
The comparisons between the findings from the 2000 report and 2006 report are
more limited for this section. This is due in part to the changes in the admissions
procedures introduced by the 2003 School Admissions Code of Practice. Most
notably, in 2006, parents applied to only one admission authority. Parents were
also asked differently about over-subscribed schools in 2006, replacing parental
report of whether they knew the oversubscription criteria with parental
understanding of what the oversubscription criteria were. About a quarter of
parents in each year reported that the oversubscription criteria of schools had
influenced their choice (24% in 2000, 25% in 2006).
                                             
41 Interpretation of these findings requires some caution but the reasons are likely to include residential
segregation, differences in the time and resources available to make travel to more distant schools practically
feasible and different choice criteria between parental groups.
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Although parents applied to only one admission authority, they were able to
include in their list of preferences schools that were located in other local
authorities. In both 2000 and 2006, parents living in London were most likely to
apply for a school in another local authority (in 2006, this was done by 27% of
parents in London and 6% of parents elsewhere).
It is also possible to compare the experience of special admission arrangements
across the two surveys. A similar proportion of parents reported that a test formed
part of the application process for at least one of the schools for which their child
had applied. In 2000, 10% of parents reported that their child had been
interviewed by at least one of the schools they had applied for. Since interviews
with parents and pupils were discouraged under the 2003 School Admissions
Code of Practice, the 2006 survey asked about parent and child attendance at a
‘formal meeting as part of the application process’. About one-in-six parents (17%)
reported attending such a meeting in 2006. Although this figure seems quite high
in the context of the 2003 School Admissions Code of Practice, it should be
treated with some caution as some parents may have included information-
seeking meetings in schools as formal meetings.
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3.3.4 Mode of applying for schools
99% of the parents in the sample completed an application form42. Of this number,
only 2% did so via the internet, despite the fact that about a third of local
authorities allowed online applications at that time43. The small proportion applying
on the internet spanned 26 of the 78 local authorities covered by the survey,
although half of the parents making online applications lived in one county
(Hertfordshire) suggesting that the likelihood of applying via the internet depends
largely on the commitment to this mode by the local authority. Online applications
have subsequently been introduced in all local authorities, with on average, 18.2%
of parents making secondary applications online in 2006/07 so this mode of
application will be more important in the future.
The majority of parents found the process of applying for schools easy whether on
paper or online. This is to be expected of online applications since it is likely that
only those parents who are confident using this method would choose this
approach.
Table 3.17:  How easy or difficult respondents found it to apply for schools online
and on paper
Row %
Very
easy
Fairly
easy
Neither
easy nor
difficult
Fairly
difficult
Very
difficult
Unwt N
Paper applications 77 19 3 1 * 2124
Online applications 86 13 0 2 0 65
Total 2189
Base: All respondents who completed an application form excluding one respondent who did not
know whether they completed an application form online.
The base includes those who answered ‘don’t know’ to this question (1 respondent who completed
the form online and 8 who completed the form on paper.)
                                             
42 The base through this section is the parents who completed an application form (unweighted N=2190).
43 The  administrative data collected from the composite prospectuses in Strand 1 indicated that 55 out of 148
local authorities had an internet option at that time.
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The main reason cited by parents for applying on paper rather than online was that
they didn’t know or think it was possible, which was probably true for most parents
who gave this answer. Two other most common reasons were lack of access to a
computer or the internet (17%) or lack of confidence with these (11%). 16% of
respondents said that they didn’t apply by internet simply because they had been
given a paper copy, while 6% said that this was because they had applied through
their primary school.
Table 3.18:  Reasons for applying on paper rather than online
Column %
Reasons for not applying online
Didn’t know (or think) it was possible 41
No access to a computer or internet 17
Was given a paper copy 16
Not confident using internet/computer (or can’t use computer) 11
Applied through primary/junior school 6
Thought method less reliable than by post 5
Easier on paper 3
Worried would make a mistake 1
Didn’t consider it 1
Couldn’t think of a reason 1
Other 3
Unweighted N 2124
Base: Respondents who applied on paper rather than online.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
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3.3.5 Schools applied for
Parents are encouraged to apply for the maximum number of preferences allowed.
This is a minimum of three schools in all local authorities but some (e.g. all London
Authorities) may apply for more (usually six). Most local authorities emphasise to
parents that to list fewer than the maximum will place them at a disadvantage.
Despite this, of the parents in the survey who completed an application form, only
a third applied for three schools and 63% applied for either one or two schools. Of
the parents who applied for three or fewer schools, 76% lived in local authorities
where three preferences were allowed and 21% lived in local authorities where
more than three preferences were allowed.
5% of parents applied for more than three schools. Of the parents applying to
more than three schools, 64% lived in London.
The main reason given by parents for applying for fewer than three schools was
that they believed their application would be successful with the school(s) listed,
for example because a sibling already attended the school or because they met
the oversubscription criteria in some other way. A little under a third applied for
only one or two schools because they didn’t want their child to attend any other
schools and a quarter cited the fact that other schools were not reasonably
accessible.
Table 3.19:  Reasons for applying for fewer than three schools
Column %
Reasons for applying for fewer than three schools
Knew child would be successful at listed school(s)/ sibling goes there/ met
oversubscription criteria
45
Didn’t like some schools/ Didn’t want child to go to any other schools 30
Some schools were not within reasonable distance/ Fewer than three
schools in area/transport difficulties
25
Greater chance of success if applied to fewer 6
Limited choice of faith schools/ only wanted religious school 3
Other 6
Vague or irrelevant 2
Don’t know 1
Unweighted N 1287
Base: Respondents who applied for fewer than three schools.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
The table below presents the characteristics of schools listed by parents as first
preference. Further on in the report, these characteristics are compared to the
schools nearest to parents’ homes that parents did not apply for.
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Table 3.20:  Characteristics of first preference schools
Column %
Characteristics of schools 1st preference schools in survey
Type
     Community 53
     Foundation 23
     Voluntary aided 19
     Voluntary controlled 4
     Academy 1
     CTC *
Selection type
     Wholly selective 12
     Partially selective 19
     Non-selective 69
Gender
     Mixed 89
     Boys 4
     Girls 6
Religion
     Does not apply/none 78
     Roman Catholic 16
     Church of England 5
     Christian *
     Jewish 0
     Muslim/Sikh 0
Admission policy
     Comprehensive 88
     Selective 4
     Modern 7
Specialist status
     Specialism 87
     No specialism 12
Area
     Inner London 4
     Outer London 8
     Other metropolitan 24
     Non-metropolitan 63
Density
     Rural 14
     Urban 86
Unweighted N 2190
Base for the survey data: First preference schools listed by parents.
Percentages do not add up to 100 for all breakdowns in the table for the following reasons:
1. Some characteristics were missing for Academy and CTC schools: religion, admissions policy
and specialism.
2. 9 of the first preference schools could not be coded. The base includes these parents but the
breakdowns are missing from the table.
3. A small number of schools were missing data for gender and urban-rural.
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The focus of the survey was on applications to maintained schools, but parents
were also asked whether they had also applied for any independent schools.
Given that all the parents in the sample had children currently attending
maintained secondary schools, the figures do not include all parents who applied
to both sectors. However, it provides an indication of the parents who considered
private schooling.
2% of parents whose children attended a maintained secondary school had also
applied for at least one private independent school. The proportion was higher
(4%) among parents living in London.
3.3.6 Applying for schools outside the LA
Parents living on the boundaries of their local authority are more likely than others
to apply for schools in a different local authority to the one in which they live
because they may be within a reasonable distance. This section investigates
whether there are any other factors associated with applying for schools outside
the parent’s local authority. Unless parents live in a particularly sparsely populated
area or near the local authority boundary, applying for schools outside the local
authority is an indicator of the pro-activity of parents, partly because it requires
them finding out about schools beyond their own area and also because it
indicates a commitment to potentially more complicated and expensive travel
arrangements.
The table below shows a clear relationship between living in London and applying
for schools outside the local authority. The density of population and schools in
London means that schools outside the parent’s local authority may be as
accessible as those within. Moreover, as London authorities invited parents to
express six preferences, parents there had more opportunity to express a
preference for a school that was outside their area. We will return to this issue in
the next section when considering the factors that influenced parents’ choices
about schools.
Table 3.21:  Proportion of parents applying to at least one school outside their
local authority (according to parent report) by type of local authority in which
parents live
Type of local authority in which parents live Row % Unweighted N
London 27 385
Metropolitan 7 735
Non-metropolitan 6 1061
Total 9 2181
Base: Respondents who completed the application form and who knew whether they applied to
schools outside their local authority.
Base includes one respondent who was classified as living in Wales.
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Logistic regression analysis was undertaken to identify what characteristics were
independently associated with applying for schools outside the local authority
where they lived. Three variables were found to be significant:
• The number of schools applied for: the more schools parents applied for,
the more likely they were to include a school outside their local authority.
• Whether the first preference school was over-subscribed: where parents’
first choice schools was over-subscribed it was nearly twice as likely that
either that school or another one that the parents had applied to was
outside their local authority.
• Region: parents in London were more than three times as likely than those
in other areas to apply for schools outside their local authority.
Table 3.22:  Logistic regression showing factors associated with applying for
schools outside LA (family and area characteristics)
Applied to a school in another LA N Odds ratio 95%
confidence
interval
Number of schools applied for (p<0.001)
1 701 1.0
2 585 2.1* 1.2 -3.7
3 738 3.5* 1.8 -6.9
4+ 164 10.2* 5.3 -19.7
Oversubscription of 1st preference school
(parent report) (p<0.01)
Not over-subscribed 1481 1.0
Over-subscribed 707 1.9* 1.2 -2.9
Type of LA (p<0.001)
London 386 1.0
Metropolitan 737 0.3* 0.1 -0.6
Non-metropolitan 1065 0.3* 0.2 -0.5
Unweighted N 2188
Base: Respondents who applied for schools on the common application form.
Base includes only those cases that have values for all variables in the model.
*these odds ratios denote the individual categories that were significantly associated with the
outcome variable at the 95% confidence level. If an odds ratio is significant, a value greater than
one indicates higher likelihood of the outcome variable occurring for that category compared to the
reference category, and odds lower than one indicate lower likelihood.
A similar regression analysis for the 2000 survey found that parents in London
were more likely than those elsewhere to apply to more than one admission
authority.
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3.3.7 Applying for faith schools
Since the publication of the 2000 parent survey, there has been increasing interest
in the relationship between faith schools and fair admissions. Faith schools which
are Voluntary Aided (of which the majority are Roman Catholic or Church of
England) are their own admission authority and by implication have the power to
set their own criteria for awarding places when over-subscribed (albeit in
consultation with the local authority and having regard to the admissions School
Admissions Code of Practice). Such schools have been criticised for being highly
unrepresentative of their local communities44 tending to be popular among
advantaged parents who may also be better informed about the oversubscription
criteria. The 2007 School Admissions Code has prompted renewed debate about
the way in which faith schools allocate places on the basis of religious affiliation
with some schools specifying the level of religious commitment within their
oversubscription criteria. There has also been a challenge to schools to admit a
quota of pupils who are of no faith or a different faith. It is therefore timely to
investigate parents’ experiences of applying to faith schools.
17% of schools nationally are faith schools. Among parents in the survey, 20%
listed a faith school as first preference and 30% of parents applied to at least one
faith school.
At a different point in the interview parents were asked to state their religion and, if
they had one, whether they actively practised. Overall, 89% of parents stated that
they had a religion and 29% said that they actively practised. Among parents who
made a faith school their first choice, 95% stated that they had a religion and 56%
that they actively practised.
3.3.8 Schools with special application requirements
Depending on their type, some schools are allowed to impose special application
arrangements beyond simply completing the application form submitted to the
local authority. Schools that are their own admission authority (such as Voluntary
Aided schools) may request supplementary information to decide whether the child
may be suitable for the school. Under the 2003 School Admissions Code of
Practice, schools were discouraged from conducting interviews with children or
parents but some schools continue to meet parents and children on a one-to-one
basis. 45Selective schools, such as grammar schools, are able to test the general
ability of candidates while schools with a specialism (now the majority of
                                             
44 Tough, S. and Brooks, R. (2007) Fair Choice – Choosing a Better Admissions System. Institute for Public
Policy Research.
45 The 2006 Education and Inspections Act has now made interviews unlawful.
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Community schools) are allowed to select a small proportion of pupils on the basis
of aptitude in the area of specialism by test, sports trial or audition. Three local
authorities, and some individual schools, have banding arrangements where pupils
are tested to ensure an intake that is representative of the full range of attainment
levels (see section 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 for full details)46.
This section investigates the relationship between parental experience of special
application arrangements and the type of school applied for. Applying to a school
with special application arrangements often requires a certain level of commitment
on the part of the child and his/her parents and the analysis explores whether
certain family or area characteristics are associated with applying to such schools.
40% of parents applied for at least one school that had special admission
arrangements. The most common type mentioned (by 17% of parents) was a
formal meeting between the school and either the parent or child. However, as
explained above, this figure should be treated with some caution as it may be the
case that parents included information-seeking meetings with schools rather than
formal meetings that were held as part of the application process. It is surprising
that tests of aptitude and auditions/sports trials were not more frequently
mentioned given the increasing number of schools with a specialism. It is possible
that, despite the explanation provided during the parent interview, some parents
were confused between tests of ability (for selective schools) and tests of aptitude
for schools with a specialism.
                                             
46 1% of the parent sample (weighted) lived in these local authorities. However, a further 19 local authorities
have within them at least one admission authority (e.g., an autonomous school) that uses banding.
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Table 3.23:  Proportion applying for at least one school requiring special admission
arrangements
Column %
Special admission arrangements
Supplementary information 12
Tests of ability 12
Tests for banding 3
Tests of aptitude 2
Auditions/sports trials 2
Formal meeting between parent/carer and head teacher 15
Formal meeting between child and head teacher 17
Any special admission arrangement 40
Unweighted N 2190
Base: All respondents who completed application form.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
The table below shows the proportion of parents applying for first preference
schools with special admission arrangements broken down by type of school. This
analysis was limited to first preference schools partly because they were the most
important schools for parents and also because parents were more likely to
remember the arrangements for their preferred school47. The proportions for all
schools (in the final column) are fairly similar to the previous table, with formal
meetings being mentioned the most often and supplementary information and
selective tests being mentioned by approximately one-tenth of the sample.
Supplementary information was required by a greater proportion of Voluntary
Aided schools than schools of other types as was found in the results from the
analysis of the composite prospectuses in the previous chapter. Voluntary aided
schools are owned by a voluntary organisation (often a church) and can set their
own admissions policy in consultation with the local authority. The type of
supplementary information most commonly requested was proof of religious
affiliation (Table 4.26).
Tests of ability were required by nearly a quarter of Foundation schools, a greater
proportion than schools of other types, again echoing the findings from the
composite prospectuses. These schools are similar to Voluntary Aided schools in
that the governing body owns and runs the school, employs the staff and sets the
admissions policy while the local authority funds the school.
                                             
47 The school type was linked from Edubase, not reliant on parent report.
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There was little difference in the proportions of schools of different types requiring
formal meetings with parents and children, supporting the hypothesis mentioned
above that parents included information-seeking meetings in this category48.
However, the 2007 School Admissions Code reinforces the ban on admission
interviews for parents or children imposed by the Education and Inspections Act
2006.
Table 3.24:  Proportion whose first preference school required special admission
arrangements by type of school
Column %
Comm
-unity
Found-
ation
Voluntary
aided
Voluntary
controlled
Academy/
CTC
All
schools
Supplementary information 3 6 35 10 [20] 10
Selective tests (of ability) 4 23 7 4 [50] 9
Banding tests 1 5 2 1 [19] 2
Aptitude tests, auditions,
trials
1 4 1 5 [6] 3
Formal meetings for parents 15 12 19 12 [20] 15
Formal meetings for pupils 16 15 16 15 [13] 16
Unweighted N 960 588 517 79 40 2184
Base: First preference schools that were coded by type.
Logistic regression analysis was undertaken to identify what characteristics were
independently associated with listing as first preference a school that had special
application requirements. Three variables were found to be significant:
• The type of first preference school: the school was more likely to be a
Foundation or Voluntary Aided school than a community or Voluntary
Controlled school.
• Taking action to maximise their child’s chances: parents who took special
action such as coaching their child or arranging extra tuition were roughly
twice as likely to apply for a first preference school that had special
application requirements (see section 3.4.7).
                                             
48 Particularly in the case of formal meetings with parents since parents often meet with heads and other staff
to find out about schools. The proportion of meetings with pupils in Voluntary Aided schools is the same as
found in the following paper:
West, A., and Hind, A. (2003) Secondary School Admissions in England: Exploring the extent of overt and
covert selection. Research and Information on State Education Trust.  www.risetrust.org.uk/admissions.html
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• Selection type of first preference school: parents who were applying to a
wholly selective school were more likely than those applying for partially
selective or non-selective schools to have to deal with special application
requirements.
• Type of local authority: parents in London were more than twice as likely as
those in metropolitan or non-metropolitan areas to apply for a school that
had special application requirements.
Table 3.25:  Logistic regression showing factors associated with listing as first
preference a school with special application requirements (family, school and area
characteristics)
Listed as first preference a school that had special
application requirements
N Odds ratio 95%
confidence
interval
Type of first preference school (p<0.001)
Community/Voluntary controlled 1039 1.00
Foundation 588 1.9* 1.1 -3.3
Voluntary aided 516 4.1* 2.4 -7.1
Academy/CTC 40 4.0 0.9 -18.5
Took actions to maximise child’s chances
(p<0.001)
No 1722 1.00
Yes 461 2.2* 1.7 -2.9
Selection type of first preference school
(p<0.001)
Not selective 1473 1.0
Wholly selective 435 2.7* 1.5 -4.9
Partially selective 275 0.8 0.4 -1.4
Type of LA (p<0.01)
London 385 1.0
Metropolitan 736 0.4* 0.2 -0.8
Non-metropolitan 1062 0.4* 0.2 -0.7
Unweighted N 2183
Base: Respondents who applied for schools on the common application form.
Base includes only those cases that have values for all variables in the model.
*these odds ratios denote the individual categories that were significantly associated with the
outcome variable at the 95% confidence level. If an odds ratio is significant, a value greater than
one indicates higher likelihood of the outcome variable occurring for that category compared to the
reference category, and odds lower than one indicate lower likelihood.
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The association between supplementary information and faith schools is evident in
the table below. Proof of religious affiliation (included under ‘information to apply
published criteria’) was the primary type of information sought by schools.
However, parents also mentioned other types of information that they were asked
to provide which from the next round of school admissions will no longer be
permitted. The 2007 School Admissions Code prohibits schools from assessing
parents’ work, financial, marital or social status. It also bans schools from giving
priority to children on the basis of their interests and hobbies.
Table 3.26:  Types of supplementary information requested
Column
%
Types of supplementary information requested
Information to apply published criteria 67
  - proof of religious affiliation 59
  - attendance at place of worship 9
  - proof for home address 5
Personal information about the child 13
Reasons for application 12
Other information 11
Background details of family 9
Academic record 5
Unweighted N 323
Base: All respondents who applied to a school requiring supplementary information.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
Note: This was an open question that was coded after the interviews were complete and was then
recoded to converge with the analysis of the composite prospectuses in Strand 1.
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3.3.9 Over-subscribed schools
This section examines parents’ experiences of applying to over-subscribed
schools and considers the implications of their experiences for fair admissions.
When asked whether any of the schools they had actively considered applying to
were over-subscribed, just under half of parents (44%) said that at least one was
while a further 12% said that they didn’t know. Of those who said they did actively
consider over-subscribed schools, 25% said the oversubscription criteria
influenced their choice of which schools to apply to and 85% actually applied to a
school that was over-subscribed. Of all the parents who completed an application
form, 38% applied to at least one school that they reported to be over-subscribed.
When applying to an over-subscribed school, it is important for parents to know
the chances of their child being offered a place as this will affect the other schools
that parents express a preference for. The majority of parents found out about the
oversubscription criteria from an official source – the secondary school that was
over-subscribed, the local authority or the child’s primary school. A minority relied
on word of mouth and general knowledge about schools.
Table 3.27:  Where parents found out about oversubscription criteria
Column
%
Where parents accessed oversubscription criteria
The secondary school that was over-subscribed
(including prospectus, website)
41
The local authority booklet 31
Talking to other parents, friends or neighbours 17
Child’s primary school 14
Talking to someone else 3
General knowledge 3
Other 2
Unweighted N 265
Base: Respondents whose choice of schools was influenced by the oversubscription criteria.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
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Of those who accessed the oversubscription criteria, the majority of parents found
them useful to helping them choose which schools to apply to but one-fifth thought
they were of little or no use. This may be because of the complexity of
oversubscription criteria in some admission authorities or because the criteria do
not provide certainty about whether or not a child will be offered a place.
Table 3.28:  Usefulness of over-subscription criteria in helping parents choose
which schools to apply to
Row %
Very useful Fairly
useful
Little or no
use
Unwt N
Oversubscription criteria 36 42 20 265
Base: Parents who used oversubscription criteria to help them find out about schools.
The 6 respondents who replied ‘don’t know’ are included in the base.
Based on parents’ reports of oversubscription49, a third listed an over-subscribed
school as their first preference. Of the other schools, between 15% and 20% were
over-subscribed. This shows that over-subscribed schools were more likely to be
parents’ first choice than to be listed as a ‘back-up’ school.
                                             
49 Although the over-subscription status of all schools was collected for Strand 1, it is not possible to compare
parent report with the administrative data because the over-subscription status was unknown for over 40% of
schools within each preference category.
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Table 3.29:  Proportion of parents whose preferred schools were over-subscribed
(according to parent report)
Row % Unwt N
1st preference school 32 2189
2nd preference school 19 1487
3rd preference school 15 902
4th preference school 19 164
5th preference school 18 76
Applied for at least one over-
subscribed school
38 2190
Base: Respondents who completed an application form.
Note that one respondent did not know how many schools they applied for and is excluded from
this table.
Fewer than 50 respondents applied to 6, 7 or 8 schools and are not included in the table.
Parents who applied to an over-subscribed school were asked which factors they
expected the schools to take into account in allocating places. The most frequently
cited reasons were living within the catchment area and sibling attendance at the
school. The importance of the location of the family’s home in relation to the
school is clearly evident in the mentions of catchment and proximity in this list.
Table 3.30:  Factors that parents expected over-subscribed schools to take into
account
Oversubscription criteria parents
expected schools to take into account
Column %
Catchment related 57
Sibling related 43
Proximity related 23
Faith related 20
Feeder related 13
First preference 8
Medical/social 6
Children of associated adults 1
Other (including child ability) 26
Unweighted N 856
Base: Parents who applied to an over-subscribed school.
Note: The number of times criteria were mentioned sum to more than the base because multiple
responses were allowed.
Under the 2007 School Admissions Code, schools will not be permitted to take into
account performance in primary school, whether the school was listed as first
preference or whether a parent teaches at the school.
Of the parents who reported that their first preference school was over-subscribed,
76% thought their child met the oversubscription criteria and 8% didn’t know. This
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shows that a quarter of parents felt that there was some risk that they would not be
awarded their first preference school. The proportion of parents stating that they
met the oversubscription criteria declined with each additional over-subscribed
school applied for (55% for the second school and 38% for the third school). This
shows that there was a strong correlation between the order of preference and
parents’ perceptions of how likely the application was to be successful.
Logistic regression analysis was undertaken to identify what characteristics were
independently associated with listing as first preference a school that they reported
to be over-subscribed. Five variables were found to be significant:
• Household income: parents with higher incomes were much more likely to
apply to over-subscribed schools.
• The level of educational qualifications of the mother: mothers who had
education qualifications were more likely to apply to over-subscribed
schools. Mothers who had qualifications at level 4 or higher (degree level)
were four times as likely to apply to such schools as those who had no
qualifications and twice as likely as those whose highest qualification was at
Level 2.
• Active practising of religion: parents who actively practised religion were
more likely to apply to an over-subscribed school.
• Child’s special needs: parents of children who had special needs were less
likely than other parents to apply for over-subscribed schools.
• Taking action to maximise their child’s chances: parents who took special
action such as coaching their child or arranging extra tuition were more
likely to apply for a first preference school that was over-subscribed.
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Table 3.31:  Factors associated with listing as first preference a school that was
over-subscribed
Listed as first preference a school that was over-
subscribed
N Odds ratio 95%
confidence
interval
Household income (p<0.001)
£0-£9,999 119 1.0
£10,000-£24,999 923 2.5* 1.4 -4.4
£25,000-£39,000 344 3.5* 2.1 -5.9
£40,000-£59,999 140 2.5* 1.3 -4.7
£60,000+ 68 4.7* 2 -10.9
Highest qualification of mother (p<0.001)
No qualifications 270 1.0
NVQ level 1 or 2 or equivalent 685 2.2* 1.4 -3.5
NVQ level 3 or equivalent 290 3.8* 2.1 -6.8
NVQ level 4 or equivalent 349 4.2* 2.9 -6.1
Parent actively practising religion (p<0.001)
No 1060 1.0
Yes 534 1.6* 1.1 -2.2
Child has special needs (p<0.001)
No 1365 1.0
Yes 229 0.5* 0.4 -0.7
Took actions to maximise child’s chances
(p<0.05)
No 1250 1.0
Yes 344 1.6* 1.1 -2.3
Unweighted N 1594
Base: Respondents who applied for schools on the common application form.
Base includes only those cases that have values for all variables in the model.
*these odds ratios denote the individual categories that were significantly associated with the
outcome variable at the 95% confidence level. If an odds ratio is significant, a value greater than
one indicates higher likelihood of the outcome variable occurring for that category compared to the
reference category, and odds lower than one indicate lower likelihood.
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3.3.10  Summary
The findings in this section show that making an application was fairly
straightforward for most parents while a minority experienced significant elements
of complexity or risk.
The application form itself was felt to be easy to complete in its paper form.
Although internet options were available in some areas and were felt to be
acceptable there, they were not yet a large part of the process.
The process of choosing schools also appeared to be straightforward for the
majority of parents. Most used fewer than the three or more preferences available
to them because they were confident of getting a school of their choice. Indeed,
most parents stated that none of the schools they applied for were over-
subscribed. Where oversubscription applied, parents generally felt able to access
the information that they needed about the oversubscription criteria, usually from
the school itself or the local authority. Many of those who noted that their first
preference school was over-subscribed were nonetheless confident of a
successful application because they believed that they met the oversubscription
criteria.
The application process was more complex for parents who applied to a school
outside their local authority (one-in-ten parents did this). These parents tended to
include a larger number of schools on their list of preferences and were more likely
to apply to schools that were over-subscribed. Many of them lived in London,
where competition for places was stronger than average, as in 2000.
Another area of complexity was special admissions arrangements such as formal
meetings, supplementary information and tests. The most commonly required
supplementary information was the proof of religious affiliation that was requested
by faith schools (for which 20% of parents expressed their first preference).
Parents who applied to a school that had special admissions requirements were
more likely to be applying to a Voluntary Aided school or Academy, to live in
London and to have taken special action in furtherance of their child’s application.
These sorts of special actions are considered in the next section which explores
how parents made their choices.
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3.4 Making choices
All parents were asked to list the schools they applied for in order of preference.
This section focuses on how parents made their preferences for schools, including
the factors that led them to choose or reject a school, the proportion applying for
their nearest school and reasons for not applying to a preferred school. The
section also examines other aspects of choice such as receiving advice about how
to order the schools on the application form and taking special actions to maximise
the chances of securing a place for the child at their preferred school.
3.4.1 Key findings of section
• The main reasons given for favouring schools were good reputation, good
exam results and the child wanting to go there.
• 25% of parents did not apply to their nearest maintained school. The main
reasons cited were poor reputation, poor exam results and problems with
behaviour/discipline.
• Controlling for other factors, parents who chose not to apply to their nearest
maintained school were more likely to live in areas with high population density
or where admissions appeals were relatively high. In terms of their personal
characteristics they were more likely to actively practice religion. They were
less likely to have taken account of secondary school catchment areas when
they last moved and more likely to have taken special action to maximise the
chances of success with their child’s application.
• Where parents chose not to apply to the maintained school that was nearest to
where they lived the school they preferred was more likely than the nearer
school to be a Voluntary Aided or Foundation school, to be a single sex school,
to have a religious affiliation, to have a specialism or to be a larger school. Only
5% of parents did not apply to their favourite school and the main reason was
to do with location and travel inconvenience.
• Of those who applied to more than one school, 95% said they listed the
schools in the order they really preferred and 38% received advice about the
order in which to list schools. The main source of advice was the child’s
primary school.
• In most cases, both parents were involved in choosing and applying for
schools. Mothers were involved to a much greater extent than fathers.
• About one-in-five parents had taken special actions such as providing coaching
or extra tuition to maximise their child’s chances of getting into their preferred
school. 22% of parents had taken catchment areas into account when they last
moved house.
3.4.2 Comparison with 2000
Although the categorisation of reasons for liking or disliking schools in the 2006
survey differed from that used in 2000, the findings were quite similar. The most
common reason given by parents for wanting a place in their favourite school in
2000 was academic outcomes while in 2006 the first two reasons given were good
reputation and good exam results.
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A similar proportion of parents chose not to apply to their nearest maintained
school in 2000 and 2006 (28%, 25%). Poor academic results, behaviour and
discipline were the main reasons in both years.
A similar proportion of parents in 2000 and 2006 reported that there were other
maintained schools that they would have preferred over the ones they applied for
(8%, 5%).
3.4.3 Reasons why parents wanted a place at their preferred school
We are aware of the limitations and criticism of asking parents to list their reasons
for choosing and then ranking them in a list50. It risks giving the false impression
that parents make choices on the basis of a small number of discrete criteria in a
highly rational way whereas the qualitative literature shows that parents think of
the individual criteria as subtly inter-linked and that many decide as much on the
basis of ‘feel’, intuition and trust in what they hear on the grapevine as on what
one might be thought of as a cool and rational approach on the basis of objective
criteria. As long as these considerations are kept in mind there is still some value
in reporting on what parents said about their choices when asked in this survey.
Parents who applied to more than one school were asked which school they most
wanted their child to attend and why51.
                                             
50 For a critique of the ‘market research’ approach to parental choice see Bowe et al (1994). For the variety of
meanings parents give to their reasons for choice see Coldron and Boulton 1991 and 1996; For the anxiety
accompanying choice of school see Reay and Lucey 2000, and Coldron 1999; for how parents put trust in the
grapevine see Ball and Vincent 1998; for an overview of all of this and how and why parents invest in school
choice see Ball 2003.
51 It was not assumed that parents would list their favourite school as their first preference since there is
evidence that some parents make tactical decisions in ordering their schools depending on the type of schools
and whether they are over-subscribed.
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Parents gave a wide range of reasons for favouring their preferred school. The
reason mentioned by the most parents was that the school had a good reputation
in the community. Also important were good exam results, the child wanted to go
there, sibling attendance and good facilities.
Table 3.32:  Reasons for parents wanting a place in their preferred school52
Column %
Reasons for wanting place in preferred school
School has good reputation in the community /good Ofsted report 40
School has good exam results 33
Child wanted to go there 31
Sibling goes there 28
Facilities are good 22
Friends are going there 20
It’s the local school 20
School has good discipline/behaviour 19
Other characteristics of school particularly liked (e.g., mixed, size) 13
Pupil social characteristics 10
Religious reasons 6
Subject specialism 5
Convenient to get to/distance from home 5
Had previous positive experience of school 5
General – the best school for the child 4
Other child-related reasons (e.g., special needs) 3
Other 3
Missing 1
Unweighted N 1487
Base: Respondents who applied to more than one school.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
                                             
52 Unfortunately, only parents who applied for more than one school were asked the reasons for favouring
their preferred school so we do not have this information for parents who only applied to one school.
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3.4.4 Reasons for not applying to the nearest maintained school
In order to find out what characteristics are associated with unpopular schools,
parents were asked whether they had applied to their nearest maintained school
(which would probably be the most convenient and obvious choice in most cases)
and if not, the reasons why. 25% of parents did not apply to their nearest
maintained school.
Parents living in non-metropolitan areas were the most likely to apply for their
nearest maintained school probably because distances between schools are
further and it would be more inconvenient to travel to a different school than for
parents living in more densely populated areas.
Table 3.33:  Proportion of parents not applying to their nearest maintained school
by type of local authority in which they lived
Type of LA in which parents live Row % Unweighted N
London 30 385
Metropolitan 29 735
Non-metropolitan 21 1061
Total 25 2181
Base: Respondents who completed the application form.
Base includes one respondent who was classified as living in Wales.
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The main reason for not applying to the nearest maintained school was that it had
a poor reputation in the community. Other more specific reasons included poor
exam results, problems with behaviour and discipline, religious reasons, the child
did not want to go there and the sibling did not go there. These reasons largely
mirror those for favouring the preferred school.
Table 3.34:  Reasons for parents not applying to their nearest maintained school
Column %
Reasons for not applying to the nearest maintained school
School has poor reputation in the community 38
School has poor exam results 21
School has problem with behaviour/discipline 21
Religious reasons 18
Child did not want to go there 16
Sibling doesn’t go there 11
Pupil social characteristics 7
The facilities are poor 5
Preferred a different school 5
Friends not going there 4
Unlikely to get a place 4
Other characteristics of school not liked (e.g., mixed, size) 9
Other child-related reasons (e.g., special needs) 2
Didn’t like area 1
Other specific reason 10
Vague or irrelevant 2
Unweighted N 611
Base: Respondents who did not apply for their nearest maintained school.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
This question was asked separately of those who had applied to one school and those who had
applied to more than one school. The original code frame had 7 codes for one and 8 codes for the
other as ‘friends not going there’ was accidentally excluded. The codeframe was expanded during
the edit of open ‘other’ answers to include codes from ‘religious reasons’ onwards.
Logistic regression analysis was undertaken to identify what characteristics were
independently associated with parents not applying to their nearest maintained
school. Five variables were found to be significant:
• Population density: parents living in more densely populated areas were more
likely to not to apply to their nearest school. This is unsurprising as this group
of parents would be more likely to have multiple schools within convenient
travelling distance.
• Proportion of appeals: parents in local authorities where between 10% and
19% of admissions decisions were appealed were more likely than parents in
areas where fewer decisions were appealed not to apply to their nearest
school.
• Active practising of religion: parents who actively practised religion were
roughly twice as likely as other parents not to apply to their nearest school
(presumably many of these parents were applying to the nearest school of their
own religious affiliation).
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• House moving: parents who had not taken school catchment areas into
account when they last moved house were more likely than other parents not
to apply to their local school.
• Taking action to maximise their child’s chances: parents who took special
action such as coaching their child or arranging extra tuition were more likely
not to apply to their local school.
Table 3.35:  Logistic regression: factors associated with not applying to nearest
maintained school
Didn’t apply to nearest maintained school N Odds ratio 95%
confidence
interval
Population density of LA (p<0.01)
Least dense (0-1.7) 218 1.0
(1.7-9.1) 352 1.0 0.4 -2.2
(9.1-22.3) 429 0.9 0.5 -1.4
(22.3-40.3) 562 1.4 0.8 -2.6
Most dense (40.4-854080.4) 619 2.1* 1 -4.1
Appeals as proportion of admissions in 2004-5
(p<0.05)
0-10% 1181 1.0
11-20% 843 1.7* 1.1 -2.5
21-32% 156 0.9 0.5 -1.8
Parent actively practising religion (p<0.001)
No 1453 1.0
Yes 727 1.9* 1.5 -2.3
Took into account secondary school catchment
areas when last moving house (p<0.001)
No 1703 1.0
Yes 468 0.7* 0.5 -0.9
Took actions to maximise child’s chances
(p<0.001)
No 1720 1.0
Yes 460 1.6* 1.3 -2.1
Unweighted N 2180
Base includes only those cases that have values for all variables in the model.
*these odds ratios denote the individual categories that were significantly associated with the
outcome variable at the 95% confidence level. If an odds ratio is significant, a value greater than
one indicates higher likelihood of the outcome variable occurring for that category compared to the
reference category, and odds lower than one indicate lower likelihood.
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The table below focuses on parents who chose not to apply to their nearest school
and compares the characteristics of that school with the characteristics of the
school they chose to apply for instead (the final column on the tables shows the
characteristics of all first preference schools).
It is evident that the type of school had an impact on parental attitudes. Five
differences between the preferred school and the nearer one were observed:
• The preferred school was more likely to be a Foundation or Voluntary Aided
school (58% compared with 18%).
• The preferred school was more likely to have a religious affiliation, especially
Catholic (38% compared with 13%).
• The preferred school was more likely to be single sex (14% compared with
5%).
• The preferred school was more likely to have a specialism (88% compared with
70%).
• The preferred school was likely to be larger than the nearer school (an average
of 1169 pupils compared with 998 pupils).
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Table 3.36:  Characteristics of nearest maintained schools not applied for
compared with schools listed as first preference
Column %
Characteristics of schools Parents not applying to nearest school All parents
Nearest schools 1st preference
school
1st preference
schools
Type
     Community 72 38 53
     Foundation 11 22 23
     Voluntary aided 7 36 19
     Voluntary controlled 1 2 4
     Academy 3 1 1
     CTC 1 * *
     Missing 5 * *
Selection type
     Wholly selective 15 15 12
     Partially selective 21 22 19
     Non-selective 59 63 69
     Missing 5 * *
Gender
     Mixed 86 85 89
     Boys 2 6 4
     Girls 3 8 6
     Missing 9 2 1
Religion
     Does not apply/none 82 62 78
     Roman Catholic 5 31 16
     Church of England 4 5 5
     Christian * 1 *
     Jewish 0 0 0
     Muslim/Sikh 0 0 0
     Missing 5 * *
Specialist status
     Specialism 70 88 87
     No specialism 21 10 12
     Missing 5 2 *
Total 611 611 2190
Average number of children at
school
998 1169 1159
Unweighted N (schools with
pupil data)
582 608 2184
Base: parents who did not apply for their nearest maintained school and all parents who completed
an application form.
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3.4.5 Favourite schools that parents chose not to apply to
Parents were asked whether there were any maintained schools other than those
they applied for that they liked better. Only 5% of parents said that there was such
a school that they favoured but chose not to apply to. There is no direct
comparison for this figure from the 2000 survey as parents were then able to apply
to multiple authorities and it was harder to establish what the first preference
school. However, 8% of parents in 2000 identified another state school that they
would have preferred for their child over the ones which they had applied for. So it
is possible to conclude that the proportion of parents choosing not to apply to a
school that they regarded as their favourite was no higher in 2006 than in 2000.
Nearly half (43%) of parents in 2006 who chose not to apply to their favourite
school gave as their reason that the school was over-subscribed and their child did
not meet the oversubscription criteria (whether based on proximity, religion or a
test). This finding provides another indication that the oversubscription criteria are
important in influencing parents’ preferences. The next most common reasons
were that the school’s location was inconvenient (29%) and that the child did not
want to go there (19%).
Table 3.37:  Reasons why parents did not apply to their favourite maintained
school
Column %
Reasons for not applying to favourite school
Difficult to get to/inconvenient location 29
Over-subscribed – not meet distance criteria 21
Child did not want to go 19
Over-subscribed – not meet religious criteria 12
Over-subscribed – unlikely to pass test 10
Sibling doesn’t go there 7
Transport costs too high 7
Over-subscribed – not meet other criteria 7
Don’t know 1
Other specific answer 17
Vague or irrelevant 2
Unweighted N 121
Base: Respondents who did not apply for their favourite school.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
7% of parents cited transport costs as a barrier.  From 2008 there will be additional
support for parents for travel costs.  It will be of interest to see if this influences this
proportion in the future.
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Parental perceptions of the favourite schools not applied for were similar to those
of the schools listed as first preference.
Table 3.38:  Characteristics of favourite schools not applied for
Column %
Characteristics of favourite school not applied for
Good exam results 52
Good reputation in the community 44
Good facilities 27
Other characteristics of school particularly liked 23
Good bullying/anti discipline policy 19
Children well-behaved 8
Pupil social characteristics 8
Child wanted to go there 4
Child’s friends are going there 4
Religious reasons 4
Sibling goes there 3
It’s the local school 3
Convenient to get to/distance from home 3
Had previous positive experience of the school 2
General – the best school for the child 2
Subject specialism 2
Other child-related reasons *
Other specific answer 3
Vague or irrelevant 1
Unweighted N 121
Base: Respondents who did not apply to their favourite school.
3.4.6 Ordering schools
There is evidence to suggest that parents do not always list schools in the order
they most prefer which may be related to selective admission policies and
oversubscription. In the parent survey, 95% of parents who expressed a
preference for more than one school said they listed schools in the order they
really prefer. 38% (of the same base) received advice about the order in which to
list schools and 3% weren’t sure/couldn’t remember.
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The main source of advice for ordering schools on the application form was the
child’s primary school, followed by the local authority and the secondary schools.
Of those who received advice on how to order their schools, 14% changed the
ordering of schools after receiving advice53. Advisers funded by the Choice Advice
initiative were not in place for the 2006 parents.
Table 3.39:  Source of advice about ordering schools on the application form
Column %
Source of advice about ordering of schools
Child’s primary school 36
Local authority 27
Secondary schools 19
Advice given with application documents 14
Friends, relatives and/or other parents 10
Social services/health professionals/education
welfare officer
1
Priest/other faith representative *
Other specific answer 2
Vague or irrelevant 1
Unweighted N 585
Base: Respondents who said they received advice about the order in which to list schools.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
The majority of parents (62%) spent between two and 12 months finding out about
secondary schools before making their application. 22% of the sample spent just
one month finding out about schools while 13% spent more than a year.
                                             
53 The question did not distinguish between changes made before and after an application was submitted.
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Table 3.40:  Length of time spent by parents finding out about schools before
applying
Time spent finding out
about schools before
applying
Column %
1 month 22
2 – 6 months 33
7 – 12 months 29
1 to 3 years 9
Over 3 years 4
Missing 3
Unweighted N 2215
Base: All respondents.
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3.4.7 Involvement of family members and actions taken
Table 3.41:  Level of involvement of the other parent depending on relationship of
respondent to child
Column %
How involved
was the other
parent?
Respondents
who were
mothers
Respondents
who were
fathers
Very much 53 76
Partly 19 11
Not at all 26 8
Don’t know * 1
Missing 2 4
Unweighted N 1872 312
Base: Respondents who were parents of the child starting secondary school. ‘Mother’ includes
foster mother and step-mother and ‘father’ includes foster father and step-father.
The parent who responded to the survey was asked to indicate the extent to which
the child’s other parent was involved in choosing and applying for schools. In 85%
of cases, the respondent was the mother. 72% of mothers reported that the father
was involved at least partly in the process, but in a quarter of cases the father was
not involved at all. This proportion is likely to include fathers who do not live in the
home. Of the fathers who responded to the survey, 87% reported that the mother
was at least partly involved. Given the proportion of mothers and fathers
responding to the survey, it is clear that mothers took the primary responsibility for
choosing and applying for secondary schools.
79% of respondents54 said that the child was very involved in choosing and
applying for secondary schools and 16% said they were partly involved. Only 4%
of parents reported that their children were not at all involved.
                                             
54 The base for this figure is all respondents (N=2215).
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It is a frequent argument that some parents, given their social characteristics, are
better placed to take special actions to maximise their child’s chances of securing
an offer from their favoured school. Parents in the survey were asked whether they
had taken any special actions such as moving house or joining a place of worship
specifically for the purpose of their child’s schooling.
One-fifth of the sample reported that they had taken special actions, the most
common being the parent coaching the child. 5% made sure their child attended a
particular primary school that may have had links with the secondary school. A
small minority paid for extra tuition and arranged extra-curricular activities for the
child.
Table 3.42:  Actions taken to maximise chances of securing a place at preferred
school
Column %
Actions taken
Coach child yourself 8
Get child into a particular primary school 5
Pay for extra tuition 4
Arrange extra-curricular activities for child 4
Move to the catchment area or rent a house there 3
Join a church or other place of worship 1
Ask someone with influence in the process to
recommend your child
1
Use the address of a relative in the catchment area *
None of these 81
Other specific answer *
Vague or irrelevant *
Unweighted N 2190
Base: Respondents who completed an application form.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
Parents were also asked whether they had taken into account the catchment
areas of secondary schools when they last moved house and 22% had done so.
These parents were more likely to have taken special actions than parents who
had not considered catchment areas when moving (25% compared with 17%).
These figures suggest that a substantial minority of parents go to considerable
lengths to maximise their child’s chances in education.
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Logistic regression analysis was undertaken to identify what characteristics were
independently associated with taking special action to maximise their child’s
chances of getting a school place. Three variables were found to be significant:
• Previous experience of applying to a secondary school: parents who had
not applied to a secondary school before were more likely to take special
action.
• House moving: parents who had taken school catchment areas into account
when they last moved house were more likely than other parents to take
special action. We can surmise that in many cases these parents’ house
purchases will have secured their choice of school under proximity rules.
• Ethnicity: Non-white parents were twice as likely as white parents to take
special action.
Table 3.43:  Logistic regression: factors associated with taking special action to
maximise the chance of an application being successful
Didn’t apply to nearest maintained school N Odds ratio 95%
confidence
interval
Previous experience of applying to secondary
school (p<0.01)
No previous experience 846 1.0
Had previous experience 1000 0.6* 0.5 -0.8
Took into account secondary school catchment
areas when last moving house (p<0.01)
No 1436 1.0
Yes 403 1.6* 1.1 -2.4
Maternal ethnicity (p<0.001)
White 1615 1.0
Non-white 231 2.0* 1.4 -2.8
Unweighted N 1846
Base includes only those cases that have values for all variables in the model.
*these odds ratios denote the individual categories that were significantly associated with the
outcome variable at the 95% confidence level. If an odds ratio is significant, a value greater than
one indicates higher likelihood of the outcome variable occurring for that category compared to the
reference category, and odds lower than one indicate lower likelihood.
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3.4.8 Summary
The findings in this section show that parents explained their choice of a school in
terms of it having a good reputation and good exam results and their child wanting
to go there. Where parents chose not to apply for their nearest school they
explained their decision in terms of the absence of these characteristics, saying
that the school had a poor reputation, poor exam results or poor discipline. This
pattern was extremely consistent with the 2000 survey.
For three quarters of parents the nearest maintained school to where they lived
satisfied these concerns and was their first preference. Only 5% of parents
identified a ‘favourite’ school that was different from their first preference but was
not selected due to some barrier such as the school’s location, the child’s
preference or a perceived low chance of gaining a place.
The quarter of parents who chose not to apply to their nearest school tended to
live in more densely populated areas where more schools were accessible and
where admissions appeals were common, indicating stronger competition for
places. They were less likely than other parents to have taken account of school
catchment areas when they last moved house and were more likely to actively
practice religion. The schools that these parents preferred to their nearest schools
had different characteristics, being more likely to be a Voluntary Aided or
Foundation school, to be a single sex school, to have a religious affiliation, to have
a specialism or to be a larger school.
About a fifth of parents took special steps such as coaching or extra tuition in
furtherance of their child’s application and, as the previous section showed, these
steps were more common where schools had special admissions arrangements. A
similar proportion of parents had taken account of school catchment areas when
they last moved house in order to maximise their chance of success with a school
of their choice.
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3.5 Parental satisfaction with the application process and outcomes
This section investigates parental satisfaction with the outcome of applications
made for schools in 2006 and aspects of the process. Objective measures of
satisfaction include the proportion of parents offered a place for their child in their
first preference school and the proportion making appeals against the decision of
their admission authority. Alongside these objective outcomes, this section reports
on subjective measures of parental satisfaction with the application process and
outcomes.
3.5.1 Key findings of section
• The majority of respondents (97%) received an offer for their child in early
March 2006.
• 84% of the whole sample were offered their first preference school. This was
lower for parents living in London (70%). Following appeals, these proportions
rose to 86% of parents overall and 72% of parents in London.
• Multivariate analysis showed that four factors were independently associated
with parents who were offered a place at their first preference school. These
were parents applying to only one school, applying in a local authority where
first preference first was the dominant preference system, having already got
an older sibling at the school (or otherwise having prior experience of
secondary school admissions) and being white. We cannot explain why white
parents appear to have been more successful with their applications than non-
white parents.
• Of those who were offered a school, 97% accepted the offer and 3% appealed.
• Multivariate analysis identified five factors that were independently associated
with making an appeal. These were not getting the first preference school
applied for, applying to three or more schools, applying to a first preference
school that was believed to be over-subscribed, applying for a wholly selective
school and living in a local authority where admissions arrangements were
predominantly diverse.
• Satisfaction with the process was generally high. Over 90% of parents were
satisfied with the overall provision of information and the formal sources of
information (except school achievement and attainment data and
oversubscription criteria).
• 43% were very satisfied and 38% were fairly satisfied with the choice of
schools in their locality. Satisfaction was lowest among parents living in
London.
• Satisfaction with the current school attended by the child varied according to
whether or not it was the parents’ first preference. 95% of parents whose child
currently attended their first preference school were satisfied, compared to
82% of parents whose child attended a school that was not their first
preference.
• Multivariate analysis showed that, controlling for other variables, parents who
did not get their first preference school were five times more likely than other
parents to be dissatisfied with the current school that their child attended.
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• However, for parents who were not awarded their first preference school,
nearly half (48%) were more satisfied once their child had started the school
than they were beforehand.
• The most common means of travelling to and from school was by foot with
49% walking at least part of the journey, 31% travelling by car, 19% by public
transport bus and 17% travelled by school bus (percentages sum to more than
100 because multiple answers were allowed). Satisfaction with travel
arrangements was highest among parents whose children walked and used no
other form of transport.
• Of the 10% of parents who were dissatisfied with their child’s travel
arrangements, the main reason was that they had to pay the cost of travel
(39%). Other reasons included worrying about the child’s safety (29%) and the
poor condition of public transport (27%).
3.5.2 Comparison with 2000
The 2000 survey differentiated between the proportion of parents offered their first
preference school and those offered their favourite school. This was because
under the admissions system that was in place at the time, parents could apply to
more than one admission authority, for example to their own local authority, to
another local authority and to a school that was its own admission authority. For
the purpose of analysis, the first preference schools referred to those listed first in
the application to the parents’ own local authority, then schools which were their
own admission authority and finally to local authority schools in other local
authorities. By contrast, the favourite school was the one that the parents said they
most wanted their child to attend.
In 2006, 84% of parents received a first offer for their first preference school.
There was no comparable statistic in 2000 because parents were then required to
make separate applications to more than one school because the applications
process was not co-ordinated by the local authority. In 2000, 92% of parents
reported receiving a ‘first preference’ offer while 85% reported receiving an offer at
their ‘favourite’ school. Allowing for the changes to admissions systems and the
differences in questioning, it seems safe to conclude that the proportion of parents
who gained a place at their most favoured school was fairly consistent between
2000 and 200655.
                                             
55 In other words, we think that the school listed first under the admissions system in 2006 might correspond
better with the 'favourite' school than with the school listed first under the admission system in 2000, since
under that system parents could apply for more than one school as a first preference, i.e. there were multiple
expressions of first preference and (potentially) multiple offers of 'first preference' schools. The 'favourite
school' in the 2000 report distinguishes which of these expressed 'first preferences' was actually their most
preferred.
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In both years, parents living in London were least likely to be offered a place for
their child in their first preference school but only in 2000 was the reported rate of
appeals higher in London.
In both years, the overall rate of appeal in the sample was similar (5% in 2000 and
3% in 2006). The national rate of appeals for the whole of England as recorded by
the DfES (DfES 2007) was 6.1%.
Overall satisfaction levels with the application process were high across both
years. As in 2000, the satisfaction with outcome for parents in 2006 depended on
whether their child was offered their first preference school.
In both 2000 and 2006, about one-in-ten parents felt less satisfied with the
outcome than they had before their child started attending secondary school, more
than one-in-three said they were more satisfied and about half felt the same.
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3.5.3 Offers
All parents who applied for maintained secondary schools were meant to be
offered a place in one school for their child on or near the 1st March 2006. The
survey findings showed that 97% of parents received an offer at this time, 2% did
not and 1% did not know56.
Overall, 84% of parents in the sample were offered a place in the school that they
had listed as first preference and 95% were offered one of the schools they had
listed. 2% were offered a place in a school that they had not applied for and 2%
said they did not receive an offer.
The proportion of parents who were offered a place at their first preference school
was lower in London than elsewhere (70% compared with 86%).
Logistic regression analysis was undertaken to identify what characteristics were
independently associated with parents receiving an offer at their first preference
school. Four variables were found to be significant:
• The number of schools applied for: parents who had applied to a single school
were more likely to get their first preference than those who applied for multiple
schools. This finding is what we would expect since it is likely that many
parents who only listed a single school did so because they were very
confident of getting their first choice perhaps because they had high priority for
selection under the admissions criteria, for example because they had another
child already at the school, because their child had attended a feeder school or
because the school was known to be under-subscribed.
• The dominant preference system in the local authority: parents in local
authorities that operated first preference first systems were more likely than
those in local authorities operating an equal preference/default ranking system
to get an offer at their first preference school. “This difference is likely to reflect
the greater weighting given to first preferences under the first preference first
system. Although this system results in more first preference offers, it does not
necessarily result in a higher proportion of offers that are acceptable to
parents. This is because some parents make strategic choices about which
schools to list first and second preferences have much reduced chances of
resulting in an offer. First preference first systems are no longer permitted
under the School Admissions Code 2007.
                                             
56 The base for this figure is all parents in the sample, not just those who said they completed an application
form because some of the parents who said they didn’t complete a form were nevertheless offered a place.
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• Previous experience of applying to secondary schools: parents who had an
older sibling at the school or otherwise had previous experience of applying for
a secondary school were more likely to get an offer at their first preference
school. Clearly, siblings rules, which the analysis of the composite
prospectuses found were the most frequently used category of
oversubscription criteria, would have been an important element of this trend.
• Ethnicity: white mothers were more likely than non-white mothers to get an
offer at their first preference school. We cannot tell from the data whether this
difference reflected some form of differential treatment or just some differences
in the types of applications made by white and non-white parents that were not
captured by other variables in the regression analysis.
It is notable that socio-economic factors such as income and employment status
were not found to be significant in this regression analysis. So there was no
indication that the level of application success differed according to social class.
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Table 3.44:  Logistic regression: factors associated with receiving offer of first
preference school (family and area characteristics, whether action taken by
parents, school characteristics including whether over-subscribed)
Child currently attends first preference school N Odds ratio 95%
confidence
interval
Number of schools applied for (p<0.001)
1 587 1.00
2 482 0.2* 0.1-0.4
3 640 0.3* 0.2-0.4
4+ 136 0.1* 0.0-0.1
Dominant preference system of LA (P<0.05)
Equal preference/default ranking 1426
First preference first 419 2.3* 1.0-6.9
Previous experience of applying to secondary
school (p<0.01)
No previous experience 845 1.00
Had previous experience 1000 1.6* 1.2-2.2
Maternal ethnicity (p<0.05)
White 1614 1.00
Non-white 231 0.5* 0.3-1.0
Unweighted N 1845
Base includes only those cases that have values for all variables in the model.
*these odds ratios denote the individual categories that were significantly associated with the
outcome variable at the 95% confidence level. If an odds ratio is significant, a value greater than
one indicates higher likelihood of the outcome variable occurring for that category compared to the
reference category, and odds lower than one indicate lower likelihood.
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3.5.4  Appeals
Of the parents who were offered a school in March 2006, 97% accepted the offer
and only 3% appealed. Surprisingly, the rate of acceptance and appeal was not
higher in London – 96% accepted the offer and 1% appealed. As noted earlier the
national rate of appeals for the whole of England was 6.1% and the rate of appeal
in 2006 for London as a whole was 9.3%, as recorded by the DfES (DfES 2007).
The number of parents appealing was small, so the proportions in the table below
should be treated with caution57. Half of the parents who appealed were offered
their second preference school and one-third were offered a school that they didn’t
apply for. Three parents appealed despite being offered their first preference
school. This may occur because a family’s personal circumstances have changed
or because parents listed as first preference a school that was a tactical safe bet
while actually preferring the second school listed58.
Table 3.45:  Proportion of parents appealing broken down by the preference
number of the school that they were originally offered
Column %
Preference number of school
originally offered to those who
appealed
1st preference 5
2nd preference 50
3rd preference 11
4th preference 3
A different school 33
Unweighted N 49
Base: Respondents who appealed
                                             
57 To provide some context for the survey appeals figures, the following proportions are from the national
figures for 2004-05. The proportion of appeals per LA (as a percentage of the number of admissions) varied
from 1% to 32%, with a mean of 11%. The proportion of appeals that were successful varied from 0 to 61%
across Local authorities with a mean of 26%. The difference in proportions between the appeals figures for the
survey data and for 2004-05 may be due to the small number of appeals in the survey data or may be
because of those who appealed (and particularly, those who were unsuccessful in their appeal) a proportion
exited the maintained sector and took up places in independent schools, therefore not appearing in this
sample.
58 Among the three parents who appealed despite being offered their first preference, two said that the school
they listed as second preference was in fact their favourite and one said that their first choice was their
favourite, so their circumstances probably changed.
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Logistic regression analysis was undertaken to identify what characteristics were
independently associated with parents making an appeal. Five variables were
found to be significant:
• Whether current school had been first preference: as we would expect, appeals
were more common where parents had not gained their first preference school.
• The number of schools applied for: parents who had applied to three schools
were much more likely than parents who had applied to fewer schools to have
made an appeal.
• Whether the first preference school was reported to be over-subscribed: as we
would expect, parents who reported that their first choice school was over-
subscribed were more likely to have been unsuccessful with their first
preference and to appeal.
• Selection type of the first preference school: appeals were more common
where the first preference school was wholly selective than when it was not
selective.
• Diversity of admissions in the LA: parents in admission authorities that were
predominantly diverse were less likely than those in authorities that were
predominantly non-autonomous to make an appeal.
152
These findings are what would be expected. It is interesting that there were no
significant associations between appealing and parents’ family characteristics.
Table 3.46:  Logistic regression: factors associated with making an appeal (family,
school characteristics)
Made an appeal N Odds ratio 95%
confidence
interval
Whether current school was first preference
(p<0.05)
No 339 1.0
Yes 1844 0.5* 0.3 -1
Number of schools applied for (p<0.001)
1 701 1.0
2 582 1.2 0.6 -2.5
3 737 4.8* 2.7 -8.4
4+ 163 2.4 0.8 -7.6
Oversubscription of 1st preference school
(parent report) (p<0.001)
Not over-subscribed 1477 1.0
Over-subscribed 706 4.8* 2.5 -9.4
Selection type of first preference school
(p<0.01)
Not selective 1473 1.0
Wholly selective 435 2.6* 1.1 -6.3
Partially selective 275 0.5 0.2 -1.2
Diversity of parent LA schools in groups
(p<0.05)
Non-autonomous (0-25%) 848 1.0
Diverse (25-75%) 1233 0.3* 0.1 -0.9
Autonomous (75-100%) 102 0.6 0.1 -5.7
Unweighted N 2183
Base includes only those cases that have values for all variables in the model.
*these odds ratios denote the individual categories that were significantly associated with the
outcome variable at the 95% confidence level. If an odds ratio is significant, a value greater than
one indicates higher likelihood of the outcome variable occurring for that category compared to the
reference category, and odds lower than one indicate lower likelihood.
Of the 56 parents in the survey who appealed, 91% appealed for one school, 8%
for two schools and 1% for three schools.
Sometimes, it is possible to resolve appeals without taking it to a hearing. Of the
parents in the survey who appealed, 48% took the appeal to a hearing. The
national figure for the proportion of appeals lodged that are taken to a hearing is
73.5%. 80% of those who didn’t take the appeal to a hearing gave the reason that
they were offered their preferred school without going to a hearing. Of those who
appealed, 68% won the appeal, twice that (36.4%) recorded by DfES statistics and
8% didn’t know the outcome.
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Following the appeal procedure, the number of children offered a place in their first
preference school increased. In the end, 86% of parents secured a place for their
child in their first preference school (72% in London).
3.5.5 Satisfaction with application procedures
Parents responding to the survey were asked to rate their satisfaction with a range
of aspects of the application process providing a subjective measure of
satisfaction. In each case, satisfaction was measured with a five-point scale
ranging from very satisfied to very dissatisfied. Following the wording used in the
2000 survey, parents were asked how satisfied they were that the information was
‘easy to follow’59.
Parents expressed a high level of satisfaction with the formal sources of
information used. 81% of parents thought that school achievement and attainment
data were easy to follow and 90% and over thought that the other types of
information were easy to follow.
Table 3.47:  Parental satisfaction with formal sources of information
Row %
Very
satisfied
Fairly
satisfied
Neither
satisfied
nor
dissatisfied
Fairly
dissatisfied
Very
dissatisfied
Unwt
N
Local authority booklets 59 36 3 2 * 1041
School prospectuses or
brochures
65 32 2 1 * 1294
School websites 47 43 5 4 2 581
School achievement and
attainment data
30 51 8 10 1 972
Ofsted inspection reports 44 47 5 3 1 647
Base: Respondents who used the information sources listed.
94% of parents said they were satisfied that they had all the information they
needed to help them decide which schools to apply for and only 3% expressed
dissatisfaction60.
                                             
59 Similar questions were asked in 2000 in relation to local authority booklets and school brochures. In both
cases the proportions expressing satisfaction were similar to 2006.
60 This question was asked in the same way in 2000. A slightly lower proportion (87%) were satisfied in 2000.
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Table 3.48:  Overall parental satisfaction with the provision of information
Row %
Very
satisfied
Fairly
satisfied
Neither
satisfied
nor
dissatisfied
Fairly
dissatisfied
Very
dissatisfied
Unwt
N
Overall satisfaction with
information
63 31 4 2 1 2215
Base: All respondents.
80% of parents who considered applying to over-subscribed schools were satisfied
that the oversubscription criteria were easy to follow and 8% were dissatisfied.
Table 3.49:  Parental level of satisfaction that oversubscription criteria were easy
to understand
Row %
Very
satisfied
Fairly
satisfied
Neither
satisfied
nor
dissatisfied
Fairly
dissatisfied
Very
dissatisfied
Unwt
N
S a t i s f a c t i o n  w i t h
oversubscription criteria
43 37 10 4 4 265
Base: Respondents who considered over-subscribed schools and for whom the oversubscription
criteria influenced their choice.
3% replied ‘don’t know’ to this question.
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81% of parents were satisfied with the choice of schools in their locality. This
varied by the type of local authority in which parents lived. Parents living in London
were the least satisfied with the choice of schools (70% satisfied, 22% dissatisfied)
despite the greater density of schools than elsewhere in the country. Parents living
in other metropolitan areas expressed the highest level of satisfaction (82%).
Table 3.50:  Parental satisfaction with choice of schools in locality by local
authority type
Row %
Local authority type Very
satisfied
Fairly
satisfied
Neither
satisfied
nor
dissatisfied
Fairly
dissatisfied
Very
dissatisfied
Unwt
N
London 35 35 8 12 10 385
Metropolitan 43 39 8 5 4 736
Non-metropolitan 45 38 6 7 5 1065
All 43 38 7 7 5 2186
Base: Respondents who completed an application form.
3 respondents replied don’t know and are not included in the table.
1 respondent included in the overall base was classified as living in Wales.
Two thirds of survey respondents who had appealed won their appeal whereas the
proportion of successful appeals nationally was about one third, suggesting that
unsuccessful appeals were either under-reported or under-represented in the
survey sample. Most survey respondents who appealed expressed satisfaction
with the appeal procedure. However, the level of satisfaction was affected by the
outcome of the appeal and those who lost their appeals tended to be very
dissatisfied with the procedure.
Table 3.51:  Parental satisfaction with the appeal procedure
Row %
Very
satisfied
Fairly
satisfied
Neither
satisfied
nor
dissatisfied
Fairly
dissatisfied
Very
dissatisfied
Unwt
N
Satisfaction with appeal
procedure
26 28 4 8 26 49
Base: Respondents who appealed.
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3.5.6 Satisfaction with application outcomes
Overall, 73% of parents were very satisfied and 20% were fairly satisfied with the
school that the child currently attends. Only 4% were dissatisfied. Understandably,
the level of satisfaction with the current schools varied according to whether the
current school was the school preferred by parents. Where the child secured a
place in the first preference school, 95% of parents were satisfied and where they
did not, 82% were satisfied. It is interesting that the level of satisfaction is high
among both groups of parents.
Table 3.52:  Parental satisfaction with current school by school preference
Row %
Satisfaction with current
school
Very
satisfied
Fairly
satisfied
Neither
satisfied
nor
dissatisfied
Fairly
dissatisfied
Very
dissatisfied
Unwt
N
Current school was 1st
preference
75 20 2 2 1 1807
Current school was not
1st preference
57 25 5 5 7 340
All 73 20 3 2 2 2147
Base: All parents who responded to the question about satisfaction with school.
Of the parents whose child attended a secondary school that was not their first
preference, nearly half said that they were more satisfied now than before the child
started the school and 16% were less satisfied. Taken together with the previous
table, it seems that the majority of parents become reconciled to the school offered
to their child regardless of their preferences. Only 12% of parents who did not
secure their first preference remained dissatisfied once their child had attended
the school for a term.
Table 3.53:  Current level of satisfaction with current school compared to before
child started last September by school preference
Row %
Current satisfaction compared
with before child started school
More
satisfied than
then
Less
satisfied than
then
Feel the
same
Unwt N
Current school was 1st preference 38 7 5 1807
Current school was not 1st
preference
48 16 36 340
All 39 9 53 2147
Base: All parents who responded to the question about satisfaction with school.
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Logistic regression analysis was undertaken to identify what characteristics were
independently associated with parents being dissatisfied with the school that their
children attended. Two variables were found to be significant:
• Whether the current school was first preference: parents whose child was not
attending the first choice school were five times more likely to say that they
were dissatisfied.
• The number of schools applied for: although this variable was significantly
associated with dissatisfaction, the pattern was not consistent and so it was
unclear how applying for more schools was related to dissatisfaction.
Table 3.54:  Multiple regression: factors associated with dissatisfaction with
outcome (family, area and school characteristics, application outcome)
Dissatisfied with current school attended N Odds ratio 95%
confidence
interval
Current school was first preference (p<0.001)
No 344 1.0
Yes 1845 0.2* 0.1-0.5
Number of schools applied for (p<0.01)
1 702 1.0
2 585 1.3 0.7-2.3
3 738 0.5 0.2-1.2
4+ 164 1.7 0.5-6.0
Unweighted N 2185
Base includes only those cases that have values for all variables in the model.
*these odds ratios denote the individual categories that were significantly associated with the
outcome variable at the 95% confidence level. If an odds ratio is significant, a value greater than
one indicates higher likelihood of the outcome variable occurring for that category compared to the
reference category, and odds lower than one indicate lower likelihood.
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3.5.7 Travel arrangements
Travel to and from school is an influential aspect of school choice and satisfaction.
As reported above, the main reason for parents not applying for their favourite
school was travel inconvenience and the government has recognised that unequal
access to transport can affect fair admissions61. This section investigates the
means by which children travel to and from their current school and parental
satisfaction with the arrangements.
Some children used more than one means of transport to get to and from school,
but half the sample said they usually walked, 31% usually took the car, 19%
usually went by public transport bus and 17% usually travelled by school bus
(percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed).
Of those who used forms of transport other than walking and cycling, 31% of
respondents said that the local authority paid for the child’s travel and 69% said
that the parent/carer paid62.
Table 3.55:  Use of different forms of transport to get to or from school
Column %
Mode of transport
Walk 49
By car 31
By public transport bus 19
By school bus 17
By bicycle 4
By rail/overground train 3
By underground train/metro 1
taxi 1
Private/special bus/coach *
Other specific answer *
Unweighted N 2215
Base: All respondents.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
                                             
61 2007 Code of Admissions.
62 1% gave other answers.
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 Most parents whose child used a school bus reported that the main criterion for
using it was the distance from home to school. Religion was mentioned as a
criterion by 8% of parents.
Table 3.56:  Criteria for using school bus for current school according to parent
report
Column %
Criteria for using school bus
Distance of home from school 73
Living near the bus route 10
All children entitled/no criteria for use 9
Religion 8
Low income 1
Special needs 1
Other specific answer 4
Vague or irrelevant answer 2
Unweighted N 385
Base: Respondents whose child uses the school bus.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
Overall, 65% of parents were very satisfied with their child’s travel arrangements
and 22% were fairly satisfied. These figures varied according to the form of
transport used with the highest levels of satisfaction expressed by those whose
child walked to and from school. The lowest level of satisfaction was expressed by
parents whose child took a public bus to travel to and from school.
Table 3.57:  Satisfaction with travel arrangements to and from current school by
mode of transport
Row %
Mode of transport Very
satisfied
Fairly
satisfied
Neither
satisfied
nor
dissatisfied
Fairly
dissatisfied
Very
dissatisfied
Unwt
N
Walk only 88 10 1 1 1 670
Car only 50 25 9 10 7 318
Public transport bus only 37 34 4 12 13 305
School bus only 61 28 4 6 1 314
All respondents 65 22 4 6 4 2215
Base: All respondents.
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Of the parents who were dissatisfied with their child’s travel arrangements, the
main reasons were that they had to pay travel costs, were worried about their
child’s safety and thought the quality of public transport was poor.
Table 3.58:  Reasons for parental dissatisfaction with current travel arrangements
Column %
Reasons for dissatisfaction
Have to pay travel costs 39
Worried about child’s safety 29
Poor public transport (including timing, conditions) 27
Too far to travel 13
Long journey time 14
Issues with school bus (unreliable, crowded, expensive, smoking, bullying) 14
No school bus provided 5
Other specific answer 6
Vague or irrelevant 3
Unweighted N 226
Base: All respondents who expressed dissatisfaction with child’s current travel arrangements.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
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3.5.8 Summary
The findings in this section show that in 2006, as in 2000, most parents got the
secondary school place that they wanted for their child. Information was generally
felt to be good and the oversubscription criteria, when applicable, was generally
felt to be capable of being understood. Accordingly, satisfaction with the system
was generally high.
However, there was a minority of parents whose applications ended with
disappointment. 16% were not offered a place at their first preference school (30%
of parents in London). These parents were less satisfied with the admissions
system than other parents. They were often dissatisfied with the school that they
were allocated, although half of them said that they were more satisfied with the
outcome once their child had started at the school. As in 2000, parents in London
were less likely to be successful in their application and more likely to be
dissatisfied than parents in other areas.
The survey found that most parents were very satisfied with the arrangements for
their child’s travel to secondary school. Parent’s whose children could walk, or
travel by school bus, were more satisfied than those who had to travel by car or
public transport. This aspect of parental satisfaction may assume increased
importance if proximity becomes less decisive in admissions criteria.
A minority of parents who were not offered their school of choice appealed.
Parents who lost appeals tended to say that they were ‘very dissatisfied’ with the
system and with the appeal procedure.
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3.6 Chapter Summary
The survey presents a picture of parents’ experiences of secondary school
admissions that is broadly positive and comparable with the findings of the
previous study in 2000.
The broadly positive experiences of more than two-thirds of parents can easily be
summarised. These parents found that information about schools was accessible,
adequate and useful. They found the application process to be reasonably
straightforward and the choice of school quite easy to make, focusing as it did on
their local school. The outcome of the process was satisfactory as 84% of parents
were offered a place for their child at the school they had put as their first choice.
While parents generally felt well informed about schools, there was evidence that
some parents had better access to knowledge than others. School prospectuses
and brochures were in plentiful supply but were used more by better educated
parents than less well educated parents. The internet was playing a growing role
and parents who had easy access to the internet appeared to have significantly
better access to information. However, the most highly valued information was
obtained informally, through school visits and talking to other parents and school
staff. These trends suggest that parents with poorer educational attainment, low
internet access, poorer social networks and poorer information-gathering skills
could be disadvantaged in the admissions process. It is important to stress that
these findings only relate to access to the available information and we found no
evidence that less well-educated parents or parents from less affluent socio-
economic groups were disadvantaged in the applications because of their lower
use of information. However, these findings clearly have relevance for the Choice
Adviser initiative.
The survey identified some notable trends affecting a minority of parents. In areas
where places were limited, particularly in London, parents were invited to express
a larger number of preferences and did so, were more likely to apply to schools
outside their local authority and were less likely to get a school of their choice.
Special admissions arrangements, which will be more restricted under the new
admissions code, increased the complexity of the process and were associated
with increased special actions, such as coaching and extra tuition, by parents who
were keen to improve their child’s chances.
Proximity to schools was found to be central to the oversubscriptions criteria
followed by many admissions authorities and parents had a good understanding of
how this affected their chances of success. A fifth of parents had taken account of
catchment areas the last time they moved home and those who hadn’t done so
were more likely to take other special actions to further their application. This
established relationship between proximity and application success seems likely to
be weakened as the new admissions code is implemented, with positive or
negative consequences for some parents’ satisfaction with the system. In this
context, it is worth noting that parents’ satisfaction with their child’s travel
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arrangements was greater when the child could walk or travel by school bus than
when they had to travel by car or public transport.
Despite the majority position of parental satisfaction, there remained a small
proportion of parents for whom the admissions process resulted in substantial
disappointment and dissatisfaction. For these parents, dissatisfaction was
generally focused on the outcome rather than the process.
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4 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ADMISSIONS SYSTEM IN 2006:
CURRENT OUTCOMES AND MEASURES OF THE SUCCESS
OF ADMISSION ARRANGEMENTS
4.1 Introduction
We identified at the beginning of this report some objectives against which the
effectiveness of the admissions system can be measured. They broadly
concerned procedural integrity and fairness, enabling parents to educate their
children according to their views and contributing to every child having a good
education while no child receives a better education at the expense of another. In
this section we use the results of our mapping of admissions, the data provided
about outcomes, and findings from other studies to look at how the present system
fares in relation to these objectives.
The objectives were to:
• Provide a means by which those who consider admissions arrangements to
be unfair can refer the matter to an independent adjudicator
• Provide an effective means for parents to appeal to an independent tribunal
if they are unsatisfied with the outcome
• Provide access to clear and understandable information and criteria that are
transparent, and seen to be objectively applied
• Satisfy parents' wishes as to how and where their children are to be
educated
• Ensure that all parents are treated equally and schools do not covertly
select students on the basis of social status or prior attainment
• Not inhibit the quality of education overall and, if possible, contribute to
enhancing it
• Not allow the greater achievement of some children to be at the expense of
others
• Contribute to social cohesion
• Not contribute to the harm inflicted by wholesale denigration of children and
communities
4.2 Procedural efficiency, integrity and fairness
4.2.1 Key findings
• The system in 2006 was more efficiently managed and better co-ordinated
than in 2000.
• In some areas the LA continued to co-ordinate admissions after the national
offer date and in others this role ended at that point.
• The requirement to consult made compliance with the School Admission
Code of Practice 2003 more likely
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• Community and Voluntary Controlled schools and Academies were more
likely than Foundation and Voluntary Aided schools to comply with the
regulations and guidance stated in the 2003 School Admissions Code of
Practice
• Voluntary Aided schools were the least likely to comply compared with all
other types of school
• Procedural non-compliance is only a part of the reason for segregated
intakes
• There was no evidence for the view that parents from lower socio economic
groups are being denied access to popular schools just because they are
less able to understand the admissions process.
•  More educated parents were likely to access more information but very few
parents felt they were lacking basic information about secondary schools
• There was no evidence that parents who were less educated had any
reduced chance of gaining their first preference.
4.2.2 The co-ordination and regulation of admissions
The system in 2006 was more efficiently managed and better co-ordinated than in
2000. 99% of parents completed an application form for starting secondary school
in 2006. The majority of respondents (97%) received a single offer for their child
on the same day in March 2006. The co-ordination role of the Local Authority was
important in delivering this efficiency giving them oversight of the needs of all
children and parents. The legislation and guidance governing this co-ordination
was aimed at ensuring a single offer.
The purpose of co-ordinated admission schemes is to establish
mechanisms for ensuring, so far as reasonably practicable, that every
parent of a child living in the LEA area who has applied for a school place in
the ‘normal admission round’ receives an offer of one, and only one, school
place on the same day. (School Admissions Code of Practice 2003 para
6.1)
Consequently, in the model timetables offered as guidance the co-ordination
responsibility of LA's ceases after the national offer day of March 1st.  In some
areas this co-ordination role did end with the offer of places in March and,
following that, each admission authority dealt with its own appeals and any other
matters and no one had responsibility for the management of admissions and
appeals across the whole area. In others it appeared that agreements had been
reached that the LA should continue to have a role. There is evidence from
previous research (Coldron et al 2002) that there is more likelihood that
Foundation and Voluntary Aided schools are less likely to comply with the
legislation and guidance on the management of appeals and that where the LA
manages the process standards are higher. There is also a case for better co-
ordination for in-year admissions. We were unable in this project to gather data as
to how many LAs did or did not extend their co-ordination role. It would be of
considerable interest to gather that data and to try gauge any consequences for
parents, children and schools as a result.
166
It was not part of the project to gather data about admission forums or whether or
not the schools had actually consulted but, assuming all schools consulted as
required within the admission forum, this was likely to make compliance with the
School Admission Code of Practice 2003 more likely overall because the greater
transparancy made timely objections more possible. However admission
authorities were only required to have regard to the code and objections may not
have been made against non-compliant proposals. These may partly explain the
different levels of compliance we found but further research would need to be
done to find how admission forums were working and how effective the
consultation and objection process was in policing the system. Our data shows
that the admission arrangements of Community and Voluntary Controlled schools
and Academies as found in the composite prospectuses were more likely to
comply with the regulations and guidance in the 2003 School Admissions Code of
Practice than those of Foundation and Voluntary Aided schools.. This was
particularly the case for Voluntary Aided schools – many more requested
supplementary information other than to apply published criteria, fewer prioritised
children in care and more made parental commitment a criterion. Each of these
provided a means of covert selection of children. Although it is not possible to
establish beyond doubt that this was a cause, it is the case that Voluntary Aided
and Foundation schools have an intake that is more socially advantaged and has
higher prior attainment than Community schools63. It is not possible to say how
much this non-compliance actually works against certain groups of parents gaining
fair access to all schools but given the incentives schools have to select the easier
to educate children64 it is likely to make a contribution. The fact that Community
comprehensive schools also differ markedly in their intake (Gibbons and Telhaj
2007) shows that segregation of intakes is not the result of these procedural
issues on their own. The cumulative effect of these means of selection together
with other factors is what maintains segregation, and we look at this in more detail
in a later section.
4.2.3 Transparency, Information and the manageability of the process
If parents are to be able to make conscientious choices they need information
about schools and they need to be able to manage the process. If some parents
have more information or can manage the information and process better than
others then there is a potential problem of equality of opportunity and for
conscientious choice.
In the survey of parents in 2000 (Flatley et al 2001) nearly nine in ten parents
(87%) said that they were satisfied they had all the information they needed to
                                             
63 For the latest in a long line of studies that reveal that schools that are free to set their own admissions
criteria have a more advantaged intake see Gibbons, S. and Telhaj, S. (2007).
64 See section 2.7.2
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help them choose a school. However only 57% of parents reported they knew
about the oversubscription criteria of their schools. Parents in the higher
occupational groups, who were owner occupiers, and educated to degree level
were more likely to know. But, despite this, gaining their first preference school did
not vary significantly by class.
The current parent survey seven years later also found that more educated
parents were likely to access more information but that very few parents felt they
were lacking basic information about secondary schools. 80% of parents who
considered applying to over-subscribed schools said that the oversubscription
criteria were easy to understand. Furthermore, there was no evidence that parents
who were less educated had any reduced chance of gaining their first preference.
This suggests some caution about the claim that parents from less affluent socio-
economic groups are failing to get into high performing schools because they are
not as able as more affluent or well educated parents to understand the process
and the information. They may have less adequate social networks to gain good
references, or poorer writing skills that give clues as to their social status and
educational attainment and therefore aid covert social selection. If, as the
evidence suggests, all social groups are gaining their first preference schools in
equal measure, but that a substantial proportion of social segregation persists in
schools, then it seems that less advantaged parents are expressing first
preference for schools with less socially advantaged intakes. This is more likely to
be a result of having less financial capital to move to the catchment area of a
school, or that they wish to go to schools within their own community, prioritising
solidarity rather than rejection of people like themselves.
Nevertheless there are some interesting findings concerning information. Firstly,
the analysis of the levels of complexity of the oversubscription criteria showed that,
on each measure, Voluntary Aided schools are more complex than other types of
schools. They have more OSCs, twice as many items per OSC and twice as many
items in total. Secondly, some composite prospectuses do not reveal the
subscription status of schools.
4.3 Diversity
4.3.1 Key findings
• It is important to distinguish the different rationales for diversity in debates
about admissions. One arises from the right of parents to educate their
children according to their views and beliefs and a second arises as a pre-
requisite of an education market.
• Schools are diverse in many ways. For analytical purposes we identify four:
Structural, Educational, Compositional and Reputational and each school
will present a different mix of these
• There are significant differences in how, and how far, parents can gain
information about them
• Structural diversity has increased significantly.
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• It is difficult to judge whether educational diversity has increased or
decreased. The evidence available suggests a decrease.
• Other studies show that while grammar and secondary modern schools are
at the extremes of segregation by attainment, all types of schools differed in
this way. Social segregation nationally has not significantly increased since
the introduction of more parental choice in 1988. Despite there being no
overall increase, segregation is increasing in specific localities particularly in
London and other densely populated areas. Most children live in White-
majority areas and attend schools where there is a White-majority of
students. Approximately one-tenth of students attend schools with a non-
White majority but with a significant White minority. A small proportion of
students attend schools where one minority group predominates. There has
been no increase in ethnic segregation between schools other than that
explained by the increase in the BME school population. The minority
population is not evenly spread across all LAs, but is concentrated in a few
areas. In these enclaves there are schools where the students are almost
exclusively White and others where they are almost exclusively from
minority communities.
• Social segregation is higher in areas where: the population is more dense,
there is a greater number of schools nearby, there is structural and religious
diversity between schools, there are more schools that are their own
admission authority, the area is one of the 14 most selective.
• While it is important to have identified the extent of diversity on each
separate dimension, there are important inter-connections between them.
• How schools differ in reputation is extremely salient to parents’ expression
of preferences but it is not amenable to measurement.
4.3.2 Kinds of diversity
There are two reasons for considering diversity. Firstly, satisfying parents’ wishes
as to how and where their children are to be educated requires appropriately
different kinds of schools and enough of each kind actually available. Secondly, a
diversity of providers is relevant to a policy of raising overall school quality through
the operation of a quasi-market. It is important to emphasise that these reasons
are different. The first arises from the liberal egalitarian view of society and the
need to provide for the autonomy of individuals. It is therefore about giving as
much room as possible that is compatible with social cohesion and respect for
others. It is an argument underpinning the existence of faith schools but would
also be relevant to other differences in the curriculum, educational approach and
composition of a school. The second kind of diversity is aimed at removing
monopolies and provider capture by introducing competition. Advocates of the
market argue that the two are connected in that by making school survival
dependent on what parents want, while enabling schools to respond, will
eventually provide optimum diversity and optimum satisfaction. It is relevant
therefore to ask, How much diversity is there and what is the range of schools
from which parents can actually choose?
Firstly however we need to be clear about what we want to mean by diversity. This
varies in current debate depending on the focus, and the often polemical role the
concept of diversity plays in popular, political or academic debates. What we might
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call structural diversity is emphasised in relation to the introduction of a greater
variety of providers of schools which is, in turn, justified by reference to the market
concepts of provider capture and competition, the empirical claim that parents
want more choice and to the liberal concept of free choice to protect the autonomy
of the individual. Educational diversity is emphasised where the focus is on school
performance or the right of parents to choose a religious education or the
individual needs of the pupil. Diversity of intake or compositional diversity is
emphasised in discussions of educational equality or the fairness of the
admissions system. Each of these is, potentially, of considerable significance to
parents and any study of parental responses or attitudes to diversity needs to take
account of all of these kinds65.
We distinguish the following kinds of diversity
Structural Diversity which includes
• how the school is governed i.e. constitutional arrangements
• how the school is financed
• who is held accountable and how
• who has control over staff employment and the material assets of the school.
Educational diversity which includes
• what the school teaches
• how the teachers teach/the educational experience of the children
• exam performance
• ethos
• educational principles
• organisation for learning (e.g. mixed ability or setting)
Compositional diversity (diversity of intake) which includes
• sex
• ability/attainment on entry
• religion
• socio-economic group
• ethnicity
Reputational diversity
• a judgement conferred by groups of parents, or communities about the quality
and status of the school in relation to others
                                             
65 A fuller version of these arguments can be found in the discussion paper commissioned by the RISE
(Research into State Education) Trust (Coldron 2007)
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The first three capture actual differences between schools, by which we mean
differences that are either part of the formal constitution of a school, or are (at
least in theory) capable of being objectively evidenced. They are attributes of the
school. The reputation of a school can not be so evidenced but is an extremely
significant contribution to a parent’s decision. Previous studies (Gewirtz et al 1995;
Ball and Vincent 1998; Which 2005) found that when parents are asked what it is
about schools that most informs their choices the different reputations of schools
are highly significant. The parent survey for this study confirmed the importance of
reputation for parents with it being the most frequently cited reason for wanting
their preferred school. However, we do not know what parents mean by
reputation66. For each parent it is likely to be an amalgam of many things and it is
clearly affected by the other kinds of diversity while being different from them.
Each school will present a different mix of structural, educational, compositional
and reputational diversity. Gaining adequate information about these kinds of
diversity is important for parents but some kinds of diversity may more easily be
discerned by parents than other kinds. The varieties of structural diversity are
evident, if parents are interested in looking for them, some aspects of educational
diversity such as exam performance can be got from the league tables and
aspects of compositional diversity such as single sex or religious affiliation are to
be found in school admission criteria. However, it is not so easy objectively to
know the average social status of the intake of a school but, judgements are never
the less made on the basis of characteristics such as area of residence and the
look and behaviour of the children attending. It is far from straightforward to judge
the quality of teaching and management and their effect on the educational
attainment of the children even with OFSTED reports and the measures of value
added. It is next to impossible, even with intimate experience over a period of time,
to know how all the teachers teach, or what the day to day experience of the
children is likely to be. Further, even the most informed observer could not predict,
even broadly, what an individual child’s experience is going to be in a particular
school. There are simply too many unknowns and variables at play including
people’s idiosyncratic responses and the myriad of personal/professional
relationships. In the following sections we assess the level of each kind of
diversity.
4.3.3 Structural diversity
Since 1988 there has been an increase in the variety of forms of governance and
types of school. Prior to the reforms of the Conservative governments from 1988
to 1997 local government was the sole financer of state schools. In order to
                                             
66 Previous studies on other criteria that parents frequently cite such a happiness of their child (Coldron and
Boulton 1991) and discipline ; (Coldron and Boulton 1996) have shown how varied these vague but important
criteria are.
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introduce a quasi-market some schools opted to be independent of the local
authority while still being fully financed from public funds. The subsequent Labour
governments from 1997 have continued a policy of greater diversity of providers.
There are now the five types of school in the sector as described earlier (section
2.2.1) and a sixth, Trust schools, is proposed in the new legislation67. There are
some authorities where all schools are Community (e.g. Cornwall) and some
where they are all either Voluntary Aided or Foundation or Academies (e.g. Brent).
Academies, while only a small proportion of all schools, are targeted at particular
areas where parental preference is likely to be more polarised. These new types of
school are likely therefore to have a considerable impact within those areas. An
important aspect of structural diversity is thought to be that the different providers
should be their own admission authority and able, in consultation with other
admission authorities in the area, to set their own admission arrangements.
There is no doubt therefore that this kind of diversity has been enhanced over the
last decade but the evidence from the parent survey suggests that it is not an
important factor in parents’ choice of school. As we will see in later sections this
kind of diversity is associated with less effectiveness on measures of parental
satisfaction and of segregation and the evidence from the literature suggests that
there has been little or no gain in overall attainment that is attributable to the
competition between providers.
4.3.4 Educational diversity
As structural diversity has been enhanced there has been a concerted attempt to
decrease the educational differences between schools. Successive governments
have sought to make all schools high performing as measured by examination
results. They have also prescribed more closely what goes on in secondary
schools through the National Curriculum, the Literacy and Numeracy strategies,
high stakes inspections (including the new ‘light touch’) that judge schools
according to a strict framework laying down the criteria for success, the
personalisation agenda and encouragement to set according to ability.
There is evidence that greater competition between schools leads to greater
homogenisation. The PASCI study (Woods et al 1998) found that schools tend to
‘privilege’ the academic aspects of their provision over other parts of the
educational mission. They also try to appeal to a broad group of parents rather
than focusing on a niche and they do not try to be sharply distinct from other
schools. There seemed to be little incentive to innovation. Schools therefore
tended to converge rather than offer something different.
                                             
67 Education and Inspections Bill 2006
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More recently the work of Fielding et al (2005) on the transfer of good practice
supported this earlier finding of Woods et al (1998). They found that competition
between schools tended to inhibit innovation and risk taking. Stakes were high
because of the prevalent ‘badging’ of institutions where explicit comparison of
schools was encouraged using a small number of linear dimensions such as exam
performance. This led to schools being categorised for policy purposes (as
Beacon schools for example), and therefore labelled or ‘badged’ publicly, as
superior or inferior. They concluded that:
staff and schools will not take risks if the consequences of doing so are
likely to adversely affect their identity, their jobs, the continued well-being of
the schools in which they teach and the young people whom they serve.
(p73)
While these government actions and their effects have worked to reduce
educational diversity one major initiative has been introduced as the means to
enhance it –specialist schools. Specialist schools offer educational diversity in so
far as they offer relatively high standards of teaching and of exam performance in
the area of specialism (Castle and Evans 2006). However, there is no way that
parents would be able to identify what form that excellent teaching took apart from
the assumed connection with results. Being a specialist school provides no
information about educational organisation, teaching methods, ethos, or
educational principles and, because all specialist schools are required to teach the
full curriculum, there is no difference in what the school teaches. However, where
the school is over-subscribed and selects 10% by aptitude in the specialist
subjects, it is likely to have a marginally more advantaged intake than
neighbouring schools (West and Hind 2003). The parent survey found that 5% of
parents spontaneously mentioned subject specialism when asked why they
wanted a place in their preferred school.
One of the most important considerations for parents is the educational experience
of their children in the school of their choice, but parents do not make sharp
distinctions between the educational experience and the emotional and social
experience (Coldron and Boulton 1991; Coldron and Boulton 1996). Parents are
sensitive to the ‘feel’ of a school and the respondents to the parent survey
reported that the most useful source of information was school visits where they
could experience at first hand the ethos of a school and the approach to education
and the care of their children. There was little emphasis on schools’ organisation
for learning by respondents in the parent survey either in their reasons for
preferring or avoiding a school. This may point to a lack of any shared public
language to talk about and identify significant aspects of school and the
educational experience of children. Helping to enrich discussion between all
stakeholders and particularly parents about educational diversity and how it affects
the experience of their children would be a prerequisite to parents being able to
take full advantage of the existence of educational differences between schools.
4.3.5 Compositional diversity
Differences in the intake of schools have been the focus of criticism about the
fairness of educational provision and the admissions processes (West and Hind
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2003; Lupton 2004; Coldron 2005; Gibbons and Telhaj 2007; Webber and Butler
2007; Gordon and Monastiriotis 2007). There is a great deal of theoretical and
empirical work that points to this being one of the most important criteria for
parents and why it matters a great deal to them who their children‘s peers will be
(Holme 2002; and  Ball 2003 for an overview). There is overwhelming evidence of
the social and attainment segregation of intakes which is a predicted outcome of
these explanations. However when parents were asked in our parent survey about
their reasons for choice only 10% volunteered social composition. However 33%
cited the correlated feature of good exam results, and 59% the socially influenced
perceptions of discipline/behaviour and reputation. The same pattern is found
when asked about why they rejected their nearest school – 21% poor exam
results, and 59% the socially influenced perceptions of discipline/behaviour and
reputation. The following sections look at the evidence of compositional diversity in
English secondary schools.
Single sex and co-education
A minority (13%) of all secondary schools have a single sex intake with slightly
more schools for girls to be educated on their own than for boys. A significantly
larger proportion of Voluntary Aided and Foundation schools (23% and 20%
respectively) are single sex compared to Community and Voluntary Controlled
schools where the proportion is only 8%68.
                                             
68 DfES data http://www.edubase.gov.uk/
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Table 1:  Proportions of each type of school with single sex intake
Comm* % VA % Found % All % of
All
Girls 106 5 63 12 54 10 223 7
Boys 65 3 59 11 53 10 177 6
Total 171 8 122 23 107 20 400 13
*Includes Voluntary Controlled schools
Ability/attainment on entry
There are 43 local authorities with some schools that select all (grammar schools)
or part (partially selective schools) of their intake by general ability as measured in
a test. 22 of these local authorities have fewer than 10% selective places. While
this level of selection will not be without local effect on the intake of some
neighbouring schools, particularly in self-contained urban areas, it may be
considered a low level of selection especially in rural authorities.
As we have seen in section 2.5 there are 8 Local Authorities with more (some
considerably more) than 25% of selective places and the remaining 75% plus
attend what are in effect secondary modern schools although a number of different
names are now used. In addition there are 6 other authorities where the proportion
of selective places is over 18%. There are six other authorities where there are
some grammar schools but they take less than 18% of the admissions in the area
but more than 10%. Here, all other schools are comprehensive, there is no
authority wide 11+ exam and the comprehensive schools aspire to an all ability
intake. The existence of the grammar schools in these areas sometimes means
that sub-areas, for example Colchester in Essex and Salisbury in Wiltshire, are
effectively wholly selective because parents have little practical choice but to
choose within that area. In other areas, such as Calderdale and Plymouth, the
effect is less but intake of the comprehensives is still significantly affected because
the majority of the highest attaining pupils are taken by the grammars thus
skewing the attainment range of the remainder.
In a recent analysis Gibbons and Telhaj (2007) confirmed that, while grammar and
secondary modern schools are at the extremes of segregation by attainment, all
types of schools differed in this way, including schools in areas with no selective
places. They found no evidence that the level of attainment segregation had
increased between 1996 and 2002 but there were interesting differences between
types of school. Voluntary Aided, and to a lesser extent Foundation, schools
generally draw higher-attaining pupils with a narrower range of attainment than in
their local area overall. They also found evidence that, on the part of Voluntary
Aided schools, it is more likely to be because the schools are in some way
selecting (p1297). Specialist schools also seemed to attract slightly higher-
attaining pupils.
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Religious affiliation
Approximately 15% to 16% of schools offer an explicitly religious character and
prioritise entry of children of the faith. In 2006 two thirds of these were Roman
Catholic and about one third Church of England with a very small proportion of
other religions.
Table 2
Maintained secondary schools designated as religious
(excluding academies)69
Religion n % of all religious
schools
% of all secondary
schools
Roman Catholic 334 63 10
Church of England 163 31 5
Other Christian 20 4 1
Jewish 9 2 0
Muslim 3 1 0
Sikh 1 0 0
Seventh Day Adventist 1 0 0
Total 531 100.0 16
All but six local authorities have faith schools. The six that do not are
predominantly rural70.
Socio-economic grouping
There has been a great deal of debate about the level of social segregation
between schools (Gibson and Asthana 2000; Goldstein and Noden 2003; Gorard
2002). Much of the debate has focused on the increase or decrease of such
segregation and the causes. For example, whether or not this was as a result of
the marketisation of education, and what role is played by residential segregation
and interaction with admission policies. There has also been a great deal of
discussion about the most appropriate means of measuring segregation. This has
focused on technical differences in the mathematical modelling of segregation.
Despite the heated debate there are key points of agreement on the facts although
not necessarily on the interpretation of those facts. Firstly, social segregation
                                             
69 DfES data for 2006 http://www.edubase.gov.uk/
70 The six LAs without religious schools are Cornwall, North Somerset, Rutland, Shropshire, South
Gloucestershire and Wokingham.
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nationally has not significantly increased since 1988. Secondly; social segregation
is higher in areas where:
• the population is more dense
• there is a greater number of schools nearby
• there is structural and religious diversity between schools
• there are more schools that are their own admission authority
• the area is wholly selective.
Recent work by Allen and Vignoles (2006) provides evidence that, despite there
being no overall increase, segregation is increasing in specific localities
particularly in London and other densely populated areas. Their segregation curve
approach to measuring segregation also helpfully highlights the different patterns
of separation that occur in different LAs. For example, for three LAs with the same
Dissimilarity index (a measure of overall segregation) one may have a small
proportion of schools with a predominantly high socio-economic intake with all of
the others equally sharing the remaining students (Advantage segregation), while
another LA might have a small number with a predominance of low socio-
economic students (Disadvantage segregation) while a third has a smooth
continuum of segregation from most to least segregated. These different patterns
would pose significantly different contexts of choice for parents. In this report we
have used both measures D and Skew in analysing segregation.
Ethnicity
Schools differ in terms of their ethnic composition and this is strongly connected to
the level of residential segregation. Johnston et al (2006a) found that for most
people, the norm is that they live in White-majority areas and attend schools where
there is a White-majority of students. However, approximately one-tenth of
students attend schools with a non-White majority but with a significant White
minority.  They also found that only a small proportion of students attend schools
where one minority group predominates. They conclude that across England as a
whole,
...(1) both Blacks and South Asians are substantially more segregated in
schools than they are in neighbourhoods; and (2) South Asians are more
segregated than Blacks. p8
Nationally, there has been no increase in ethnic segregation between schools
other than that explained by the increase in the BME school population (Johnston
et al 2006b). It is the case however that the minority population is not evenly
spread across all LAs, but is concentrated in a few areas:
..the presence of ethnic enclaves is a feature not only of London and other
large cities (especially Birmingham) but also a number of other urban
centres which have attracted substantial numbers of migrants in recent
decades. p15
In these enclaves there are schools where the students are almost exclusively
White and others where they are almost exclusively from minority communities.
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This, together with the finding that segregation of school populations is greater
than the residential segregation in the area, suggests that post-residential
processes such as admissions procedures and parental choice may be part of the
explanation. In terms of the ethnic composition of schools, significant diversity is
evident only in this minority of areas.
4.3.6 The inter-connection of dimensions of diversity
While it is important to identify the extent of diversity on each separate dimension,
there are important inter-connections between them. For example Voluntary Aided
schools are associated with compositional diversity by religion but also by social-
composition with voluntary aided schools having fewer children on free school
meals than other schools in the area. Research conducted for the Sutton Trust
(Sutton Trust 2006), found that in voluntary aided (faith) schools, the average
proportion of pupils on free school meals was 5.6% compared with 14.6% for the
surrounding areas. Other examples of inter-connection are where Pakistani and
Bangladeshi families are over-represented in the lower socio-economic groups;
and, schools with intakes largely drawn from the lower socio-economic groups are
more likely to have a relatively poor exam performance.
4.3.7 Reputational Diversity
With each of the other kinds of diversity we asked the question “How much of this
diversity exists?” and the way to answer seemed more or less straightforward.
With this fourth category it is not so obvious. One way to operationalise the
concept is whether or not a school is over or under-subscribed. If we take it that a
school with an excellent reputation is equated with it being highly desired by
parents relative to other schools in the area then, where a school is over-
subscribed this would indicate a relatively high reputation and vice versa. Since we
are concerned to measure diversity within parents' actual field of choice this would
be a good measure. As we have seen from the results of our study of the
composite prospectuses this information is not currently available across the
country.
However there is strong evidence that this kind of diversity exists in many areas, is
accessible to parents in their field of choice (Ball and Vincent 1998; Which 2005),
and that in particularly urban areas there is a remarkable consensus on a
hierarchy of desirability on the basis of reputation (Coldron 2005). It is also
extremely salient to parents’ expression of preferences - in the current parent
survey the most often cited reason for choosing or rejecting a school was
reputation.
4.3.8 The number of schools from which parents can choose?
Other things being equal it seems reasonable to assume that parents would wish
to choose a school within comfortable travel distance. Defining nearby schools as
those within a 10 minute drive of the place of residence, Burgess et al (2004)
estimated that Londoners had around 17 schools nearby, parents in other urban
areas about 7 and those in rural areas 1. While parents can legally choose any
school, in reality the practicalities of travel, the admissions criteria of schools and
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parents' own preferences, radically restrict the range from which they feel they can
effectively choose. It is therefore not surprising that some parents complain that
there is no real choice (Which Report 2005) and that the theoretically available
schools translate into two or three ‘real’ choices.
In the parent survey for this study 81% of parents said they were very satisfied or
fairly satisfied with the choice of schools in their locality. Satisfaction was lowest
among parents living in London even though they appear to have more schools to
choose from. The nationally representative survey for the Parents’ Experience of
Choosing a Secondary School project (Flatley et al 2001) found that 28% of the
respondents said their child did not attend their nearest school. This is lower than
current estimates. For example DCSF figures based on the School Census Data
supplied to the authors suggest about 50% of pupils overall (but varying by FSM
status and geographical location) travel further than their nearest school71. In the
parent survey for this current study 25% of parents reported that they did not apply
to what they considered to be their nearest maintained school.
4.4 How satisfied are parents?
4.4.1 Key findings
• Appeals heard increased up to a peak in 2000/01 and then have steadily
declined72.
• The decreases in the level of appeals appears to be evidence that the
various codes on admissions have had a beneficial effect.
• When other factors are controlled, appeal rates are higher in Local
Authorities with lower proportions of pupils with English as a first language;
not based in London; with higher population density; with a higher school
segregation score (D); that are one of the 14 most selective
• The evidence of the parent survey is that there are no significant
differences in the social characteristics of those who make appeals
• In 2006 about 85% of parents gained their first expressed preference.
• Nationally 93% of parents gained either their first or second preference
• The first preference figure has remained fairly consistent since 2000. It is
also a consistent finding that the percentages are lower in London with
around 70% gaining first preference and about 82% gaining either their first
or second preference
                                             
71 Burgess et al (2007) also suggest a higher figure see Burgess S., McConnell, B., Propper, C. and Wilson,
D. (2007) The Impact of School Choice in England: Implications from the economic evidence. Policy Studies,
Vol. 28, No 2
72 Data from DCSF Statistical First releases
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• The great majority of parents nationally are satisfied with the outcome of the
admission arrangements but there can be considerable variations between
areas
• First preference rates are higher in LAs with: lower population density;
lower proportions of autonomous schools; higher proportions of pupils with
English as a first language; lower rates of cross border movement (imports
and exports); fewer admission authorities; that use the first preference first
system of coordination; and have a lower school segregation score (D):
• On average just over 1% of parents did not apply for a school on the
Common Application Form.
4.4.2 Results of the appeals measure
Appeals give a good indication of the level of parents’ satisfaction with the
outcome of the admission arrangements. A fair system would allow appeal against
decisions. In such a complex system of allocation, under tight deadlines where
people have strong feelings about the outcomes, there will always be appeals. But
where the level of appeals is too high or rising this is a sign either that the
procedures are not working effectively or that the issues presented to it are
inherently problematic and perhaps insoluble, or both. In any case, appeals gives
a broad indication of overall effectiveness of admissions and of parental
satisfaction.
The trend of appeals over time
We analysed data on appeals down to LA level for all years since 199573. Parents
who are unhappy with the result of their application notified on March 1st  may at
that point notify the admission authority that they wish to appeal. These are the
number of appeals lodged. On average about two or three percent of the problems
raised by parents are resolved before the need for the Admissions Panel to be
asked to make a ruling. There are therefore two measures of appeals, those
lodged and those heard. We report on both measures when looking at the trend
since 1995/96.
                                             
73 All figures used in the Tables 3, 4 and 5 are calculated from DCSF Statistical First releases except for the
figures for 2002 and 2003 which were calculated from figures supplied separately by DCSF.
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Table 3:  Appeals lodged and heard against non-admission of children to
maintained secondary schools in England 1995/96 – 2005/06
95
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/00
00
/01
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/02*
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/04
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/05
05
/06
Appeals
lodged as a %
of total
admissions
6.0 6.7 7.6 8.7 9.6 10.3 11.4 10.9 9.4 9.3 8.3
Appeals heard
as a % of total
admissions
4.3 4.9 5.5 6.3 7.0 7.5 7.1 7.2 6.7 6.8 6.1
Table 4
Level of secondary school appeals in England from 1996 to 2006 
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When figures for all schools are combined, both measures show a similar upward
trend for appeals up to a peak in 2000/01 for those heard and in 2001/02 for
appeals lodged and then a decline to 2005/06 the latest date for which figures are
available. 2001/02 was the second year after the first full code on admissions
came into force. A further decrease coincides with the second code on admissions
that was published in 2003 and was implemented voluntarily by some authorities
in September 2004 with all authorities required to comply by September 2005. It
appears to be evidence that these codes had a positive effect on this measure.
The results for London authorities follow a slightly different pattern. They are
consistently higher than the average for all English authorities on both measures
and they peak in 1999/00 and 2000/01. Since that time there has been a sharp
decrease and, while the level is still higher than the English average, the gap is
smaller than previous years.
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Table 5
Level of secondary school appeals in England  and in 
London from 1996 to 2006
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The first cohort to be affected by the pan-London scheme was that entering Year 7
in 2005. It will be interesting to see if this coincides with further reductions in
London’s rate of appeals in future years.
Factors associated with the level of appeals
In order of importance, when other factors are controlled, appeal rates are higher
in LAs
• with lower proportions of pupils with English as a first language: Higher rates of
appeals are found in LAs with lower concentrations of pupils with English as
their first language. Expressing the pattern in percentage units, if two LAs were
identical on all other measures but differed in their concentrations of pupils with
English as their first language by 10 percentage points, the one with the higher
concentration would be expected to have lower rates of appeals (by between 1
and 2 percentage points).
• not based in London: Once other factors are controlled for, being located in
London seems to have an additional negative impact on appeal rates (there
are lower rates of appeals in London). This is somewhat surprising considering
the impact of high population density with all but 3 (Bromley, Havering &
Hillingdon) of the 32 London LAs having population densities above the 75th
centile. For the other 29 London LAs, the (negative) impact of population
density is cancelled out by the (positive) impact of being located in London.
• with higher population density: Population density remains positively correlated
with rates of appeals once other factors are controlled for. On average, rates of
appeals for LAs with a population density above the 75th centile were higher by
4 percentage points in 2005 and 2 percentage points in 2006.
• with a higher school segregation score (D): Higher rates of school segregation
are associated with higher appeal rates
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• that are one of the 14 most selective: Whether an LA was highly selective or
not seems to have an impact on appeal rates once other factors are controlled
for. On average, rates of appeals for the 14 most selective LAs were higher by
about 2 percentage points in 2005 and 2006.
It has been suggested (Taylor et al 2001) that advantaged parents, being more
active in choosing a school, are more likely to appeal but the evidence of the 2001
parent survey and the current parent survey is that there are no significant
differences in the social characteristics of those who make appeals. This should
not be surprising. When the individual experience of the appeal process for
parents is understood (Coldron et al 2002), reasons become evident as to why we
might expect disadvantaged parents to appeal. Making an appeal is hard work and
often distressing and the odds of winning an appeal are only about 1 in 3. The fact
that advantaged parents have greater social educational and financial resources to
devote to the management of the admission process would suggest that they
would less often reach the appeal stage. Conversely, parents who have fewer
such resources will less often get the place they wanted and are therefore more
likely to have to appeal. There is no doubt that some advantaged parents use
appeals as a means of maximising their options and that some disadvantaged
parents are disengaged altogether from the process The variation in the number of
appeals reflects the greater complexity and competition for school places in
densely populated areas.
4.4.3 Results as to which of their expressed preferences applicants
received
Although we gained data, and report below, on which of their preferences parents
gained we argued in section 1.1.4 that only the proportion of first preferences
gained by applicants in each Local Authority gives a reliable indication of the
satisfaction level of the cohort of applicants to that authority. However the figures
for those receiving their second preference and of those who received one of their
expressed preferences are also of interest and are reported here. The subjective
responses from the nationally representative sample of parents as to how satisfied
they were with the outcome and which of their preferences they gained also give
important measures of satisfaction.
The rank of preferences that parents gained
The data set compiled from the returns from the request to all Local Authorities
contains detail for 106 (72%) of the 148 local authorities. This was a disappointing
response. Given the importance of this measure we conducted a missing value
analysis for the 42 authorities (Appendix B). Across all 148 Local Authorities there
were a total of 686,079 admissions. The 106 Local Authorities dealt with 510,570
of these admissions (74%) of which 441,398 (86%) got their first preference
secondary school. This measure is very close to the percentage (84%) of parents
who reported in the nationally representative survey that they had been offered the
school that they had ranked on the common application form as their first
preference. A parent survey in 2005 (Which 2005) found that 89% of parents got
their first preference school.
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The changes in the procedure since 2000 mean that we must be cautious in
making comparison. In 2000, parents could apply to a number of different
authorities and therefore put different schools as an expressed first preference. It
was just this that the School Admission Code of Practice 2003 was intended to
eliminate. The 2000 survey (Flatley et al 2001) asked which, of all of the schools
for which they had expressed a preference, was the parents’ favourite. In 2003
parents only applied on one form and therefore their expressed first preference
was their favourite in the terms of the earlier survey and the one that the current
measure should be compared with and not what the 2000 survey called
'expressed first preference'. None of these figures is definitive but it seems safe to
conclude that in 2006 around 85% of parents gained their first expressed
preference and that this figure has remained fairly consistent since 2000. It is also
a consistent finding that the percentage is lower in London at around 70%74.
The percentage of parents gaining either their first or second expressed
preference was 93%. The 93% figure, whilst taking into account the caveats
expressed about assuming that the second choice is equally acceptable, might
reasonably be taken as an indication of satisfaction albeit less robust than the
figures for gaining first preference. This measure of those gaining either first or
second preference is roughly comparable with the 2000 survey measure of a first
preference offer. In the system in operation in 2000 parents had to apply
separately to different local authorities and/or admission authorities.  They would
therefore have more than the single ranked lists of preferences required in 2006
and consequently would have had more than one school that could be described
as their 'first preference' school. While they might have had a favourite school
among these expressed first preferences they had expressed a positive
preference for all of them. In so far as one can assume that the first and second
preferences on the 2006 Common Application Form are positive preferences then
the 2000 and 2006 measures are comparable. With those assumptions in mind we
note that the 2006 figure of 93% for those gaining first or second preference is
very close to the 92% of parents in 2000 who reported receiving a 'first preference'
offer.  This is a national average and there are considerable variations between
areas.  The figure for London parents is lower with an estimated 82% gaining their
first or second preference.
Factors associated with higher or lower proportions gaining their first
preference
Bearing in mind the differences between the Local Authorities that responded and
those that did not, the results of a multi-variate analysis were as follows. In order
of importance, once other factors are controlled for, first preference rates are
higher in LAs with:
                                             
74 The Which report in 2005 and the 2000 parent survey put it at 68%.
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• Lower population density. on average, rates of gaining first preference in
LAs with a population density above the 75th centile were lower by 10
percentage points.
• Lower proportions of autonomous schools: on average, rates of gaining first
preference in LAs where schools are predominantly autonomous are lower
by about 10 percentage points
• Higher proportions of pupils with English as a first language: if two LAs
were identical on all other measures but differed in their concentrations of
pupils with English as their first language by 10 percentage points, the one
with the higher concentration would be expected to have higher rates of
gaining first preference (by about 1.7 percentage points).
• Lower rates of cross border movement (imports and exports): LAs with high
levels of cross border movement have lower rates of gaining first
preference
• Fewer admission authorities: LAs with more admission authorities tend to
have lower rates of gaining first preference.
• That use the first preference first system of coordination: on average, rates
of gaining first preference in LAs that used the equal preference/default
ranking system of coordination are lower by about 3 percentage points.
• A lower school segregation score (D): Higher rates of school segregation
are associated with lower first preference rates. For example,  If two LAs
were identical on all other measures but differed in their school segregation
scores by 0.1, the one with the higher concentration would be expected to
have lower rates of gaining first preference (by about 1.6 percentage
points).
Being located in London does seem to have an additional negative impact on first
preference rates when examining the full model.  However, the vast majority of the
‘London effect’ is accounted for within the other variables (e.g. population density,
cultural diversity, poverty & segregation etc.) and this variable can be excluded
without reducing the model’s explanatory power. Whether an LA was one of the 14
most selective or not contributed very little to the model and could be excluded
without reducing the model's explanatory power.
Multi-variate analysis of the data in the parent survey also found that applying in a
local authority where first preference first was the dominant preference system and
being white were independently associated with parents being offered a place at
their first preference school.
4.4.4 Acceptability of the school offered
The parent survey for this current study found that for 97% of parents who were
interviewed the school they were offered was acceptable. Some may have
accepted their offer even though they were not satisfied with it. The survey will
also not have included those parents who found their offer unacceptable and
opted for a private independent school. We do not know how many parents this
applies to. Of the parents in maintained school who accepted the offer the great
majority were satisfied with the current school attended by their child. As might be
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expected the proportion of satisfied parents for whom this was their first choice
school was higher (95%) than for those for whom it was not their first preference
(82%). We may conclude that the great majority of parents in 2006 were satisfied
with the outcome of the admission arrangements, but that there were significant
regional variations.
4.4.5 Results on those who expressed no preference
Some authorities did not collect this information and only 79 (53%) authorities
were able to give us the required data.  These show that the average for these
authorities was 1.3% with a maximum figure in one authority of 7.2% and a
minimum of zero. The parent survey found that 1% of respondents had not applied
for a school on the Common Application Form. The figures will include those who
are missing because they opt for a private independent school those who have
moved away from the area and a proportion who failed to fill in a form due to
family stress or other reasons for being disengaged. These last are one of the
groups of parents that the new Choice Advisers are intended to help.  It is likely
that this will be of considerable benefit to the individual parents targeted but, the
small proportion is unlikely to have a significant impact on overall outcomes.
4.5 Efficiency of the procedures
4.5.1 Key findings
• The admission system is now more uniform across Local Authorities and
more co-ordinated.
• The great majority of respondents (97%) received an offer for their child on
the due date
• Parents’ satisfaction with the process was generally high.
4.5.2 Co-ordination of the system
The admission system is now more uniform across Local Authorities and more co-
ordinated. The measures introduced in the School Admission Code of Practice
2003 have reduced the dysfunctional variations and made the process more
predictable for parents while preserving the ability of admission authorities to set
their own criteria. Evidence of efficiency comes from the parents survey where the
majority of respondents (97%) received an offer for their child on the same day in
early March 2006 and where satisfaction with the process was generally high with
over 90% of parents satisfied with the overall provision of information and the
formal sources of information. An evaluation of the pan-London admissions
scheme which embodied these changes (Pennell, West and Hind 2006) found that
a high proportion (90%) considered that there were advantages of the scheme
compared with the previous year and were satisfied with the number of
preferences allowed, the liaison with local authorities, liaison with individual
schools and with the timetable adopted. Over 80% thought the scheme had
eliminated – or partially eliminated – multiple offers and reduced the numbers of
children without places.
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Further evidence suggesting that the School Admission Code of Practice 2003 had
a beneficial impact is the downward trend of appeals beginning in 2004 (the first
year of the implementation of the code’s recommendations) following a peak in
2003.
4.6 How fair is the system?
4.6.1 Key findings
• Schools that are their own admission authority, particularly Voluntary Aided
schools, used aspects of admission arrangements that lend themselves to
covert social selection more than other schools.
• Grammar schools were more likely to have a socially segregated intake
• The most powerful driver of the social segregation of schools is residential
segregation in combination with admission arrangements prioritising
proximity.
• Segregation was much less in the three banded authorities than in
comparable areas.
• The system in 2006 may have reduced covert selection but it did not
eliminate it nor mitigate residential selection.
4.6.2 Introduction
A fair system would not only be procedurally objective but would contribute to
every child having a good education. Bearing in mind the difficulty in separating
what makes a successful school from the effect of its intake it remains that if all
social groups had the same chances of getting into the most popular schools the
intakes of those schools would reflect the proportions of social groups in the area.
There would be no social segregation. The more social segregation of school
intakes the less fair or equitable the system.
Further, a fair system would ensure that no child receives a better education at the
expense of another. It is the case that children of all abilities perform better in the
company of relatively advantaged peers and do worse in the company of those
who are disadvantaged. It follows that where there are unbalanced intakes one
group is gaining at the expense of another. Measures of segregation therefore
indicate the level of this kind of fairness.
In addition, the system should not contribute to the harm inflicted by wholesale
denigration of children and communities. Where already advantaged parents seek
to avoid schools with a concentration of less advantaged children there is often an
accompanying discourse of denigration and vilification that does considerable
harm to children, schools and communities (Reay 2007; Holme 2002).
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4.6.3 Segregation by socio-economic class
We reviewed previous evidence in section 4.3.5. Residential segregation
(selection by mortgage) is one of the main causes of social segregation (Gordon
and Monastiriotis 2007; Webber and Butler 2007). Another possibility that we do
not explore here is that the social class of parents who are practising Christians is
on average higher thus leading to the intake of faith schools being relatively
socially segregated. A third is the active but covert social selection by schools
through the use of a variety of means including the legitimate and illegitimate use
of the admission process. We have seen that all schools have incentives to select
children with a higher socio-economic background, but, only those that are already
popular and therefore oversubscribed have the means to do it.
The Sutton Trust (Sutton Trust 2006) implicated admissions in the greater
segregation of the 200 top performing comprehensive schools that are their own
admission authorities. They found that there was a difference between schools
that were their own admission authority (Voluntary Aided and Foundation schools)
and those that were Community schools. The autonomous schools were highly
unrepresentative of the geographical community within which they were located
with 5.8 per cent of their pupils eligible for free school meals compared to 13.7 per
cent of the pupils in their local area. By contrast, the Community schools in the top
200 were roughly representative of their area. The recent IPPR report (Tough and
Brooks 2007) cited Allen as finding that more generally, schools that are their own
admission authorities are much more likely to have ‘high ability’ children and in this
sense to be more highly unrepresentative of their local areas than Community
Schools. The same finding is reported by Webber and Butler (2007).
We found in this current study that schools that are their own admission authority,
particularly Voluntary Aided schools, used more than other schools, aspects of
admission arrangements that lend themselves to covert social selection. They
more often:
• request supplementary information beyond the need to apply published
criteria
• use oversubscription criteria that have the potential to socially discriminate
• select by aptitude
• use face to face meetings as part of the selection process
• have relatively complex arrangements
• have special application requirements about which parents had to be pro-
active
They less often:
• prioritised children in care  or who had special educational needs
We also found that grammar schools were more likely to have a socially
segregated intake and there is a strong correlation between prior attainment and
social class in all schools. However, the most powerful driver of the social
segregation of schools is residential segregation. The parent survey found that
22% of parents had taken catchment areas into account when they last moved
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house. The proximity and catchment oversubscription criteria reinforce this while
banding by attainment works to balance by social background as well as
attainment. Segregation was much less in the banded authorities than in
comparable areas.
The evidence suggests therefore that the system in 2006 may have reduced
covert selection but it did not eliminate it nor mitigate residential selection. The
School Admissions Code 2007 includes measures aimed at addressing social
segregation and covert selection by schools. It will be important to measure the
effect of these measures for future cohorts.
4.7 Do the current admission arrangements contribute to better levels of
attainment?
4.7.1 Key findings
• There are three ways in which admissions might impact on attainment,
through increased competition, through some children’s higher attainment
being at the expense of others’ lower attainment as a result of social
segregation and through selection to schools on the basis of attainment or
aptitude.
• The evidence suggests that there is little if any increase in overall
attainment as a result of competition and that some children are gaining at
the expense of others.
• The evidence concerning selection and overall attainment levels is complex
but it is clear that it contributes substantially to injustice of distribution
without any significant balancing educational benefit.
• Selection by aptitude is not the same as selection by attainment to grammar
schools. It has a significantly different meaning.
4.7.2 How admissions might impact on attainment
There are three ways in which admissions might impact on attainment. The first is
through increased competition where advocates of the quasi-market argue that
overall standards will improve if the admissions system supports a quasi-market in
which schools must compete for popularity with parents. To be popular they must
offer what parents want and it is implicitly assumed that parents want good
schools which includes higher educational standards. The second kind of impact
would be if some children’s higher attainment was at the expense of others’ lower
attainment through the difficulties arising from social segregation of intakes. The
third is selection to schools on the basis of attainment. A proper description of the
working of the admissions system would want to be able to say whether or not
these effects are found, their size and whether different arrangements reduce or
increase the effects.
This is a complex task. As one recent report that reviewed the evidence for the
first two kinds of impact on attainment put it:
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We... face complex evidence about the impact of choice on segregation, the
impact of segregation on the level and pattern of attainment, and the impact
of competition on school performance.(Tough and Brooks 2007)
Following their review they concluded that:
• the clearest link is between segregation and polarisation of results
with evidence that peer effects in schools full of high-attaining pupils
pull their results up further while peer effects in schools full of low-
attaining pupils push them down further
• there is some evidence to suggest that segregation of pupils causes
inefficiency in the school system
• there is little evidence that the introduction of choice-based
admissions policies has increased levels of segregation
• while there is some evidence of a relationship between competition
and school performance in the US, the evidence from England is not
positive.
The third way in which admissions might impact on attainment is selection by
attainment or aptitude. Schagen and Schagen (2002; 2003a and 2003b) and
Atkinson and Gregg (2004) found that while standards at school level (i.e. between
grammar and secondary modern schools) were very different the standard at LEA
level showed little difference compared with non-selective LEAs. However they are
strongly associated with social segregation. Grammar schools are populated by
the more affluent while secondary modern schools are populated by the less
affluent. Just 5.8% of all pupils eligible for free school meals attend grammar
schools compared to 26.4% of all other groups. Twelve percent of pupils in
secondary modern schools are on free school meals and only 2% in grammar
schools. Further, grammar school selection is not solely on the basis of ability.
Atkinson and Gregg (2004) found that if you were of high ability but poor you
would stand less chance of gaining a place with poorer children only half as likely
to attend a grammar school as other children with the same underlying ability. This
is compounded by grammar schools receiving more resources per child than
secondary modern schools (Levacic, R. and Marsh A. 2007).
Evidence as to the link between social selection and accompanying educational
advantage is also found at the international level. The PISA study looked at the
different performance of national systems (OECD/UNESCO-UIS 2003). This study
was concerned to investigate any relationship between school and student
characteristics and student performance. They found that the socio-economic
background of the school intake was much stronger than the effect of any other
variable (Ch. 7 p219) and that academic selection is correlated with socio-
economic segregation (Ch 7 p220). Selection by attainment therefore contributes
substantially to injustice of distribution without any significant balancing
educational benefit. It also imposes a widespread sense of failure on those who
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are not ‘selected’ contributing to disrespect and social stigma of social groups and
individuals (see Ireson and Hallam 2001 for an overview).
Our results show that there has been a growth in selection by aptitude. There are
important differences between selection to specialist schools by aptitude and
selection to a grammar school. The distinction we wish to draw is not on what is
purported to be measured (it is difficult to find a definition of aptitude that is
sufficiently distinct from ability) nor on the systematic bias toward selecting
children from higher socio-economic families, but rather on the meaning or
symbolic effect. Grammar schools maintain and reinforce a structural and symbolic
hierarchy of schooling that contributes significantly to unequal outcomes and the
kind of denigration described earlier. The narrative in which they are embedded is
that of ability - an objectively verifiable, unchangeable and fateful attribute that
evokes different life paths starting with being allocated to a grammar or secondary
modern - and this narrative is imposed on all children within an area. It is
experienced collectively as a member of the selected few or the rejected many.
Specialist schools’ selection by aptitude on the other hand is part of a different
narrative – that of individual achievement and extraordinary talent.
Nevertheless both selection by aptitude and attainment allows some already
popular schools to manage their intakes to include easier to educate children from
already advantaged backgrounds. Wholly selective schools in particular are
associated with higher social segregation, higher appeals and to a lesser extent
lower proportions of parents getting their first preference. They are also associated
with the denigration and low self esteem of the majority of children who are
deemed to have ‘failed’ to be selected for the higher status school.
4.8 Summary
The system in 2006 was more efficiently managed, better co-ordinated and better
regulated than in 2000. Procedures and regulations were fair and the opportunity
was fully available to gain redress through appeal. However there was incomplete
compliance with the regulations despite the presence of a clear system for making
objection about non-compliant admission authorities. Nevertheless parents’
satisfaction with the admissions process and outcomes was high with the great
majority of parents nationally gaining either their first or second preference. A
majority also expressed satisfaction with the school their child attends. There were
however notable differences between areas.
Any perceived unfairness in the system does not seem to come from the inability
of parents from lower socio-economic groups to understand the system or to gain
their first preference school. There was no evidence for the view that parents from
lower socio economic groups are being denied access because they are less able
to understand the admissions process. While it was the case that more educated
parents were likely to access more information very few parents felt they were
lacking basic information about secondary schools. More importantly there was no
evidence that parents who were less educated had any reduced chance of gaining
their first preference. They are gaining access to the schools they want but they
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are not the same ones as more advantaged parents. This again raises the
question of how a good school should be defined.
Despite this high level of satisfaction across all social groups and the well drafted
and comprehensive regulations for policing admissions the evidence suggests that
the outcomes of the system are in some important respects still unfair. For some
schools, especially those that are Voluntary Aided or Foundation or selective,
there is an accumulation of factors (some to do with admissions and some not)
that lead to them having more socially advantaged intakes than other schools,
particularly those that are Community or Voluntary Controlled. This segregation of
intakes means that some, already advantaged, children have the considerable
educational benefit of being with predominantly socially advantaged peers while
other, already disadvantaged, children have the further educational handicap of
being predominantly with harder to educate, peers. One group’s higher average
attainment is at the expense of the other group’s lower average attainment. While
the admission arrangements have not made segregation of intakes worse, neither
have they managed yet to substantially mitigate the problem which arises from
patterns of behaviour deeply embedded in our social structure and expressed, for
example, through residential segregation which directly affects admissions.
This study gathered no direct evidence about the wholesale denigration of children
and communities that sometimes accompanies the admissions process. There is
evidence from other studies that, where there is greater social segregation or
selection by prior attainment, there is a consequent polarisation of the parental
perception of schools which in turn leads to the vilification of schools, their staff,
the children who attend, their families and their communities (Reay and Lucey
2000, 2002, 2007; Holme 2002) . This problem is not sufficiently acknowledged in
public debate.
With regard to whether admission arrangements had any effect on attainment
other studies suggest that there is little if any increase in overall attainment as a
result of the competition supported by the admission arrangements current in
2006. Selection by prior attainment to grammar schools also appears to have little
if any effect on increasing the overall educational performance of children in the
area. It does however contribute substantially to the creation of socially
segregated intakes.
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5 DISCUSSION OF POLICY OPTIONS
5.1 Direct and indirect social selection
Segregated intakes occur as a cumulative result of a number of processes of
social selection. We might usefully discriminate direct social selection resulting
from admission criteria or covert use of procedures from indirect social selection
that is the result of conditions or circumstances not under the control of the
school’s admission authority but nevertheless result in a socially skewed intake75.
Direct and indirect social selection can each reinforce the other. Where a school
wishes to maintain its advantaged intake it will have regard to the indirect
processes at work in its particular context and these can vary markedly. Criteria in
one context can work very differently in another. For example one school may
wish to have a sibling oversubscription criterion to maximise the number of
children from the advantaged families it already largely serves. But for a school
that draws largely from a multiply disadvantaged area the sibling criterion can be
seen as a problem76. This is an argument in favour of the approach of the new
legislation and guidance of ensuring close monitoring by the admission forum of
the level of segregation in each school and the requirement to take local action to
mitigate any discovered social selection.
As already reported, we found evidence of potential direct and covert social
selection especially in Voluntary Aided and Foundation schools which, in
combination with residential segregation, probably contributed to their socially
segregated intakes. Covert direct selection can be reduced by the effective
enforcement of regulations regarding criteria and procedures. The School
Admissions Code 2007 is much stronger than the 2003 Schools Admissions Code
of Practice and the current approach to this policing is to respond to objections
made by local stakeholders but to put on local authorities, as champions of
children and parents interests, a duty to object. The new regulations and guidance
are likely to have a considerable impact although further research will be required
to confirm just how far this prediction is fulfilled. Another, less complex, approach
would be to allow the admission arrangements for schools in an area to be set by
an independent body rather than each individual admission authority. This could
                                             
75 These are close to the terms ‘covert’ and ‘default’ social selection but 'direct' avoids the assumption of
intention implied by the usual term 'covert' and 'indirect is better than 'default selection' precisely because
'default' is in danger of masking what is often an explicit intention to benefit from indirect selection e.g. when a
parent moves into a catchment area
76 This is illustrated by the words of the member of senior management in charge of school admissions quoted
earlier on page 10 in the section on Justice as Recognition.
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accommodate religious criteria for faith schools and would be likely to increase
compliance with regulations and make it easier for Local Authorities to fulfil their
duty to move towards less segregated intakes.
While direct social selection may well be amenable to such policing, counteracting
indirect social selection is likely to require pro-active policies. The new code
explicitly addresses some of these issues too.
5.2 The effects of balancing intakes
The aim of balancing intakes vies with other policy priorities77 and must overcome
the practical difficulties of reducing segregation in different and highly complex
local geographical and social contexts. In the following sections some of the policy
options available to better balance intakes are discussed, but first we look at the
theoretical gains of balancing intakes. For the purposes of illustrating the potential
benefits of balancing intakes it is useful to speculate as to what might follow if the
intake of each school in an area perfectly reflected the social and ethnic
composition of the population that they served. In this highly theoretical case:
• each school in an area would have the same composition;
• the incentive for parents to choose on the basis of the social or ethnic
intake of a school would be removed;
• school performance would unequivocally be the result of the quality of
teaching, management and facilities and not a result of the intake;
• there would be a narrowing of the range of performance of schools i.e. a
drastic reduction in the number of failing schools and a proportionate
reduction in the number of schools with outstanding results;
• evidence suggests that educational standards overall would improve
because the negative peer effect in schools with concentrations of
disadvantaged children would be diluted and, because diluted, it would not
have a proportionate negative effect on the performance of the balanced
intakes;
• there would be an opportunity for the foregrounding of genuine differences
in educational approach and other kinds of diversity which might provide
more choice for parents according to their views and beliefs;
• the denigration of whole schools would be reduced as a result of
eradicating the division into highly desirable and highly undesirable schools
on the basis of social composition.
                                             
77 For example, prioritising perfectly balanced intakes would only be compatible with parental choice only in
the very unlikely event of an equal number of every type of parent expressing a preference to each of the
schools.
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5.3 Practical difficulties of balancing intakes
It can readily be seen that such perfectly balanced intakes across a Local
Authority cannot easily be achieved in practice for the following reasons. Social
groups are not evenly distributed across a geographical area. Many cities and
towns are characterised by residential segregation both social and ethnic. In rural
areas with relatively low density of population the distances between schools is
much greater than in more densely populated areas. Some metropolitan Local
Authorities have geographical outlying sectors which would intolerably exacerbate
the problem of travel for some parents (and would have environmental
implications) because fully balanced intakes would probably result in more children
travelling away from their nearest schools78. Of note in relation to this is the finding
of the parent survey that parents were more satisfied when their children walked or
travelled by bus to school. A successful policy of balancing intakes might also cut
across the preference of some parents and children to be with sufficient others of
their own community79.
These complexities suggest that an approach that required admission authorities
to move towards better balanced intakes while leaving the detail to be worked out
at local level would be wise. This appears to be the current policy. The School
Admissions Code of Practice 2003 strongly encouraged practices that helped
balance intakes but admission authorities ultimately only had to have regard to the
guidance. Now since February 2007 they must act in accordance with the new
Schools Admissions Code 2007 which adds to strong encouragement the
requirement to take action:
1.67Admission authorities and governing bodies must ensure that their
admission arrangements and other school policies are fair and do not
disadvantage, either directly or indirectly, a child from a particular social or
racial group, or a child with a disability or special educational
needs...Admission authorities and governing bodies should develop and
implement admission arrangements, practices and oversubscription criteria
that actively promote equity, and thus go further than simply ensuring that
unfair practices and criteria are excluded.
                                             
78 This already happens in the case of religious and selective schools which draw from a much wider
geographical area than their immediate neighbourhood and for many non-religious schools which also draw
from wide areas as a result of parental preference. Currently 25% of parents already opt away from their
nearest school. It is therefore difficult to judge how far fully balanced intakes would affect new groups of
children i.e. those who would not already be opting away from the nearest school or how far the total miles
travelled would be reduced or increased.
79 This is not just a point about black and minority ethnic children. Indeed there is anecdotal evidence that
some parents from ethnic communities are keen for their children to attend schools with a full ethnic mix and
to avoid schools with too large a proportion from their own ethnic community. It is just as much an issue for
children of different life style cultures, what Bourdieu calls ‘habitus’.
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1.90 It is good practice for admission authorities to analyse information on
their intakes, and where possible their applicants, to find out whether they
attract a wide range of families or whether their school fails to attract all
sections of the local community.
1.91 Admission authorities for all schools must act upon any information that
suggests that the school’s or admission authority’s policies or practices
appear to be unfairly disadvantaging one group of children compared to
another...
We look in the next section at the pros and cons of a number of possible
admission arrangements available to admission authorities and local authorities
that offer the potential for reducing segregation namely, banding, random
allocation (lottery), subsidised travel, the drawing of catchments and some other
means to reduce direct and indirect social selection. It is the case that some of
these measures are oversubscription criteria and in practice apply only to the most
popular, and therefore oversubscribed, schools. The onus will be on those popular
schools to take action to reduce their proportion of children from higher socio-
economic status families and to increase their proportion of children from lower
socio-economic status families. This is not something they will necessarily be
willing to do and highlights the importance of the requirement on admission
authorities to take action (see section 1.91 in the quotation above) and of the
gathering of robust and trustworthy data about the level of segregation of schools
in a local area.
5.4 Fair Banding
Fair banding achieves many of the effects of balancing intakes described in 5.2
above. It eliminates segregation by ability/attainment between the schools in the
banding arrangement and, because ability/attainment is significantly correlated
with socio-economic groupings, significantly reduces social segregation and gains
the potential benefits listed above. It is likely to improve educational results overall
and to significantly reduce performance differences between schools. In so doing it
would mitigate the hierarchy of schools, making local schools more acceptable to
parents. It can be combined with a variety of other oversubscription criteria to be
applied for each band.
Some of the disadvantages are as follows. Some schools’ overall results would
improve and others would worsen. It is likely to lead to some children travelling
away from their nearest school but it is not clear whether overall this would be
more or less than happens already or whether it would be children who would not
otherwise have done so. Fair banding is necessarily incompatible with grammar
schools and the existence of selective schools in the area would reduce the
benefits. It is also possible for admission authorities, including those of Voluntary
Aided and Foundation schools, to remain outside any banding arrangements thus
reducing the overall effect. However they may then become the focus of objections
resulting from the checks and balances built into the system. Only by monitoring
and analysing robust evidence of the actual trends in particular areas over time will
we be able to tell whether any change takes place as a result of banding.
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The examples of the three local authorities currently using area wide fair banding
show that faith schools can be accommodated in fair banding arrangements.
However, where the group of applicants to faith schools have notably different
social characteristics (e.g. if their families are on average more wealthy, or have
more educational qualifications) than parents applying to non-faith schools in the
area, then some differences of intake might still occur.
An important aspect of the previous legislation covering fair banding was that it
had to apply to the applicants to the school or group of schools. This protected the
element of parental preference but also could have reduced the beneficial impact
on intakes within an area. As noted earlier (in section 2.3) the current legislation
now allows admission authorities to choose between the following three reference
groups:
• the full range of ability of applicants for the school (or group of schools
banding jointly);
• the range of ability of children in the local area; or
• the national ability range.
This makes it significantly more possible to balance intakes across a number of
schools.
5.5 Geographical Priority Areas (Catchments)
Geographical Priority Areas, or catchments, operate as an oversubscription
criterion. Catchments can, be but need not, be drawn to enable those nearest to a
school to have priority. A notable number are not. Without a detailed study of the
geography of each school’s catchment it is not clear how far the catchment
criterion was also a proximity criterion. The advantage of a catchment criterion that
does not overlap with proximity is that it addresses one of the main causes of
segregated intakes, namely residential segregation. By prioritising children from a
defined catchment that includes residential populations with a range of social and
ethnic characteristics this criterion can work to ensure a better balance of the
intake of, and fair access to, an oversubscribed school. This would have a positive
effect on the intakes of other schools and would offer the potential benefits already
identified that follow from better balanced intakes.
In addition to the possibility of an increase in the travel times for some children, the
disadvantages are that, unlike the measure of attainment used for fair banding, the
social characteristics of residential areas change over time not least in response to
school admissions. The material investment parents make and the market values
of properties attached to the perceived quality (or more precisely the popularity) of
particular schools mean that changing catchments can be politically very difficult.
In addition, boundaries are visible and appear arbitrary (e.g. down the middle of a
street) and can be difficult to defend for policy makers. If associated with
polarisation of reputation it can be hard to manage to maximise parental
satisfaction. Nevertheless catchments, together with other criteria, can be a means
of contributing to balanced intakes.
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5.6 Feeder primary schools
Schools can prioritise in their oversubscription criteria children who already attend
named primary schools. This provides a degree of security, predictability and
continuity for children and parents and there can be educational and
organisational benefits from a close relationship built over time between a
secondary school and its feeder primaries. In so far as the intake of each of the
primary schools is predominantly from a particular area then this can operate like
the catchment criterion to balance intakes but it suffers from the same problem of
the changing social character of areas. They may also require longer journeys
and, like catchments, can cause socially segregated intakes. It has the additional
difficulty that, if the secondary school is highly popular or unpopular, parental
preferences for the primary school may not be based on its quality but on the
popularity of the secondary school it feeds.
5.7 Random allocation
The School Admissions Code 2007 has for the first time stated that random
allocation can be good practice as an over subscription criterion in combination
with other criteria. Under current legislation it has to accommodate parental
preference and places can not be allocated at a school without parents having
expressed a preference for that school: it works like a lottery and you have to buy
your ticket first to be entered in to the draw. An applicant meets the
oversubscription criterion by being randomly chosen and the process is free from
any kind of bias. As such it guards against covert discrimination and can make
access to popular schools fairer. It can operate as a good tie breaker where other
criteria have failed to determine the more eligible applicants. It could actively work
to mitigate indirect segregation in the same way as banding if parents applied to a
group of schools and then were randomly allocated to each of the schools in the
group.
In the theoretical case that sometime in the future it were possible randomly to
allocate applicants to all schools in an area it would certainly achieve more
balanced intakes across a whole local authority, because it makes no attempt to
accommodate different needs or the preferences of parents and children.
However, apart from its incompatibility with parental choice, it would also lead to
some children travelling perhaps some miles away from their nearest school.
5.8 Closing schools
If a school with a higher proportion of disadvantaged pupils is closed the
redistribution of those pupils may substantially reduces the level of segregation
within the area. Falling secondary rolls over the next few years will give
opportunities for such closures. The drawbacks are that the children would not
necessarily be evenly distributed between all schools. It is more likely that
removing the school at the bottom of the local hierarchy may simply mean that a
new slightly adjusted hierarchy is created with a different school at the bottom.
Further, the threat of closure puts a blight on recruitment of staff, makes it even
more likely that parents will not put it as a preference and can mean that students
and staff seeing the school ‘out’ as it were, have a very poor experience over a
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considerable time. Further, it is unpopular schools that are under threat but some
of these unpopular schools are very good and losing them we lose expertise
acquired over many years in meeting the needs of more difficult to educate
children. Finally, the reception of the redistributed children in other schools may
reinforce negative views about them, their families and communities and may not
lead to greater social cohesion.
5.9 Effects of the wider policy context
Schools have a strong incentive to select on the basis of social characteristics.
Some of these incentives are as a result of the criteria and discourse of
accountability currently in place. Secondary schools are largely, and still fairly
crudely, judged by their children’s performance in public examinations. It is
therefore in the school’s interests to attract children who are, because of their
social characteristics or prior attainment level, more likely to perform well in these
tests. Changing the way schools are held accountable, making more explicit the
inclusive mission of schools and providing resources according to the social
characteristics of the intake (i.e. extra money for schools with the harder
educational task), would reduce these incentives and thereby encourage schools
not to select in this way.
5.10 Subsidised travel
Residential segregation, in combination with schools’ criteria and processes, is
one of the drivers of indirect social selection80. Proximity is used explicitly as an
oversubscription criterion by 61% of schools and the catchment criterion (used by
65% of schools) also overlaps to an unknown extent with proximity. Close location
in relation to a particular school is an important determinant of parents’ success in
gaining a place and this in turn reinforces the effect of residential segregation.
Making it more possible for parents successfully to apply for schools further away
would reduce this effect. Some parents may wish to opt away from their nearest
school but do not do so because of the financial cost of the extra travel. Providing
subsidised travel to schools other than the nearest would encourage this group to
apply for more distant schools. The new legislation has introduced an increased
subsidy specifically for low income parents. However it does not increase the
chances of gaining a place if they do not meet the oversubscription criteria of the
more distant school. It will be of interest to monitor what effect the extended
subsidy has on the patterns of application and the patterns of acceptance.
                                             
80 There is emerging evidence that if all children went to their nearest school the segregation of intakes would
be reduced but not eliminated. This is clear evidence of post-residential sorting through direct and indirect
means.
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5.11 Selection by prior attainment or aptitude and indirect social selection
Selection by prior attainment is currently also largely selection by social
background (Atkinson and Gregg 2004). This affects the social as well as the
attainment characteristics of the intakes of all schools in the area. One option
would be to phase out selective schools81. Another option is to require the
admission authorities for grammar schools to take effective steps to ensure equal
social representation amongst those who qualify on the 11+ test. If it is granted
that general ability is to be found in the same proportion in all social groups then it
would seem to be a duty under the current legislation on the part of the admission
authorities of selective schools to achieve a socially balanced intake. Steps that
might be taken are:
• changing to universal opt out methods of testing;
• where opt in methods of testing are used, effectively encouraging all
potentially successful candidates, especially pupils from under-represented
social groups, to take the test;
• not use additional selection by aptitude.
We have argued that selection by aptitude is different from selection by general
ability. Nevertheless, selection by aptitude not only offers a means of direct
selection, but it is also likely to lead to social selection by default. The great
majority of specialist schools do not use selection in order to fulfil their specialist
school mission. Just 129 schools in 2006 selected by aptitude that being 4.13% of
all schools and 6.2% of specialist schools. Some of the 129 combined it with
selection by attainment and the much more segregated Voluntary Aided schools
select by aptitude more than other types of school. Removing the ability to select a
proportion by aptitude is therefore an option to be considered to achieve fair
admissions.
5.12 Faith schools
We have seen that Voluntary Aided schools have socially segregated intakes. Part
of the explanation is that they more often use criteria and procedures that offer
direct means of social selection82. It is possible to require faith schools to enter into
banding agreements either in federations or authority wide. Another option is to
                                             
81 There would be a need separately to consider arguments for selective schooling that are not to do with the
admissions objectives identified here.
82 It would be of considerable interest to test whether it is the case that there is further indirect social selection
as a result of a greater likelihood that members of the Church of England or the Roman Catholic Church,
especially those who are active enough to gain positive references, will also be members of higher socio-
economic groups. The 2001 census data shows a small level of association between higher social groups and
Christian households as compared with those with no religion but it did not discriminate between different
Christian denominations nor does it provide any evidence of how active self-declared adherents are.
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require faith schools to admit a proportion of children who are not adherents of any
faith. Currently only 16% of faith schools give some priority in their
oversubscription criteria to children of no-faith and the criterion is at such a low
priority that in effect few children of no faith are admitted. In some cases however
faith schools allocate a definite number of places. Nevertheless 84% of faith
schools do not have oversubscription criteria that offer any places to children of no
faith83. This could be required of all faith schools.
5.13 Mixed methods under local control
It is unlikely that any one of the methods could or should be implemented on their
own or that any set will work for every local authority. There needs to be, in each
area and for each admission authority, a judiciously crafted set of arrangements
aimed at achieving the explicit objectives of fairness and better balanced intakes.
Legislation requires stakeholders in each local area to consult and to try to reach a
consensus. Each admission authority now has an explicit responsibility to work
towards fairer procedures and better balanced intakes. The Local Authority and
the admission forum have explicit responsibilities to act wherever they find
arrangements not to the benefit of all children. These are powerful regulatory
incentives to develop better local arrangements. Their effect depends however on
gathering data that demonstrates the state of segregation within a Local Authority.
It is not clear how far the means exists within authorities to gather this data to the
standard necessary.
5.14 Other considerations
We have concluded in this report that the system in 2006 was more efficiently
managed and better co-ordinated than in 2000 and that the co-ordination role of
the LA was important in this improvement. We also found that in some areas the
admission authorities had agreed that the LA should extend this role beyond the
national offer date. There is a need to gather further information about the
frequency and effects of this variation as a basis for reconsidering the guidance
and legislation on the co-ordinating role of LAs.
While the effects listed in 6.1.3 would seem to follow directly from perfectly
balanced intakes, they would be dependent on how schools managed their
internal organisation. According to the available evidence, better balanced intakes
should lead to an overall improvement in educational standards. If having
eliminated or reduced social segregation between schools, it was reintroduced
within schools the positive peer effects for those in the higher attaining streams
                                             
83 This does not mean that those faith schools do not admit children of no faith. If they are undersubscribed
they cannot refuse a place to any applicants.
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might continue to be preserved at the expense of negative peer effects for the
lower attaining children and as a result could still subdue the educational
opportunities for the most vulnerable children. There is a danger that practices
such as streaming and setting could result in severe social segregation (Boaler
2005 and 1997).
We should not presume that better balanced intakes would necessarily reduce the
vilification and stigmatisation of children, families and neighbourhoods (Coldron
2005b; Holme, J. 2002; Lucey, H. and Reay, D. 2002; Reay, D and Lucey, H.
2000). The effects cannot be separated out from how the school approaches its
task, how effectively it develops an inclusive ethos for example. Vilification might
continue (or get worse) rather than be reduced as a result of the moral anxiety of
parents from higher socio-economic groups and their perception of an increased
risk of ‘contamination’ from ‘rough’ pupils previously educated in separate schools.
School communities can be divided or cohesive and much depends on the
philosophy of education schools are able to practice.
In conclusion we should enter a note of realism. The fact that, despite the
widespread commitment to meritocracy, the already advantaged groups in society
successfully bequeath their considerable advantages to their children and that
education appears to enable and legitimate this process, is a phenomenon found
in all industrial societies (Marshall, Swift and Roberts 1997). The problem of social
mobility through differential access to educational qualifications is deep seated
and will not be solved by changes to admission arrangements. They however can
contribute quite significantly in conjunction with other social policies such as a
reduction in the currently very large differences in income, a reduction of child
poverty, investment in early years and policies to widen participation in higher
education. Fair and just policies on school admissions are an important mark of
commitment by governments to equality of opportunity and outcome.
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7 APPENDICES
7.1 Appendix A  Glossary
Admission Authority
The body responsible for setting and applying a school’s admission arrangements.
For community or voluntary controlled schools, the Local Authority is the
admission authority; and for foundation or voluntary aided schools, the governing
body of the school is the admission authority. For Academies the funding
agreement states who is responsible for applying admissions arrangements (in
most cases the Academy itself) but Academies can only set or alter their
admission arrangements with the prior agreement of the Secretary of State.
Admission Arrangements
The overall procedure, practices and oversubscription criteria used in deciding the
allocation of school places.
Admissions Criteria (see also ‘oversubscription criteria’)
The list of criteria an admission authority must adopt for its school(s) which are
used only when the school is oversubscribed to assess which children will be
offered a place. Once determined, admissions criteria, including the admission
number, must be published by the school and in the local authority composite
prospectus at least 6 weeks before parents express their preferences.
Admission Forum
A statutory local body charged with co-ordinating the effectiveness and equity of
local admission arrangements with a statutory right of objection to these.  Consists
of representatives of admission authorities, dioceses, the local community, parent
governors and academies.
Admission Number (or Published Admission Number)
The number of school places that the admission authority must offer in each
relevant age group of a school for which it is admission authority. Admission
numbers are part of a school’s admission arrangements, and must be consulted
upon with the rest of a school’s admission arrangements and be published with
those arrangements in the school’s prospectus and the local authority composite
prospectus. .
Banding (Fair Banding)
A system of oversubscription criteria in which all children applying for a place at a
banding school are placed into bands based on their performance in a test or other
assessment. Places are then allocated so that the school’s intake either reflects
the attainment profile of those children applying to the school, those children
applying to a group of schools banding jointly, the local authority attainment profile
or the national attainment profile.
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Catchment area (geographical priority area)
A geographical area, from which children may be afforded priority for admission to
a school. A catchment area is part of a school’s admission arrangements and must
therefore be consulted upon, determined and published in the same way as other
admission arrangements.
Children in Public Care; Looked After Children; Children in Care
Children who are in the care of local authorities as defined by section 22 of the
Children Act 1989.  In relation to school admissions legislation a ‘looked after child’
is only considered as such if the local authority confirms he or she will be in public
care when he or she is admitted to a school.
Choice Advice
An independent service commissioned by local authorities to support families who
need the most help during the admissions round to make the best and most
realistic choice of secondary school for their children.  Choice advisers assist
parents through the decision making process but must not take the decision for
them.
Common Application Form
The form parents complete and submit to local authorities listing their preferred
choices of schools when applying for a school place for their child as part of the
local co-ordination scheme during the normal admissions round. Parents must be
allowed to express a preference for a minimum of 3 secondary or 1 primary school
on the relevant common application form as determined by their local authority.
Local authorities may afford parents a higher number of preferences if they wish.
Composite prospectus
The prospectus that a local authority is required to publish at least six weeks
before parents express their preferences for schools. This prospectus must
include detailed admission arrangements of all maintained schools in the area
(including admission numbers and catchment areas).
Co-ordination/Co-ordinated scheme
Co-ordinated schemes must be consulted upon across all relevant admission
authorities and determined in the year prior to which they are to apply. All local
authorities are required to co-ordinate primary and secondary admissions for all
schools in their area.  Although individual admission authorities rank all applicants
in order of priority for admission, offers are sent out by the local authority on 1
March for secondary pupils and on an agreed date for primary pupils.
Diverse LA:
An LA was defined as Diverse if the number of autonomous schools were in the
range of 26% to 75%
First Preference First
Oversubscription criterion that gives priority to children according to the order of
other schools named as a preference by their parents, or only considering
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applications stated as a first preference.  The First Preference First
oversubscription criterion is prohibited by this Code.
Governing Bodies
School governing bodies are bodies corporately responsible for conducting
schools with a view to promoting high standards of educational achievement.
Governing bodies have three key roles: setting strategic direction, ensuring
accountability and monitoring and evaluation.
Grammar Schools (designated)
These are the 164 schools designated under section 104(5) of the School
Standards and Framework Act 1998 as grammar schools. A ‘grammar school’ is
defined by section 104(2) of the Act as a school which selects all (or substantially
all) of its pupils on the basis of general (i.e. academic) ability.
Home-School Agreements
A statement explaining: the school’s aims and values; the school’s responsibilities
towards its pupils who are of compulsory school age; the responsibilities of the
pupil’s parents; and what the school expects of its pupils.
Local Government Ombudsman
An independent, impartial and free service that investigates complaints about
maladministration of certain public bodies.
Looked After Children (see Children in Public Care above)
National offer date
The date on which local authorities are required to send the offer of a school place
to all parents of secondary age pupils in their area.  The national offer date is the 1
March each year, or next working day.’
Oversubscription
Where a school has a higher number of applicants than the school’s published
admission number each year. In this study we define a school as oversubscribed if
it has more applicants who have put the school as their first preference than the
school’s published admission number.
Oversubscription criteria (see also ‘admissions criteria’)
This refers to the published criteria that an admission authority applies when a
school has more applications than places available in order to decide which
children will be allocated a place.
Predominately autonomous LA:
Defined as 25% or less of an LA's schools are community/VC.
Predominately non-autonomous LA:
Defined as 25% or less of an LA's schools are VA/F/AC.
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Relevant Area
The area for a school (determined by its local authority and then reviewed every
two years) within which the admission authority for that school must consult all
other prescribed schools on its admission arrangements.
Schools Adjudicator
A statutory officer who is appointed by the Secretary of State for Children, Schools
and Families but is independent of him. The Adjudicator decides on objections to
published admission arrangements and variations of determined admission
arrangements. The Schools Adjudicator comes under the supervision of the
Council on Tribunals.
Statement of Special Educational Need (SEN)
A legal document issued by the local authority specifying the particular needs,
resources and provision required to support the child, and can include a named
school that is suitable for providing education for that child.
Waiting Lists
A list of children held and maintained by the admission authority when the school
has allocated all its places, on which children are ranked in priority order against
the school’s published oversubscription criteria.  There is no statutory requirement
for admission authorities to set up and maintain waiting lists but where they do
places must be allocated in accordance with the school’s published admission
arrangements.
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7.2 Appendix B  Examples of oversubscription criteria
7.2.1 Example One
Admission procedure and oversubscription criteria for a Voluntary Aided (Roman Catholic) Boys'
School in a metropolitan local authority in the North West
ADMISSION NUMBER- 215 PUPILS
TOTAL NUMBER OF PUPILS ON ROLL JANUARY 2006- 1324
(Name of School) is a Foundation School. The School has agreed to co-ordinate with the (City)
Children's Services admission arrangements. However, should the College be oversubscribed, the
Governors will apply the policy stated below. Applicants attending the primary schools listed in
Criterion 1 should be aware that if they do not select (Name of School) as a first choice then the
application will be considered under Criterion 2.
Procedure for applying to the College for admission to Year 7 in advance of the date on which Year
7 boys are admitted to the College.
In recent years the Governors have agreed to admit 215 boys into Year 7 each September. Unless
the Governing Body decides otherwise or there is an alternative legally binding determination the
annual admission number (AAN) for future years will be 215.
Where appropriate due consideration will be given by Governors to applicants reasons for applying
to the College.
In order to apply to the College for boys to be admitted into Year 7, parents must take the following
action:
Complete an application form in addition to (NOT instead of) the form issued by the Local Authority
and send it directly to the College before 3 November.
An application may be regarded as invalid if the form contains inaccurate information or if it is not
fully completed. The Governors reserve the right to inspect the baptismal certificate of a Catholic
boy for whom application is made before a place is offered.
If the application procedures are completed for more boys than there are places available, then the
available places will be offered according to the following criteria in order of priority.
Roman Catholic Looked after Children will be given priority without reference to the criteria.
CRITERION 1
In allocating places the Governors will give first priority to Roman Catholic boys attending the
primary schools of the parishes listed below if (Name of School) is stated on the Local Authority
Application Form to be the school of first preference. Such applications will be regarded as
"Criterion 1" applications. If a preference is expressed for any other school over (Name of School),
then the application to (Name of School) will be treated as an application under Criterion 2.
List of 11 Roman Catholic parishes.
Under Criteria 2, 3 and 4 the Governors of (Name of School) will use the Equal Preference Scheme
determined by the (City) Children's Services when allocating places.
CRITERION 2
After places have been allocated under Criterion 1, available places will next be allocated,
irrespective of whether (Name of School) is the school of first preference to boys attending Roman
Catholic primary schools whose parish priests confirm they are parishioners.  In allocating available
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places under this criterion the Governors will give priority to those boys thought most likely to
contribute to the published religious aim of the College, in particular, the provision of a Christian
environment in which pupils can receive a specifically Christian education during their College
years.
The contribution a boy would be likely to make to achieving the published religious aim of the
College will be assessed according to the system of points indicated below. The higher the number
of points generated by an application, the higher will be the priority of the boy concerned in the
allocation of available places.
(a) If a boy has made his First Communion. 2 points
(b) If the parents have other children of school age and they all attend Catholic schools. 2 points
If parents have no other children of school age. 2 points
(c) Points will be allocated by the Governors on the basis of confidential assessment by the boy's
Primary School Headteacher as follows (maximum 14).
Below Average Average Good Excellent
Effort in RE work 0 1 2 4
Contribution to the PastoralLife of the school
0 1 2 4
Likely benefit from Catholic secondary education  (Account may be taken of such factors as
parental supporting religious practice and the boy's own participation in local church activities)
0 1 2 4
Contribution to school liturgy 0 1 2 4
(d) Up to 12 points will be allocated by the Governors on the basis of the religious affirmation
completed by parents on the College application form. The Governors will take account of the
documentary support for the affirmation e.g. School RE reports, letters of support from priests,
individual teacher comment on religious commitment etc. (This is not an exclusive list of
acceptable supportive documentation). The Governors appointed to this task by the Governing
Body will not know the identity of applicants.
Maximum = 30: possible range = 1 to 30
(At their discretion the Governors may accept evidence that a boy is a bona fide Roman Catholic
other than confirmation by the parish priest that they are parishioners).
In the event of applications generating equal numbers of points, priority will be given to those
where the religious declaration has generated a greater total.  If priority still remains undecided
then reference points totals will be used.  Should priority still not be established, the tie break will
be the proximity of the child's home to the school as measured by the shortest walking distance
from the college's main entrance, with those living nearest being accorded the highest priority.
CRITERION 3
Boys of other Christian denominations, whose parents express a wish for their children to attend
(Name of School), may be admitted if the number of Roman Catholic children seeking admission
falls below the annual admission number, irrespective of whether
(Name of School) is the school of first preference.
Should the Governors receive applications from: Christian Looked After Children then they will be
given priority within this category.
The Governors have defined "Christian Church" as being any church in membership of, or sharing
the statement of belief, ("the Basis") of Churches Together in England.
The application procedure would be similar to the procedure under Criterion 2.  In this case points
would be allocated only under headings (c) and (d).
In the event of applications generating equal numbers of points, priority will be given to those
where religious declaration has generated a greater total. If priority still remains undecided then
reference points totals will be used. Should priority still not be established, the tie break will be the
proximity of the child's home to the school as measured by the shortest walking distance from the
College's main entrance, with those living nearest being accorded the highest priority.
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CRITERION 4
Within this criterion priority will be given to Non-Christian Looked After Children.
Boys who are not Christians may be admitted to the College if the number of applications in
Criterion 1, 2 and 3 falls below the admission number, irrespective of whether (Name of School) is
the school of first preference. In this case priority will be given on the basis of the religious
statement / affirmation made on the College application form. Should priority still not be
established, the tie break will be the proximity of the child's home to the school as measured by the
shortest walking distance from the College's main entrance, with those living nearest being
accorded the highest priority.
If a place is not offered and a subsequent appeal is unsuccessful, the Governors will not re-
determine an application unless there has been a significant change in the circumstances of the
application.
LATE APPLICATIONS
Applications received before the Governors have decided to whom places will be offered will be
processed in the normal way. Applications received later than this date will be assessed but will
only be successful if a place becomes available and if the assessment would have resulted in the
offer of a place if the application had been made at the "correct" time. At any appeal hearing, the
representative of the Governors will state whether a late application would have been successful if
it had been "on time".
WAITING LIST
Any places which are offered but declined up to 31 July in any year will be reoffered automatically
on the basis of the priority established by the oversubscription criteria. After 31 July no waiting list
will be maintained.
If you wish to apply for a place at (Name of School) you must complete a school application form
as well as placing the school as a preference on your Home Education Authority's Preference Form
/ Common Application Form.
In previous years (Name of School) has been oversubscribed for admission into year 7.
The closing date for the school application form is  3 November.
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7.2.2 Example Two
Admission procedure and oversubscription criteria for a Voluntary Aided (Church of England) Girls'
School in a metropolitan local authority in the North West
ADMISSION NUMBER- 140 PUPILS
TOTAL NUMBER OF PUPILS ON ROLL JANUARY 2006-884
The Governors of (Name of School) have agreed to follow the Equal Preference Scheme
determined by (City) Children's Services.
Category A1: Christian applications. In the first instance, 100 places will be awarded to girls from
committed Christian families - to be measured by reference to attendance, involvement and long-
standing commitment to a Christian church. The Governors have defined "Christian Church" as
being any Church in membership of, or sharing the statement of belief ('the Basis') of, Churches
Together in England. A minimum degree of commitment (i.e. two points) must be demonstrated for
admission through this category.
Category A2: Muslim applications. Up to eight places will be awarded to girls from committed
Muslim families - to be measured by reference to attendance, involvement and long-standing
commitment to a local Mosque and a local Madrassa. A minimum degree of commitment (80% of
the maximum points available) must be demonstrated for admission through this category.
Category A3: Other World Faith applications: Up to one place will be awarded to a girl from a family
that has demonstrated commitment to one of the other major World Faiths (viz Buddhism,
Hinduism, Judaism, or Sikhism) - to be measured by reference to attendance, involvement and
long-standing commitment to the relevant faith community.  A minimum degree of commitment
(80% of the maximum points available) must be demonstrated for admission through this category.
Category B: Academic applications. Up to 21 places (15% of the total) will be awarded by reference
to aptitude in Art, Maths, Science, Music, PE or Technology, to be measured by way of a test; the
number of admissions in each category will be determined in proportion to the number of
applications received for each category (subject to a minimum of 1, and subject to adjustment in
the Maths / Science category to ensure the correct total number of places are awarded). There are
five sub-categories; applicants may only apply under one of these five.
Category B1: Application by Aptitude in Art;
Category B2: Application by Aptitude in Music;
Category B3: Application by Aptitude in PE;
Category B4: Application by Aptitude in Technology; and
Category B5: Application by Aptitude in Maths / Science
Category C: Medical / Social / Pastoral applications. Up to 10 places will be awarded to girls with
exceptional medical, pastoral or social needs. Automatic places will be offered to:
1. Any girl in the care of the Local Authority (commonly referred to as "Looked After Children");
2. Any girl with Special Educational Needs whose statement specifically names (Name of School)
as their school; and
3. Any girl whose twin (or triplet etc) sister of the same age has been offered a place in the same
Admissions Round.
In all cases, need must be verified by way of a letter from a suitably qualified professional, unless
exceptional circumstances apply.  Should more girls automatically qualify for admission under this
category, the Governors will reduce the number of places offered in Category A1 so that they may
be accommodated.
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Applicants may apply through any or all of the three main categories (A, B or C) but may only apply
once within each category (so, for example, Category B applicants can only apply through one of
the Sub-categories B1, B2, B3, B4 and B5).
The places will be offered in the following order:
• Category A1 (if less than 100 places are awarded in this category, the remainder shall be
awarded to any unsuccessful applicants from category A2, in order of priority and subject
to the 80% minimum described above; if there are still places remaining, the remainder
shall be awarded to any unsuccessful applicant from category A3, in order of priority and
subject to the 80% minimum described above; thereafter places will be allocated to
unsuccessful candidates from any category, with those living closest to the school as
measured below given the highest priority);
• Category A2 (if less than eight places are awarded in this category, the remainder shall be
awarded to any unsuccessful applicants from category A1, in order of priority);
• Category A3 (if less than one place is awarded in this category, it shall be awarded to any
unsuccessful applicants from category A1, in order of priority);
• Category B (if less than 21 places are awarded in this category, the remainder shall be
awarded to any unsuccessful applicants from category A1, in order or priority); then
• Category C (if less than ten places are awarded in this category, the remainder shall be
awarded to any unsuccessful applicants from category A1, in order of priority).
Each category of admission has its own oversubscription criteria, as detailed below:
Category A1: Christian Applications: Information will be gathered from parents and an appropriate
religious official. A points system will be used to score each application form, as described in the
document entitled "Arrangements for Admitting Students to Year 7". Should two or more girls have
secured exactly the same number of points in each of the seven areas where points are awarded,
priority will be given to girls whose permanent home address is closest to the school. The distance
will be measured by the shortest suitable walking route between the child's permanent home
address and the main entrance to the school, using the same definition as is currently in use by the
Local Authority. Should two or more girls live an equal distance away from the school, random
selection will be used to determine which girl(s) is / are offered a place.
Category A2: Muslim Applications: Information will be gathered from parents and appropriate
religious officials. A points system will be used to score each application form, as described in the
document entitled "Arrangements for Admitting Student to Year 7". Should two or more girls have
secured exactly the same number of points in each of the areas where points are awarded, random
selection will be used to determine which girl(s) is / are offered a place.
Category A3: Other World Faiths Applications: Information will be gathered from parents and an
appropriate religious official. A points system will be used to score each application form, as
described in the document entitled "Arrangements for Admitting Students to Year 7". Should two or
more girls have secured exactly the same number of points in each of the seven areas where
points are awarded, priority will be given to girls whose permanent home address is closest to the
school. The distance will be measured by the shortest suitable walking route between the child's
permanent home address and the main entrance to the school, using the same definition as is
currently in use by the Local Authority. Should two or more girls live an equal distance away from
the school, random selection will be used to determine which girls(s) is / are offered a place.
Category B: Academic Applications: In the first instance, the test will be used to determine whether
or not aptitude has been demonstrated. If more girls have demonstrated aptitude than there are
places available in that category, the test itself will be used to determine who is admitted, with
higher scores having priority over lower scores. Should girls achieve identical test scores, the
points awarded under the religious criteria (if an application has been made under this category)
will determine who is admitted, with higher scores having priority over lower scores and with
Christians given priority over Muslims, and Muslims over those from another World Faith. Should a
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further tie-break be required, priority will be given to girls who live closest to the school, as defined
above. In the event that this is unable to separate different applications, random selection will be
used to determine which girl(s) is / are offered a place.
Category C: Medical / Social / Pastoral Applications: In the first instance, places will be offered to
any girl who automatically qualifies for admission through one (or more) of the criteria listed above.
Thereafter, priority will be given to girls whose applications demonstrate that (Name of School) is
the school best placed to meet their needs. Thereafter, if necessary, applications will be ranked by
the extent to which they demonstrate that (Name of School) will be able to meet their needs and
places awarded to those the school is most able to help. In order to demonstrate this clearly, need
must be verified by way of a letter from a suitably qualified professional, unless exceptional
circumstances apply.
Category A1: Christian Applicants: In the religious Category A1 (Christian applicants), all
application forms are processed by the school based on the objective application of points to
information validated by an appropriate leader at the church. A point scoring system will be used,
as follows:
(a) To award up to twelve points for attendance by the child at a main weekly act of worship in the
calendar year before the proposed admission into Year 7.
(b) To award up to nine points for parental attendance at the main weekly act of worship in the
calendar year before the proposed admission into Year 7. The Governors have defined
'parent' in the context of the religious categories to be a parent, legal guardian, or grandparent
of the girl for whom admission is sought.
(c) To award up to nine points for attendance by the child at the main weekly act of worship in the
calendar year prior to that considered in part (a) above.
(d) To award up to six points for parental attendance at a main weekly act of worship in the
calendar year prior to that considered in part (b) above
(e) To award up to three points for the degree of involvement in church life over the past two
years demonstrated by the parent.
(f) To award up to three points for the degree of involvement in church life over the past two years
demonstrated by the child.
(g) To award up to two points if, in the opinion of the leader of the church, both parent and child
have been as committed as possible to Church life given the family's circumstances.
(h) To award up to ten points (five for each year) for at least monthly attendance by both parent
and child in each of the two years preceding the calendar year considered in parts (c) and (d)
above.
(i) To award one point if the place of worship attended is an Anglican church, or part of a Local
Ecumenical Project within the Anglican communion.
A total of 55 points are therefore available to applicants in religious category A1 (54 points for non-
Anglicans). Applicants are then ranked in points score order. Should two applicants have identical
totals, the applicant with the higher score in (a) above would be ranked higher; should the two have
the same score in (a), the applicant with the highest score in (b) above would be ranked higher;
and so on down to category (h).
Category A2: Muslim Applicants: In the religious category A2 (Muslin applicants), reference will be
made to both the local Mosque and the local Madrassa. Applicants must demonstrate a minimum
level of commitment in order to be awarded a place. This is set at 80% of the maximum points
available. All application forms are processed by the school based on the objective application of
points to information validated by appropriate leaders at the Mosque and Madrassa. A points
scoring system will be used, as follows:
(a) To award up to nine points for attendance by a parent at the Mosque in the calendar year
before the proposed admission into Year 7. The Governors have defined 'parent' in the context
of the religious categories to be a parent, legal guardian, or grandparent of the girl for whom
admission is sought;
(b) To award up to 10 points (five for each year) for parental attendance at the Mosque in each of
the two years preceding the calendar year considered in part (a) above;
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(c) To award up to 12 points for attendance by the child at a Madrassa in the first seven months
of the calendar year prior to that considered in part (a) above;
(d) To award up to nine points for attendance by the child at a Madrassa in the calendar year
preceding the seven months considered in part (c) above;
(e) To award up to three points for the degree of involvement by the child in the Madrassa during
the two periods considered in parts (c) and (d) above;
(f) To award five points if the child attended the Madrassa at least monthly in the calendar year
prior to that considered in part (d) above.
A total of 48 points are therefore available to applicants in religious category A2.
Applicants are then ranked in points score order. Should two applicants have identical totals, the
applicant with the higher score in (a) above would be ranked higher; should the two have the same
score in (a), the applicant with the higher score in (b) would be ranked higher; and so on down to
category (e).
Category A3: Other World Faith Applicants: In the religious category A3 (Other World Faith
Applicants), reference will be made to a leader of the applicant's place of worship. Applicants must
demonstrate a minimum level of commitment in order to be awarded a place. This is set at 80% of
the maximum points available. All application forms are processed by the school based on the
objective application of points to information validated by appropriate leader at the place of
worship. A points scoring system will be used, as follows:
(a) To award up to nine points for attendance by a parent at a main weekly act of worship in the
calendar year before the proposed admission into Year 7. The Governors have defined
'parent' in the context of the religious categories to be a parent, legal guardian, or grandparent
of the girl for whom admission is sought;
(b) To award up to three points for family involvement in the place of worship over the year
considered in part (a) and the year before that;
(c) To award up to two points if, in the opinion of the leader of the Church, both parents and child
have been as committed as possible to Church life given the family's circumstances.
(d) To award up to 15 points (five for each year) for at least monthly attendance by both parent
and child in each of the three years preceding the calendar year considered in part (a) above.
A total of 29 points are therefore available to applicants in religious category A3. Applicants are
then ranked in points score order. Should two applicants have identical totals, the applicant with the
higher score in (a) above would be ranked higher; should the two have the same score in (a), the
applicant with the higher score in (b) above would be ranked higher; and so on down the category
(c).
Category B: Academic Applications: In the academic categories (B1, B2, B3, B4 and B5), a test will
be administered to determine (a) whether an aptitude has been demonstrated, and (b) to what
extent it has been demonstrated. Places will only be awarded in this category to pupils who have
shown an aptitude in the relevant subject area.
LATE APPLICATIONS
Because of the time it takes to verify information and / or to arrange for testing to take place, the
Governors will not be able to consider applications after the published closing date unless
exceptional circumstances apply. If the parents believe that such exceptional circumstances apply,
a covering letter should be submitted with the application form for the Governors consideration.
WAITING LIST
All unsuccessful applications for the normal round of admissions into Year 7 will be held in a
waiting list. The waiting list will be ordered in categories using the same criteria as for normal
admissions. In the event of a place becoming available, the Admissions process will be run again
to determine which applicant is offered a place. Normally this will mean that if the vacancy occurs
because of the withdrawal of a Christian applicant, another Christian applicant will be offered a
place. The waiting list for the normal round of admissions will be maintained until the end of Year 7.
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If you wish to apply for a place at (this) High School you must complete a school Application Form,
as well as placing the school as a preference on your home education authority's Preference Form
/ Common Application Form.
In the previous three years this school has been oversubscribed for admission to
Year 7.
The closing date for the school application form is 3 November.
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7.2.3 Example Three
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7.3 Appendix C  Missing value analysis for local authorities who did not
return first preference data
On average, the 106 LAs with detail on first preference rates tended to:
• have a bias towards authorities with lower population density. On average,
the population density for the included 106 authorities was lower (median =
12.4) than that of the missing 42 (median=20.9)
• be more representative of non-London authorities. But, within each of the 4
Local Authority types, a majority of Local Authorities provided details;
varying from 58% (Inner London); 62% (Outer London), 73% (Metropolitan)
to 79% (non-metropolitan).
• be more representative of first preference first authorities (81%) than. equal
preference/default ranking LAs (66%)
• be more representative of authorities that are not one of the 14 most
selctive. 6 of the 14 authorities (43%) are missing compared with other
Local Authorities (27%).
• have a bias towards authorities with lower proportions of autonomous
schools.
• have a bias towards authorities with lower proportions of FSM uptake. The
average percentage taking FSM for missing LAs is higher on average
(mean=12.7, median=11.6) compared to the 106 (mean=11.4, median=9.8).
• have a bias towards authorities with higher proportions of white pupils. The
average percentage of white pupils in the missing LAs is lower (mean=73%,
median=84%) than the included 106 (mean=82%, median=89%)
• have a bias towards authorities with higher proportions of pupils with
English as a first language. The average percentage of pupils with English
as a first language is lower for the missing LAs (mean = 82%,
median=90%) compared with the 106 included (mean=89%, median=92%).
• have a bias towards authorities with lower levels of cross border movement.
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7.4 Apendix D  Criteria in the composite prospectus for Coopers' Company
and Coborn school relating to specialist criteria.
The Coopers’ Company and Coborn School, is a specialist sports college. They do
not select by percentage for this however, the third admissions criteria is as
follows.
3) Children who demonstrate significant involvement
in activities relevant to the ethos of the School
(definition below).
Activities Relevant to the Ethos of the School
Significant involvement in activities relevant to the ethos of the School is defined
as:
1) Active and current membership of the brownies/ cubs, girls/boys brigade or
equivalent church or religious organisation for a minimum of 2 years.
2) Playing of a musical instrument for a minimum of 2 years.
3) Active and current membership of a Drama/Theatre/Dance group for a
minimum of 2 years.
Alternatively, participation and progression in an organised artistic interest for
a minimum period of 2 years.
4) Current Membership of and regular, active participation within a competitive
sports team (not connected with 1 above) or in individual competitive sports for
a minimum of 2 years.
Applicants will need to provide documentary evidence covering the time elements
of the above and copies of any certificates.
The Admissions Panel would expect applicants to provide evidence covering at
least 2 aspects from the above.
Applications from disabled children unable to comply with the above will be
considered by the Admissions Panel providing evidence of the level of disability is
supplied.
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